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ABSTRACT
HABERMAS AND ADORNO
ON DIALECTIC OF ENLIGHTENMENT
MAY 1991
ALEX PIENKNAGURA, B.S., MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY
B.A., MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
Directed by: Professor Robert J. Ackermann
In my dissertation, I argue that Juergen Habermas
misinterprets Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno's Dialectic
q£ Enlightenment . Habermas claims that Adorno and
Horkheimer universalize instrumental reason, and that they
hence undermine their own discursive-rational contribution.
He thinks critical social theory can only be reflexively
grounded if it recognizes as its pragmatic truth-condition a
counter factual ly conceived communicative procedure that
would be free of distortion. In my view, Habermas
dedifferentiates the dialectic of enlightenment. Adorno and
Horkheimer do not reduce thought to instrumental reason, and
they characterize enlightenment as a historically
differentiated process. They maintain that enlightenment
comprises both instrumental and critical thought, critical
thought being understood by them as determinate negation.
I interpret Dialectic of En 1 igh tenment as a theory of the
formation of the subject. Furthermore, I contend that
Adorno's Negative Dial ectics and Aesthetic Theory eschew
Habermas's mistaken reading of Dialectic of Enl ightenment .
They develop the latter's dialectical account of
V
subject! V ization. Negative Dia lectics and
advance against the backdrop of Dialectic
Aesthetic Theory
of Enl ightenment'
s
theory of the progressive instrumental ization of the self
the idea of an unregimented subjective knowledge and
experience of nature.
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INTRODUCTION
In his 1937 essay Traditiona l and Critica l Theory , 1 Max
Horkheimer contrasts the elasticity of critical social
theory with what he sees as a contemplative, passive, and
uncritical traditional theory. Critical social theory,
according to Horkheimer, stresses the historicity of its
object of investigation, that is, of advanced industrial
society. Moreover, he suggests, such a theory treats of its
object, not as a harmonious organic whole, but as fractured
by conflicting economic, political, cultural, affective and
cognitive interests. Horkheimer further argues that critical
social theory does not understand itself as if it were
independent of material processes, but that it thematizes
instead its own emplacement within the social division of
labor. For Horkheimer, critical social theory does not
pretend to remain neutral with respect to the antagonisms
besetting the contemporary world. Indeed, he claims, the
theory criticizes bourgeois society for failing to live up
to its own ideals of justice, liberty and equality.
Horkheimer avers that critical theory aims to disclose the
processes leading to the stultification of consciousness, to
the erasure of subjective autonomy, under Fascism and
Stalinism. Critical social theory does not claim to
contemplate immutable, ahistorical forms, nor does it posit
a monadic cognizing subject that supposedly legislates truth
and meaning. The theory understands itself as dialectical;
it highlights the dynamic and conflictual character of its
1
object; and it thematizes its difference, its critical
distance from its material conditions of possibility, that
is, from the social division of labor.
Juergen Habermas argues that Dialectic of
Enlightenment
,
which Horkheimer coauthored with Theodor
Adorno in the mid-1940s, differs radically from the critical
theory of the 1930s. 2 in effect, Habermas charges Dialectic
of En 1 igh tenment with a self-misunderstanding, with being
und ia lec t ica 1 . He claims that Dia lectic of Enlightenment
characterizes enlightenment reason reductively, that it
monistically depicts enlightenment as instrumental
r a t iona 1 i ty. 3 (Reason is instrumental if it serves merely
as a tool to determine what the most efficient means are to
achieve whichever ends. From the standpoint of instrumental
reason, the desirability and intrinsic value of social
formations, works of art, happiness, in short, of human
ends, are incapable of rational adjudication.) In contrast
to the interdisciplinary and historically differentiated
work of the 1930s, Dialectic of En 1 ightenment
straight jackets its object in ph i losoph ico-h is tor ica
1
fashion, Habermas asserts. That is to say, Habermas thinks
that Adorno and Horkheimer construe the process of
civilization teleologically as if it were unambiguously
headed toward a state of total instrumental ization. For
Habermas, Dia lectic of En 1 igh tenment'
s
undifferentiated
understanding of enlightenment rationality blocks
theoretical access to what is in his view the paradoxical
2
rationalization of modernity. Habermas maintains that the
modern epoch, which he aseptically defines as beginning in
1500, distinguishes itself from previous epochs, governed as
they were by mythical, religious and metaphysical
worldviews. The process of modernization, according to
Habermas, is a process of rationalization, 'rationalization'
being understood by him as a paradoxical phenomenon.^ On
the one hand, he views the process of modernization as a
process of social evolution toward communicative
rationality, that is, toward a communicative procedure that
would permit the noncoercive, consensual resolution of
theoretical, moral and aesthetic problems. On the other
hand, the very communicative processes that inspire
Habermas's evolutionary optimism give rise--or so he
claims--to non- 1 inguist ic media for the coordination of
social action, that is, to money and power. Habermas argues
that such media recoil upon their communicative conditions
of possibility, and that they hence threaten to replace
communicative action (which he defines as action oriented
toward the attainment of inter subjective agreement) with the
operations of a functional rationality. Dialectic of
Enlightenment, on Habermas's interpretation, misses the
potential inherent in modernity for communication free of
domination. Habermas seems to hold that Dialectic of
Enlightenment treats of Fascism, Stalinism, the culture and
entertainment industry, and positivist science and
technology, as evidence of the unambiguous triumph of
3
instrumental reason. As against Traditiona l and Critica l
Theory
, Dialectic of Enl ightenment no longer attributes to
bourgeois society the capacity for realizing its ideals of
justice, freedom and equality, Habermas contends. He
maintains that in conceiving of instrumental rationality in
totalizing fashion Horkheimer and Adorno lose sight of the
fact that the philosophical theses they advance are a
manifestation of noninstrumental thought, and that such
theses have as their condition of possibility modernity's
progress toward communicative rationality. On Habermas's
reading. Dialectic of En 1 ightenment is not dialectical after
all: it elides the contradictory nature of rationalization;
and in its undifferentiated phi losophico-histor ical
pessimism, it loses touch with its historical matrix, with
modernity
.
My dissertation advances the view that Habermas
misreads Dia l ectic of En 1 ightenment . I interpret Dialectic
of En 1 ightenment as unfolding a theory of the formation of
subjectivity. Horkheimer and Adorno do not ascribe
logocentric autonomy to the subject, but understand it as
molded by human interaction with external nature, the
dynamic of drives, the development of the forces of
production and the history of thought. According to
Dialectic of Enl ightenment , the process of the formation of
subjectivity is a process of progressive
ins tr umenta 1 i zation. Yet, pace Habermas, Adorno and
4
Horkheimer do not reduce subjective reason to instrumental
reason. Against the backdrop of the theory of the
instr umenta 1 i zat ion of subjectivity, Dialectic of
En 1 igh tenme n
t
spawns the concept of a noninstruraental
,
unregimented subjective knowledge and experience of nature.
In my view, Adorno's Negative Dia l ectics and Aesthetic
Theory
,
unlike Habermas's critique, capture Dialectic of
Enl ightenment's differentiated account of the process of the
formation of subjectivity.
In the first chapter, I stress the elasticity of Adorno
and Horkheimer's understanding of enlightenment. Though
they view enlightenment as always presupposing the
separation between subject and object, their discussion
remains sensitive to the historical transformations that the
relation between subject and object undergoes. And the
kernel of an idea developed in Adorno's Aesthetic Theory can
already be found in Dia l ectic of En 1 igh tenment : the
autonomous art of the bourgeois era is interpreted there as
the terrain, so to speak, wherein a noninstrumental
subjectivity is evoked. 5 For Adorno and Horkheimer art is
cognitively significant; that is, it cannot be abstracted
from the process of enlightenment. In Dialectic of
Enlightenment they present in condensed form an idea that
Adorno elaborates in Aesthetic Theory : insofar as art
relates to nature in noninstrumental fashion, it offers
knowledge of a possible subjective interaction with the
5
material world, which subjective interaction would be
subversive of instrumental rationality.
In the second chapter, I argue that Habermas's critique
of Dia l ectic of Enlightenment does not systematically adhere
to what I think are some of the main tenets of his theory of
communicative action. This theory claims to be centered on
a systematizing idea, namely the idea of communicative
r a t ional i ty. 6 Needless to say, I do not mean to suggest that
Habermas's critique of Adorno and Horkheimer is therefore
false. My aim is to take his critique of Dialectic of
En 1 igh tenmen
t
as a springboard for an inquiry into the
relation between his idea of distortion-free communication
and modernity. Habermas assumes that, in contrast to
Dialectic of En 1 igh tenment
,
his philosophy furthers the
advance of communicative rationality. I contend that he
fails to establish a necessary connection between modernity
(and hence, between his texts, which claim to capture the
essence of modernity), on the one hand, and the concept of
ideal speech, on the other hand. Habermas counter factual ly
pictures a rational communicative praxis, 7 which he
characterizes minimal istical ly in procedural ist terms, and
he thinks his counter factual assumption sufficiently stable
to warrant substantive claims about the rationality of
Dia lectic of Enlightenment . Since what he counter factua 1 1
y
imagines is a communicative procedure that would include all
possible rational users of language, I find it odd that from
the standpoint of his historically localized theory he
6
issues statements about the rationality of Dialectic of
Enlightenment that sound as if they reflected a universal
consensus
.
In the third chapter, I argue that Adorno's Negati ve
Dialectics and Aesthetic Theory develop the notion of an
unregimented subjective knowledge and experience of nature,
which notion is introduced in Dia l ectic of En 1 igh tenment . I
maintain that this notion must be understood against the
backdrop of Adorno and Horkheimer's theory of the formation
of an instrumental subjectivity. Negative Dialectics and
Aesthetic Theory avoid what I think is Habermas's error of
interpreting Dia l ectic of En 1 igh tenment as if it remained
fixated on instrumental rationality.
In the fourth chapter, I argue that Habermas
incorrectly assumes that his concept of reflexive grounding
and his claim to having transcended subject-centered thought
are sufficiently stable to support his view, which is meant
to be critical, that Adorno's philosophy cannot be
recursively grounded and remains entangled within the
paradigm of subject-centered reason. I conclude the chapter
and the dissertation by arguing that Habermas falsely
isolates Dialectic o_f Enl ightenment from Negative Dialectics
and Aesthetic Theory . Adorno's philosophy is committed
throughout to the view that enlightenment rationality is not
only implicated in the domination of nature, but that it
also opens up the space for the subject's reflection upon
the subjective conditions of possibility of such domination.
7
According to Adorno, the potential immanent in the
enlightenment tradition for a noncompulsive, unregimented
human experience has not, in spite of overwhelming evidence
to the contrary, been wholly extinguished.
The question of the relation among Dialectic of
Enlightenment
,
Negati ve Dia l ectics and Aesthetic Theory has
occupied a number of contemporary German philosophers.
Ruediger Bubner thinks that there is no connection between
Negative Dia l ectics and Aesthetic Theory. 8 Michael
Theunissen, for his part, reads Negati ve Dialectics in
abstraction from the rest of Adorno's work. 9 Herbert
Schnaede Ibachmaintains that Negati ve Dialectics and
Aesthetic Theory are interrelated. 10 Helga Gripp offers as
an introduction to Adorno's philosophy a volume that focuses
solely on Negative Dia l ectics . And as I claim in my third
chapter, Anke Thyen drives a wedge between Dialectic of
Enl ightenment and Negati ve Dia l ectics
,
and she leaves
Aesthetic Theory out of her discussion of Adorno's concept
of experience. The remarks made by these philosophers about
the question whether the texts mentioned above bear any
relation to one another seem to me quite casual. To the
best of my knowledge, the said question has not been
addressed in the secondary literature on Adorno's thought
with sufficient attention to textual detail. (I understand
that in his recent book on Adorno, Frederic Jameson offers
an interpretation of the relation between Dialectic
Enlightenment, Negative Dia lec t ics and Aesthetic Theory .
8
Jameson's book was published too late to receive here the
close scrutiny it deserves.)
My dissertation seeks to begin to illuminate the
connection among Dialectic of En 1 ightenment
,
Negative
Dia l ectics and Aesthetic Theory
. This endeavor is motivated
by Habermas's critique of Dia l ectic of Enlightenment . As I
argue in the following pages, Habermas mistakenly congeals
Dialectic of Enlightenment as if it were a suicidal attack
against reason and thereby ends up erroneously severing it
from Negati ve Dialectics and Aesthetic Theory. Habermas's
critique of Adorno and Horkheimer is fairly recent and has
so far received scant attention. In what follows, I do not
broach the question whether Adorno's philosophy is right. I
limit myself to arguing, rather, that Adorno's later works,
in contradistinction to Habermas's critique, do not fall
into the mistake of eliding Dia l ectic of Enl ightenment's
differentiated understanding of enlightenment reason.
9
and domination. In his view, Dialectic of Enlightenmen t
conceives of reason monistically as the means through which
the self seeks in the course of civilization to impose an
abiding identity on itself in defiance of the threats to
such an identity posed by the external world and inner
nature. Reason, on Habermas's interpretation of Adorno and
Horkheimer's theory of the formation of subjectivity, is but
a mechanism for mastery of the external environment and for
the pacification of the senses. Further, Dialectic of
Enl ightenment
,
according to Habermas, incurs a performative
contradiction, for--he thinks--it makes philosophical claims
that are not expressive of instrumental thought. Habermas's
theory of communication distinguishes between instrumental
and discursive rationality, the latter being a
counter factual ly construed procedure that would presumably
insure noncoercive communication. For Habermas, Dia l ectic
of Enl ightenment advances views that are susceptible of
discursive examination, and hence it stands outside the
instrumental totality he claims Adorno and Horkheimer posit.
Habermas accuses Dialectic of Enlightenment of remaining
oblivious to the performative contradiction he purports to
register. On Habermas's interpretation, not only does
Dialectic of Enl ightenment fail to thematize its own
rational intervention (in the sense of discursive
rationality), but in addition it articulates an aporetic
se 1 f - r e f e r en t i a 1 critique of reason. Dialectic of
Enlightenment's thesis that enlightenment thinking since its
11
CHAPTER 1
ON HABERMAS'S DEDIFFERENTIATION
OF THE DIALECTIC OF ENLIGHTENMENT
In Dialectic of Enl ightenment
,
Max Horkheimer and
Theodor Adorno write:
The technical process into which the subject
objectified itself after its alienation from
consciousness is devoid of the multiple meanings
of mythical thinking as well as of any meaning
whatsoever. This is because reason became a mere
means of support of the all-encompassing economic
apparatus. Reason functions as the universal tool
suitable for the manufacture of all other tools:
it is fixatedly purposive, as fateful as the
exactly calculated activity of material
production, the results of which stand beyond
humanity's calculation. At last, reason's
ambition to be the pure organ of all ends saw
itself fulfilled. The rigorousness of the laws of
logic stems from the univocal character of
reason's function--in the final analysis: from
the coerciveness of se 1 f-preser vation.H
In his textual discussions of Dialectic of Enl ightenment
,
Juergen Habermas seldom supports his criticisms by quoting
from Horkheimer and Adorno's work. The passage from
Dialectic of En 1 ightenment cited above, which passage--to
the best of my knowledge—does not figure explicitly in
Habermas's critique of Dialectic of Enl ightenment
,
is
unusual in that it at least seems to provide textual support
for one of Habermas's claims, namely that Adorno and
Horkheimer's theory totalizes instrumental rationality. On
Habermas's reading. Dialectic of Enlightenment characterizes
reason as having been reduced in the course of civilization
to an instrument for human self-preservation. Horkheimer
and Adorno's globalization of instrumental rationality,
Habermas maintains, erases the distinction between reason
10
inception has been implicated in and shaped by the
domination of nature aims, according to Habermas, to expose
all claims to the autonomy of reason as ideologically
deceptive. Yet, he suggests, the thesis that reason is
inextricably linked with power is se 1 f -des tr uc t i ve
,
for it
corrodes its own claim to rational validity. Habermas reads
Dia l ectic of En l ightenment as articulating a radical
critique of reason, which critique, he thinks, undermines
itself.
In the present chapter, I argue that Dialectic of
En 1 igh tenment does not advance a self-referential critique
of reason. Habermas's criticism assumes that Dialectic of
Enl ightenment understands reason monol i thical ly
,
reductively
as instrumental rationality. According to the
interpretation I offer in the following pages, Dia l ectic of
En I ightenment does not subsume the object of its critique of
the process of civilization under a univocal concept of
reason. Habermas's assertion that Horkheimer and Adorno's
theory is a self-referential critique of reason
dedifferentiates what this theory characterizes as the
dialectic of enlightenment. Dia l ectic of Enlightenment
views enlightenment as a process, which process it does not
locate in idealist fashion exclusively within the sphere of
consciousness. Rather, Adorno and Horkheimer understand the
process of enlightenment as being entangled in natural
history. That Horkheimer and Adorno do not isolate from
such a process a congealed, ahistorical and universal reason
12
can be gleaned from a fragment in the passage from Dialectic
En 1 igh tenment quoted above, the fragment namely:
"...reason became a mere means of support of the all-
encompassing economic apparatus " (Emphasis added.)
Hence reason, for Adorno and Horkheimer, is a process. To
say of such a process that it is dialectical is, for one
thing, to attribute to it an abiding kernel within the
different historical constellations of enlightenment
rationality. The abiding kernel of enlightenment thought,
according to Adorno and Horkheimer, is an antinomial
relation between the cognizing subject and the material
world. They argue that, in confronting the object, the
subject comes to subsume it under a universalizing category,
and that, in thus standardizing the object, the subject
renders it manipulable in the interest of human self-
preservation. Dialectic of En 1 igh tenment maintains that the
price the subject pays for gaining control of an
external nature it perceives as threatening is the
reification of inner nature. In order to preserve itself,
the self--for Horkheimer and Adorno—must postpone
instinctual satisfaction. Yet Dia l ectic of Enl ightenment
does not grasp the relation between subject and object in
transhis tor ical fashion as if it remained unchanged.
Horkheimer and Adorno think that the process of
enlightenment is governed by the progressive abstraction of
the cognizing subject from the material world, from nature.
13
Thus Dialectic of Enlightenment suggests that at the
Homeric stage of enlightenment rationality, the self only
incipiently begins to distance itself from its environs and
affectivity in order to survive. in Homer's Odyssey
,
Odysseus cunningly plots his escape from the cyclops by
exploiting the ambiguity of his name: on the one hand, this
name bestows upon him a unique identity; on the other hand,
it means 'nobody'. Upon being asked by Polyphemos to
identify himself, Odysseus utters his name; according to
Dialectic of Enl ightenment
,
he thereby both asserts and
denies his individuality. Odysseus assumes that Polyphemos'
friends will interpret his name as meaning 'nobody', and,
indeed, Homer portrays the cyclops who respond to the cries
of the blinded Polyphemos as being puzzled and paralyzed by
his claim that nobody attacked him. Odysseus, who for
Horkheimer and Adorno is the prototypical instrumental ly
rational bourgeois subject, realizes that his self-
preservation depends on the temporary denial of his
identity. In the course of denying his identity in such a
fashion, Horkheimer and Adorno remark, he comes to mimic the
cyclops who are portrayed in the Odyssey as devoid of an
abiding self. Odysseus eventually vanquishes the monster
that threatened him and his companions with extinction; that
is, he masters external nature. Yet he remains entangled in
the mythical world of the cyclops to the extent that his
victory presupposes that he take on their amorphous
identity. That his subjectivity is still weak can be
14
gleaned, according to Dialectic of En 1 igh tenmen
t
, from his
need to remain tied to his ship's mast during his encounter
with the sirens, lest the sensorial bliss that comes from
listening to their music move him to give up the goal of
reaching his native Ithaca.
Positivist science, for its part, typifies a form of
enlightenment in which the separation between subject and
object is more pronounced than in Homeric thought,
Horkheimer and Adorno maintain. On their theory, pre-
enlightenment magical practices provide glimpse of human
affinity with nature. With the scientistic colonization of
contemporary knowledge, however, all traces of such affinity
have been lost, according to Dialectic of Enl ightenment .
Positivism, for Adorno and Horkheimer, converts nature into
a substrate for domination, and it confines knowledge to the
registration of industrially prepared facts. Positivist
cognition, on their theory, is the activity of an
abstractly, that is, logically unified subjectivity, which
comes to be consolidated in the course of civilization.
Dialectic of Enl ightenment interprets the process of
civilization as a process of rationalization that is
impelled by the human species' anx iety- laden effort to
preserve itself. The subjective, instrumental ratio ,
Horkheimer and Adorno claim, confronts the external world as
a thing to be manipulated in the service of survival.
According to Dialectic of Enl ightenment , positivism differs
from animism, myth, magic, Olympic religion and metaphysics.
15
in that it no longer invests nature with meaning; nature is
reduced instead to a raw material for industrial production.
Horkheimer and Adorno argue that the positivist subject of
cognition solidifies into a mechanism geared toward the
operationalization of nature.
In short, they read Homer's Odyssey as documenting an
archaic stage of the bourgeois subject, whose abstract and
domineering interaction with nature is in their view
expressive of the predominant form of enlightenment in
civilization. And, for Adorno and Horkheimer, the cognizing
self that informs positivist science and technology is the
outcome of a process in which the subject increasingly
distances itself from the material world. On their theory,
the said process issues in the reification of inner nature.
Dia l ectic of En 1 igh tenmen
t
does not conceive of reason
as if it were atemporally fixed. Rather, it understands
reason as the historical product of the subject's
interaction with the material world. Dialectic of
En 1 igh tenment does not interpret the process of
enlightenment as having come to an end, though it does not
venture to predict its future course. Horkheimer and Adorno
reject any automatic equation of enlightenment with
progress. They hold that capitalism's almost fantastic
productive capacity opens up the possibility of a life
devoid of material suffering.
Yet, they argue, not only does capitalism fail to live
up to this possibility, but it also accentuates the tendency
16
inh 6 iT 0 nt in th© procGss of civilization toward th© loss of
th© human capacity to r©fl©ct upon th© ©nds of lif©.
Ind©©d
,
according to Dialectic of Enlightenment, th© very
aims of enlightenment rationality have become mystified.
Adorno and Horkheimer do not foreclose the possibility of a
turn away from the blind development of the productive
forces implicated in the domination of nature, and they
allusively conceive of an enlightenment reason that would
recollect, as opposed to mechanically repeating, the history
of such domination. 12 in claiming that Dialectic of
Enl ightenment is a self-referential critique of reason,
Habermas misses Horkheimer and Adorno's historically
differentiated discussion of the process of enlightenment.
Furthermore, Habermas's assertion that Dialectic of
Enl ightenment articulates a self-refuting critique of reason
has the effect of erasing the distinction between Dia l ectic
of Enl ightenment and its object: instrumental reason.
Dialectic of En
1
ightenment gives an inexhaustive account of
the development of enlightenment thought. Its fragmented
structure is consistent with its critique of systematici ty,
which systematici ty it conceives as the aim of instrumental
reason. Horkheimer and Adorno view the universal categories
of metaphysics and the formalistic logical and mathematical
apparatus of positivist science as instruments for the
systematizing, subjective domination of nature. Insofar as
systematizing, logically self-contained thought obscures its
somatic, social, and historical conditions of possibility.
17
It is ideological, according to Dialectic oJ_ Enl ightenment
.
Adorno and Horkheimer take Hegel's philosophy of history to
be a case in point, for--they argue--its proclamation that
the Prussian monarchy marks the culmination of the world
spirit's march toward absolute knowledge, toward the
identity between thinking and being, spirit and nature,
concept and object, is delusive. But not every aspect of
Hegel's philosophy is in their view tainted by a rational
affirmation of the real. Horkheimer and Adorno fashion
their writing after Hegelian determinate negation, which
they see as the most advanced form of cognition. They do
not offer a theory of determinate negation or, for that
matter, of dialectics; at best, they make some scattered
explanatory remarks. Their reasoning seems to be that
dialectical thought proper cannot be distilled, as if to
serve a methodological purpose, from its objective
(sachlich) medium. In Negati ve Dialectics
,
Adorno argues
that the assumption informing much of Western thought that
theory can somehow be successfully purified of all material
influences (be they historical, instinctual, economic or
cultural) is actually governed by the psychological need for
security, by the drive toward self-preservation. In
Dialectic of En
1
ightenment
,
Horkheimer and Adorno argue that
it is erroneous to draw an absolute distinction between form
and content. It is therefore no accident that they do not
clarify in methodological fashion the notion of determinate
negation implicit in their theoretical practice. But one
18
can glean from their work that they understand dialectical
critique as, so to speak, immersing itself in its object,
rather than rejecting the object in absolutist fashion. (in
my dissertation, l seek to concretize the previous,
admittedly vague claim by arguing that Adorno carries out a
dialectical critique, a determinate negation of the idealist
subject.) Determinate negation, according to Horkheimer and
Adorno, dissolves the solidified conceptual formations
characteristic of an enlightenment rationality implicated in
the domination of nature for the sake of self-preservation.
In Kant's philosophy, the notion of the transcendental
unity of apperception is given universal scope. Kant
conceives of the spontaneous, unifying activity of
consciousness in logical, and not psychological terms.
Dialectic of En 1 igh tenment argues, in contrast, that the
cognizing self cannot be viewed in formalist fashion as an
autarchic lawgiver to nature, as divorced from all somatic
content. For Horkheimer and Adorno, not only is
subjectivity immanently connected with the sensorial realm,
but it is also governed by the history of the interaction
between nature and spirit. Thus Kant's transcendental
idealism, on their interpretation, analytically sunders the
formal, transcendental ego from nature. Dialectic of
Enl ightenment's critique of the sovereign self posited by
idealism does not advance a crude materialistic doctrine
wholly destructive of the concept of the subject. On
Adorno and Horkheimer's interpretation, the idealist subject
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is the logical conclusion of the process of civilization,
that is, of the process by which an abstract, forcibly and
see this abstract self's distancing from the material world
as creating the space for critical reflection upon the blind
advance of instrumental reason.
Horkheimier and Adorno do not confine themselves to
thematizing determinate negation as the desideratum of
contemporary philosophical practice; the grammar of
Dia l ectic of Enlightenment is itself dialectical, without
ever aiming in Hegelian fashion at systematic closure.
Neither isolated concepts nor individual sentences fully
capture the referential field to which they are related. In
the present chapter, the latter assertion will be
illustrated by focusing on a frequently quoted sentence near
the beginning of Dia l ectic of En 1 igh tenment
,
the sentence,
namely: "Enlightenment is tota 1 i tar ian."13 This sentence
will be interpreted with reference to the immediate thematic
context of which it is a part and the claim defended that
its apparently conclusive, global characterization of
enlightenment as being totalitarian is relativized later in
the text.
For Dialectic oj^ Enl ightenment the law of
noncontradiction is merely a formalistic principle.
According to Horkheimer and Adorno, both the totalitarian
tendency of enlightenment rationality and its emancipatory
features are dialectically connected, which is to say— among
consolidated self comes to be formed. Yet they
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oth6r things that thay ara not inarely undarstood as
dialactical ly connactad but ara also materially linkad.
Although most of tha santancas of Dialactic ojE En 1 igh tanmant
ara constativa, thay do not tharaby function as apodictic,
uni varsal izing claims; for Adorno and Horkhaimar, not only
is an 1 igh tanmant rationality a historical procass, but
languaga too, and this of coursa includas thair own, is a
historical product. Dia l actic of En 1 igh tanmant doas not
concoct a naologistic Carman, and it adharas to contamporary
grammatical canons. Evan though Horkhaimar and Adorno
concaiva of discursiva languaga as having arisan in tha
coursa of tha struggle by the human species to dominate
nature and thus as having been molded by this struggle,
their critique of instrumental reason does not purport to
divest itself of the categories of a language it implicates
in domination. Dialectic of En 1 ightenment does not
understand itself as overcoming the separation between
subject and object that it argues is characteristic of
enlightenment reason's progressive abstraction from nature.
Yet Dial ectic of Enl ightenment does not simply reproduce in
unmediated fashion what Horkheimer and Adorno view as the
linguistic apparatus of a subjectivity bent on the mastery
of nature. Dialectic of En 1 igh tenmen t'
s
fractured textual
presentation [Darstel lung] and the paratactic structure of
its paragraphs subvert the systematizing logic it ascribes
to a formalistic enlightenment reason oblivious of its
genesis in the domination of nature.
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The sentence 'Enlightenment is totalitarian' mirrors in
its succintness, grammatical autonomy, and apodictic
semblance the imperious, yet artificial conclusiveness of
the factual assertions of positivistic science. That its
eaning is contingent upon the thematic medium where it is
situated, as I will argue below, disqualifies it as a
protocol statement, for it does not register a readily
visible f ac t--whatever this might mean. Insofar as Adorno
and Horkheimer conceive of determinate negation as corrosive
of instrumental reason and as opening the way toward a form
of enlightenment rationality cognizant of the ratio's
abstraction from nature, the exhaustiveness with which a
totalitarian disposition might appear at first to be
predicated of enlightenment in the sentence mentioned above
vanishes
.
In addition to stressing that Adorno and Horkheimer
conceive of enlightenment as a dialectical process and that
they eschew imposing systematic closure on Dialectic of
Enl ightenment
,
my criticism of Habermas's assertion that
the critique of instrumental reason engages in a self-
referential attack against reason will underscore the
following: Dialectic of Enl ightenment's discussion of the
process of the diremption of the archaic linguistic symbol
into sign and image; its materialist account of the genesis
of Greek metaphysical categories; and its use of the past
tense to claim that there was a link between such
categories and social domination. That Horkheimer and
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Adorno understand the process of enlightenment as bringing
about the separation between sign and image, read Greek
metaphysics as entangled in social processes, and
grammatically emphasize that the connection between Greek
universals and power is a past phenomenon, makes it clear
that Dialectic of Enl ightenment views its object
histor ically
.
Dia l ectic of Enl ightenment does not conceive of reason
monistically. Further, it does not fix the bounds of
thought and language after the fashion of idealism, which
elides the materiality of the human species' commerce with
nature. Dia l ectic of En 1 ightenment evades the aporia of
self-destructive se 1 f-r e f er en t ia 1 i ty with which Habermas
seeks to burden it: it does not dehistor icize language and
rationality, and thus it avoids hypostatizing its referent;
it does not identify itself with the power commitments it
ascribes to ancient metaphysical categories; and it not
does understand itself as if it were fully autonomous from
the material process upon which it reflects and by which it
is conditioned.
According to Dialectic of Enlightenment :
Dialectics. ..reveals every image as script. It
reads in the image's features the confession of
falsity. In extracting this confession,
dialectics disempowers the image and commits
itself to truth. Language is therefore more than
a mere system of signs. With the concept of
determinate negation, Hegel stressed an element
of enlightenment that distinguishes it from^Jhe
positivist disintegration he imputed to it.
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Adorno and Horkheimer secularize and politicize the
biblical prohibition on graven images: they argue that
premature attempts at picturing utopia defuse the critical
power of the idea of utopia. On their view, positivism,
like myth, idolizes facticity and faces it as if it were
immutable. Positivism, they claim, extols the formalistic
language of mathematized science as if such language were
the avenue toward true knowledge, that is, as if a
positivistically understood science were adequate to the
material world. According to Horkheimer and Adorno,
positivism is the tautology of a social world they think
has become progressively more administered; on this view,
positivism thus sanctions the prevalent social order.
Mathematized knowledge, Adorno and Horkheimer maintain,
mirrors the objectification of nature at the hands of a
human species driven to preserve itself. Dialectics, as
they understand it, exposes the positivist registration of
facts as a photograph, so to speak, of petrified nature.
On this theory, positivism makes manifest a process before
which it passively acquiesces, namely the enlightenment
process in which the self comes to rigidify itself on
account of the instinctual demands made upon it by
civilization and a commodified social world destructive of
use-values comes into existence. To be sure, Horkheimer
and Adorno do not conceive of determinate negation as
automatically dissolving every positive fact. The abstract
totalizing rejection of the world is, on their view, no
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different from any theodicy in that it falsely professes to
have access to absolute knowledge. Globalizing world-views
that abstractly negate facticity, Horkheimer and Adorno
aver, are feeble challenges against its deification under
the aegis of ancient and positivist mythologies.
Dialectics, as they conceive of it, locates change not
merely in the domain of thought but in the objective sphere
as well.
Indeed, in tracing dialectics back to preanimism,
Adorno and Horkheimer state:
When a tree is no longer described merely as a
tree but also as evidence of something different
from itself, as the locus of mana
,
language
expresses the contradiction that a thing is at
once itself and other than itself, identical and
non-identical. ...The concept, which is all too
readily defined as the unifying characteristic
[Merkmalseinhei t] of what it grasps, was from the
beginning rather the product of dialectical
thinking, wherein each thing always is only what
it is insofar as it becomes what it is not. 15
Perhaps the following remarks will elucidate the previous
passage. Adorno and Horkheimer offer an admittedly
fragmentary account of what they term the dialectic of
enlightenment, by which they mean, for one thing, to
underscore the historicity and conflictual character of
enlightenment. Dialectic of Enlightenment presents the
rudiments of a phenomenology of enlightenment, though it
most certainly does not purport to confer logical autonomy
or teleological foresight to the concept of enlightenment.
Horkheimer and Adorno object to society-affirming,
positivistically informed historiography. Unlike such
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historiography, they do not conceal their critical,
interpretive engagement with their object. But in
contradistinction to idealism, they do not dema ter ia 1 i ze
thought
.
Enlightenment, according to Adorno and Horkheimer,
already manifests itself in myth. Early rituals, they
argue, contained an idea of the event and process to be
influenced. They add that this theoretical element of myth
finds expression in the earliest epics. "...The myths that
the tragedians found stand already under the discipline and
power Bacon glorifies as the goal [of Enlightenment
knowledge] ...."16 ^nd the solar, patriarchal myths, as
linguistically developed totalities, are, on their reading,
expressive of enlightenment reason. "...Myth wished to
report, name, tell the origin; and hence: to represent,
hold [ f es tha 1 ten]
,
explain. ..."17 in contrast, according
to Dialectic of En 1 igh tenmen
t
,
the enlightenment element of
mythical thought and language, which, as logos , sought to
give narrative accounts of events, is jettisoned by
positivistic thought. Yet, even though myth incorporates
elements of enlightenment, it is not identical to
enlightenment's positivist form and industrial content,
that is, to contemporary enlightenment's mythological
adaptation to facticity. "...Animism ensouled objects;
industrialism objectifies the soul. ..."16
The sentence 'Enlightenment is totalitarian' seems to
bring the dialectic of enlightenment to a halt. An
26
imperialist drive to cover all of logical space might lead
one to impregnate the word 'enlightenment' in the previous
sentence with all the meanings phenomenologically laid out
in the text. 'Enlightenment', at the hands of Adorno and
Horkheimer, would appear to be a congealed concept, yet a
concept immanently too conflictual for rational
stabilization. On their theory, however, this concept is
determined by and at once effective of the domination of
nature, which domination does not take place in a
transhistor ical ly uniform fashion. Horkheimer and Adorno
argue that enlightenment is the conceptual reflection of
the human attempt at mastering nature, and that, as a
historical process, the domination of nature undergoes
change, becomes other than itself. Hence, for them,
enlightenment itself is a process. The grammar of
'enlightenment is totalitarian' conceals the dynamic force
they ascribe to the process of enlightenment; the subject
seems exhaustively to be subsumed under the predicate. If
taken in isolation, this sentence would appear to stand
outside the phenomenological movement of the text. If the
sentence did indeed engulf all the meanings that the
authors of Dialectic of Enlightenment attribute to the
concept enlightenment, deductive rigor would exact the
conclusion that determinate negation, which they associate
with a phase of enlightenment rationality and which they
claim to practice, is itself totalitarian. But it is
precisely the totalitarianism of Hegel's system, the fact
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that it imposes closure on the dialectical movement of
spirit, that Adorno and Horkheimer target for criticism.
Does their positive valuation of Hegelian determinate
negation sophomor ica 1 1 y contradict the claim that
enlightenment is totalitarian?
On a more circumscribed reading of the sentence, it
becomes clear that it stresses the claim preceding it,
namely the claim: "...Regardless of the myths to which the
opposition [to enlightenment] might appeal, such myths
evince their allegiance to the principle of destructive
rationality they impute to enlightenment insofar as in
their opposition to enlightenment they mobilize
arguments..." 19 Horkheimer and Adorno think that to
oppose enlightenment as being the principle of a
destructive reason (after the fashion of romanticist
critiques of the Enlightenment, for example) is at once to
step into enlightenment's own terrain, that is, into the
terrain of argumentation. Such opposition thus annuls
itself. To be sure, Adorno and Horkheimer criticize
enlightenment as tending toward the establishment of
universal abstract equality. They maintain that under
advanced capitalism exchange value tends to become
ubiquitous, invading the realms of art and thought and
molding human relationships. According to Dialectic of
Enlightenment, bourgeois justice pays lip service to the
principle of human equality, and capitalism concretizes its
own version of the principle in the form of abstract labor.
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Adorno and Horkheimer seek to expose the societal impulse
toward abstract equality as a coercive, dedifferentiating
force. Under the aegis of instrumental reason, they hold,
human beings tend to be standardized, that is, robbed of
their individual qualities. The sentence 'enlightenment is
totalitarian' gives expression to what for Horkheimer and
Adorno is the imperiousness of abstractive thought and
instrumental action.
Yet they do not absolutize (that is, dehistor icize
,
universalize) the truth-content of the said sentence.
Adorno and Horkheimer see in enlightenment rationality a
residue of the capacity for anamnesis, for recollection of
the natural medium out of which they think thought arose.
Enlightenment reason, they maintain, distances itself from
nature in order to render it a substratum for domination.
They nonetheless interpret the distance thus gained as
creating the space for reflection upon the violence
inherent in nature. According to Dialectic of
Enlightenment
,
such violence is not a thing of the past,
and it finds modern expression in economic exploitation,
cultural manipulation and an intensified instinctual
repression. As subjective nature's reflection upon its
self-mutilation, as human nature's remembrance of its self-
alienation, enlightenment is not encapsulated by the blind
instrumental logic that continues to drive scientific and
technological progress, Adorno and Horkheimer aver. They
anchor their resistance to what they view as the
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totalitarian force of instrumental-enlightenment's
domination of nature in an enlightenment theory that
understands itself as the anamnesis of reason's entwinement
with domination, that is, as the anamnesis of suffering.
On the theory advanced in Dialectic of Enlightenment
,
a
mechanized contemporary consciousness militates against the
actualization of the potential immanent in today's world to
relieve material suffering.
Horkheimer and Adorno argue that universalizing
concepts owe their imperialism to societal domination.
"...The universality of thoughts [Die A1 Igeme inhe i t der
Gedanken]
,
as discursive logic develops them, that is,
domination in the sphere of the concept, emerges from the
foundation of domination in rea 1 i ty...." 20 The social
division of labor, with its attendant power differential,
is the condition of possibility of conceptualization,
according to Adorno and Horkheimer. "The subject's distance
from the object, the presupposition of abstraction, is
grounded in the distance to the thing [Distanz zur Sache]
that the master wins through those that are
dominated. ..."21 Greek philosophical categories, their
aura of autonomy notwithstanding, are linked in Dialectic
of Enlightenment to the material circumstances in which
they arise. Thus:
The philosophical concepts through which Plato
and Aristotle represent the world elevated, by
means of the claim to universal validity, the
conditions they justified to the status of true
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actuality. They stemmed, as can be found in
Vico, from the Athenian marketplace; they
reflected with the same clarity the
laws of physics, equality among full citizens,
and the inferiority of women, children and
slaves
.
For Horkheimer and Adorno, though, to the extent that
reality remained incongruous with metaphysical concepts,
metaphysics— in spite of i tse 1 f--retained the possibility
of disclosing social injustice. On their theory, abstract
thought, though founded on the power differential between
master and slave, makes criticism of its own material base
possible, since it constitutes itself by distancing itself
from the said base. Universal concepts, however, conceal
their involvement in societal domination, according to
Dialectic of En 1 igh tenment . And in purporting to express
immutable truths, Horkheimer and Adorno imply, such
concepts feign to break their connection with history. The
dominant form of enlightenment, instrumental reason, is
nominalistic, Adorno and Horkheimer hold. In its
systematic formalism, they claim, it blocks conceptual
access to its origin in and indebtedness to the domination
of nature. Enlightenment rationality, on the view advanced
in Dialectic of En
1
igh tenment
,
tends to become a ubiquitous
instrumental calculus, thereby repressing the memory of its
genesis in the coercive pacification of the senses.
Adorno and Horkheimer's reflection on reason's
material roots taps the critical potential immanent in the
separation between subject and object to render Greek
metaphysics and modern positivism the objects of a critique
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that exposes their false claims to universality and
sy s tema t ic i t y . For Dialectic o
f
Enlightenment, their
obliviousness of their material conditions of possibility
bears the signature of their incompleteness. Dialectic of
En 1 igh tenment*
s
materialist account of the genesis of
concepts contributes to its attempt at a determinate
negation of their false positivity.
Adorno and Horkheimer use the past tense in their
discussion of the connection between Platonic and
Aristotelian concepts, on the one hand, and societal
domination, on the other hand:
Language itself conferred upon what was said,
upon the relations of domination, that
universality which it had acquired as a means of
communication [ Ver kehr smi tte 1 ] in a bourgeois
society. Metaphysical rigor [Nachdruck]
,
the
sanction of ideas and norms, was nothing but the
hypostatization of the severity and exclusiveness
that concepts had to assume wherever language
unified [ zusammensch loss ] the ruling community
around the exercise of command. In strengthening
the societal power of language, ideas became the
more superfluous the more this power increased,
and the language of science brought about their
end. 23 (Emphasis added.)
The past tense marks the fate that according to Horkheimer
and Adorno befell the old philosophical categories in the
course of a progressive disenchanting enlightenment
critique. The Enlightenment, they aver, detected traces of
animism in metaphysical concepts:
The En 1 igh tenment.. .recogni zed in the Platonic
and Aristotelian legacy within metaphysics the
old [demonic] powers, and it persecuted the
truth-claim of universals as superstition. It
claims to discern in the authority of universal
concepts the persistence of the fear of demons.
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It was through images [Abbilder] of such demons
in magic ritual that human beings sought to
influence nature. From now on, matter is finally
to be dominated without the illusion of prevalent
[waltender] or immanent [ innewohnender ] powers,
of hidden attr ibutes.
"...Concepts are to the Enlightenment what pensioners are
to industrial trusts: no one may feel secure...."
Dialectic of Enlightenment does not interpret the
Enlightenment's suppression of metaphysics as a purely
intellectual phenomenon but also as a process welded to
progressive industrialization, to the mechanization of
thought and nature. Adorno and Horkheimer diagnose this
process as leading to the self-destruction of
enlightenment
:
Enlightenment as bourgeois had long before Turgot
and d'Alembert positivistically lost itself. It
was never immune to the conflation of freedom
with the business of self-preservation. The
suspension of the concept [die Suspension des
Begriffes], whether in the name of progress or
culture, both of which since long ago
surreptitiously col luded against truth, gave free
rein to the lie. This lie could no longer be
distinguished from a truth neutralized as a
cultural commodity in a world that confined
itself to the verification of protocol statements
and preserved thought, devalued to the
achievement of great thinkers, as a kind of
obsolete headline. 26 (Emphasis added.)
Furthermore
:
With the relinquishment of thinking, which in its
objectified form as mathematics, machinery and
organization avenges itself on its forgetful
humans [an den seiner vergessenden Menschen sich
raecht]
,
enlightenment renounced its own
real ization.27 (Emphasis added.)
The very subjectivity that by means of calculation, cunning
and instinctual renunciation, sought to master nature, to
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differentiate itself from nature, for the sake of its own
survival, ends up objectifying itself, resembling the blind
action of natural forces, Adorno and Horkheimer maintain.
Dialectic of Enl ightenment marks its distance from what it
takes to be a mechanical enlightenment by plotting the
latter's course in the past tense.
Both Dialectic of Enlightenment'
s
historically
sensitive reconstruction of the origin of metaphysical
concepts in societal domination and its notion that
positivism mimics at the level of thought nature's fate
under industrialism suggest that the critique of
instrumental reason is not self-refuting, Habermas's claim
to the contrary notwithstanding.
A sentence from the chapter on the culture industry
might suggest that Adorno and Horkheimer globally conceive
of language as having been reduced in the course of
demythologization to an instrument for the uncritical
description of facticity. "...The blindness and muteness
of data, to which positivism reduces the world, invade
language itself [geht auf die Sprache selber ueber] , which
confines itself to the registration of such data. ..."28 it
might seem that the authors of Dialectic of Enl ightenment
incur what Habermas terms a performative contradiction, for
their own language understands itself as going beyond, as
critically confronting the world of facts. Yet only if the
said sentence is analytically sundered from its thematic
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insdium do 0 s it r0tain th 0 S0inblanc0 of apodictici ty.
Adorno and Horkhoimor problonia t i
Z
0 tho dobasomont of
languago in advortising, which thoy think robs words of any
moaning linkod to autonomous oxporionco. On thoir thoory,
languago is rondorod formulaic for the purpose of
mobilizing consumers to reproduce capitalism; words are
ins tr umen ta 1 i zed as abstract signs devoid of any meaningful
content; and the jargon of the advertising industry is
positivistically fitted to an economy that manufactures
demand for such items as breath deodorizer.
But Dialectic of Enl ightenment does not ahistor ical ly
fix the object of its account of language; in fact, it
views language as historically conditioned. Adorno and
Horkheimer take hieroglyphs to indicate that words
functioned originally not only as signs but also as images.
They maintain that with the division of intellectual labor
science and interpretation [Deutung] come to be separated,
and that their separation is reflected within language.
According to Dialectic of Enlightenment
,
science
manipulates signs, whereas the different arts find
expression in images, tones and the actual word
[eigent 1 iches Wort]. "...As sign, language must resign
itself to calculation; in order to understand nature, it
must renounce the claim to be like nature. As image
[Bild], language must resign itself to reproduction
[Abbild] ; in order wholly to be nature [urn ganz Natur zu
sein]
,
it must renounce the claim to know nature. ..."29
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Horkheimer and Adorno argue that at a later historical
stage scientific formalism—with its positivist,
scientistic scaffold ing--folds into the aestheticism of a
system of detached signs, while art resorts under the aegis
of the culture industry to a technology grounded in
positivist science to become the tautology of industrial
society. On this theory, the two separate bourgeois
spheres, science and art, end up dialectically clasping
each other.
For Adorno and Horkheimer, though, the process of
enlightenment also makes autonomous works of art possible,
which transcend the mere picturing of facticity. As I will
explain in more detail later in the dissertation, Adorno's
Aesthetic Theory elaborates on Dialectic of En 1 igh tenment'
s
admittedly allusive account of the autonomous art of the
bourgeois era. In Aesthetic Theory
,
Adorno thematizes what
he sees as the cognitive content of autonomous art works:
they are said there to give expression to the largely
unacknowledged history of the ci v i 1 izational domination of
nature, that is, to repressed suffering. According to
Adorno, autonomous works of art do not paper over society's
fissures; in them, the particular, what is not subsumable
under a system, is given expression. The mimetic
expressiveness of autonomous works of art, Adorno argues,
subverts the instrumental-enlightenment predilection for
systematic conceptual assemblages. He claims that such
works do not confront nature discursively or
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quantitatively, as if to dominate it, but that they instead
give expression to the qualitative diversity of the
material world.
Positivism and its aesthetic analogue, the culture
industry, mimic the industrial reification of nature,
according to Dialectic of En l ightenment . Its textual
layout aims to dismantle what Horkheimer and Adorno
understand as the coercive instrumental- log ical apparatus
informing positivist science and the culture industry. To
be sure, Horkheimer and Adorno self-consciously retain a
conceptuality rent from mimetic expression. Indeed they
maintain that the opposition between image and sign cannot
be simply conjured av;ay. Yet, they contend, to hypostatize
each element of the opposition in its (bourgeois) isolation
is uncritically to preserve an aestheticized science and a
technolog i zed art. On their theory, to absolutize the
distinction between image and sign, to deh istor ici ze the
said distinction, is to give up the space wherein criticism
of the instrumental-rational domination of nature can take
root
.
The language of Dialectic of Enlightenment alludes to
a mimetic, non-manipulati ve relation with nature, without
thereby summarily dismissing the grammar and categories of
the philosophical tradition to which the said text does not
cease to belong. Adorno and Horkheimer pay homage to
Western enlightenment by employing abstract concepts, that
is, categories that forcibly synthesize the sensorial
37
manifold; they deride it by refusing to reach theoretical
closure. Dialectic of Enl igh tenment both preserves and
goes beyond linguistic signification. In opposition to
nominalism, Adorno and Horkheimer assume that their
language is non-arbi trar i ly related to its object, which is
enlightenment's collusion with domination. But Dialectic
o£ Enlightenment does not confine itself to denotation,
which it transcends by endeavoring to give a voice to a
nature repressed by instrumental reason. Dialectic of
Enl ightenment's fragmentary presentation echoes the
fissures immanent in industrial society, which are papered
over by the said society's affirmative ideology. The
sentences of Dia l ectic of En 1 igh tenment are not governed by
the regime of deductive systematici ty , which for Adorno and
Horkheimer merely reflects at the level of logic the
division of labor, that is, social coercion. Such
sentences are arranged, rather, around thematic foci,
without the meaning of each sentence thereby being fully
determined by the linguistic constellation in which it
figures. The relative autonomy of each sentence aids in
Dialectic of En 1 igh tenment'
s
opposition to the coercive,
hierarchical ordering of thoughts. The paratactic
arrangement of the sentences of Dialectic of Enl igh tenment
subverts the artificial polarization of thought into
immutable, apodictic, irreplaceable truths--capi tal— and
transient, contingent, exchangeable examples— labor.
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According to Gunzelin Schmid Noerr
:
[ Hor khe imer ' s reflections beginning in 1939 on the
philosophy of language
] ...1 ink up with earlier
critique of ideology remarks about language,
especially with those that refer to logical
positivism's conception of language... .Horkheimer
radicalizes the earlier approach, turning it into
an aporetic critique of the concept [Kritik des
Begriffs]. The critique remains aporetic insofar
as, in grasping language as the means of
overpowering the object, it renders obsolete its
own standard of a language that is not
i ns tr umen ta 1 1 y circumscribed. Language, according
to Horkheimer..., inextricably contains both the
power to repress the particular and the force to
liberate the particular from such repression, to
reconcile the particular with the universal. Both
the negative and the positive sides of this
critique appear in Dialectic of Enlightenment,
though without mediation The thesis of the
universality of the context of delusion
[ Verblendungszusammenhang] carries with it the
complementary thesis that the spell over humanity
and things could be broken with one stroke, if
only the redemptive word were to be spoken,
Schmid Noerr thus offers a language-oriented analogue of a
criticism that Habermas, the vauntful executor of the
linguistic turn in critical theory, directs at Dialectic of
Enl ightenment by focusing on its understanding of reason.
Habermas holds that Adorno and Horkheimer universalize
instrumental reason, and that they thereby end up
undermining the discursive rationality that he thinks makes
the critique of instrumental reason possible. Schmid
Noerr, for her part, claims that Dialectic of
En lightenment totalizingly characterizes language as being
instrumental, but that it nonetheless ascribes to language
the capacity to overcome instrumentalization. She argues
that Horkheimer and Adorno present an antinomial conception
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of language, and that they leave the said conception
unproblemati zed
.
Yet Schmid Noerr's assertion that Horkheimer and
Adorno interpret language equivocally as having both the
power to excise the incommensurable, the particular, and
the force to liberate the particular from the grip of
discursive logic is mistaken. Dia l ectic of^ Enlightenment
does indeed reject logical sys tema t ic i ty , but it only
undermines such systematici ty per format! vely. It is also
misleading for her to suggest that Dial ectic of
Enl ightenment discusses language in contradictory fashion
as harboring both an oppressive and an emancipatory
potential, and that the contradiction is left unresolved,
for Adorno and Horkheimer do not go beyond allegorically
evoking a non-instrumental, mimetic interaction with
nature. Dialectic of Enl ightenment'
s
allusive moment is
not histor icized. Horkheimer and Adorno do not
conceptually crystallize their yearning for utopia, for
they take the conceptual language by means of which they
trace the process of enlightenment to be a temporally
stabilized, prosaic, disenchanted language. What they
yearn for would be a society free from domination, a
community of free individuals, and this— they maintain— the
light of reason cannot by itself render visible, let alone
bring about.
Horkheimer and Adorno secularize and politicize the
prohibition in Jewish religion against naming God in vain.
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Just as Jewish religion—on their interpretation--retains
the utopian bond between name and being by proscribing the
false use of God's name, they refrain in Dia l ectic of
En 1 igh tenment from attempting to describe true community.
o f En 1 igh tenment does not purport to erase the
distinction between language and object. Adorno and
Horkheimer take representations of the ideal society in the
absence of an emancipatory praxis to be vacuous. Like the
positivist registration of facts, such representations
enfeeble language and hence remain passive toward the
world's course. Dialectic of En 1 igh tenment suggests.
The dialectic of enlightenment, as it is characterized
by Adorno and Horkheimer, issues both in the ratio's
repression of its materiality, of its natural medium, and
in the division between mental and manual labor. Yet what
they see as enlightenment's self-reflection upon its
entanglement with domination (indeed. Dialectic of
En 1 igh tenment ) rests on conceptual alienation from the
fetishized conditions of contemporary social life, that is,
it rests on sublimation. Dialectic of Enl ightenment too is
implicated in the dialectic of enlightenment, for the
division of labor is its social condition of possibility.
Thus, in a sense, it is correct to say that Horkheimer and
Adorno's text is self-contradictory, though this is to give
expression to a truism. In a world in which Salvadoran
peasants, union organizers, students and teachers are
cannon fodder, according to the country's owners and to
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some in Langley and Washington, critical reflection is
inherently paradoxical, that is, estranged from its
material base. Both Habermas's claim that Dialectic of
Enl ightenment is corrosive of its own rational element and
Schmid Noerr's remark that it undermines its own discourse
by globally conceiving of language as the subject's
instrument for mastering the object rest on the assumption
that the proper role of philosophical reason and language
is to remain detached from their materiality. It is in this
light that Habermas inquires into the rational
justification of Adorno and Horkheimer's diagnosis of the
self-destructive dynamic of enlightenment. Yet he passes
over in silence the claim implicit in Dialectic of
En 1 ightenment that the abscission of the corporeal from the
mental is the result of a violent historical process.
Dialectic of En
1
ightenment seeks to contribute toward
preventing the compulsive repetition of the said process.
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CHAPTER 2
HISTORICISM AND RATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION IN
HABERMAS'S CRITIQUE OF DIALECTIC OF ENLIGHTENMENT
According to Habermas, the first generation of critical
theorists failed philosophically to ground the notion of
reason in virtue of which they held advanced industrial
society to be i r r at iona 1 .31 Habermas understands his theory
of communicative action as a defense of concepts of
rationality and a rational society. In his attempt at
laying firm rational foundations for critical social theory,
Habermas claims systematically to organize his philosophy
around the concept of communicative rationality. He
construes communicative rationality counter factual ly as a
deliberative procedure in which all participants are free to
ask questions, raise objections, propose ideas and courses
of action, and the like. In the ideal communicative
situation imagined by Habermas, that is to say, speech would
not be coercively interrupted. In Habermas's theoretical
system, modernity is interpreted as facilitating social
3 2
evolution in the direction of communicative rationality;
the subject's autonomy and moral worthiness are said to have
communicative rationality as their condition of
possibility;33 and social processes, cultural formations,
philosophy and sociology are all measured against the canons
set by the notion of communicative rationality.
Habermas thinks that his philosophy, unlike the early
critical theory, is reflexive, his reason being that it
recognizes the possibility of being critically examined
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under conditions of coercion-free communication. Habermas
conceives of truth as intersubjecti ve consensus and of
rational communication as the only legitimate avenue for
attaining such a consensus. Thus his theory of
communicative action is in his view reflexive by virtue of
thematizing the deliberative setting in which its truth
could be decided upon.
Habermas argues that Horkheimer and Adorno engage in a
se 1 f-des tr uc t i V e critique of reason, a critique he sees as
too radical to leave any ground wherein they could
rationally anchor their theory. He takes it to be the task
of a critical theory of society to disclose the potential
for rationality immanent in bourgeois institutions and
culture. Habermas claims to locate such a potential in
communicative action, which he defines as social action
oriented towards reaching inter sub jecti ve understanding. He
assumes that embedded in all communication is the
expectation of intersubjecti ve agreement. To the best of my
knowledge, Habermas does not distinguish between 'agreement'
and 'understanding'. His reasoning seems to be that ideal
speech would issue in consensus, and that the understanding
of speech-acts is inseparable from taking a position with
respect to their validity. Habermas conceives of
communication in terms of speech-act theory; he believes
that semantic analysis and the Chomskian rational
reconstruction of linguistic competence miss the pragmatic
and i n te r sub j ec t i V e character of all language. Speech-acts,
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Hab6rinas maintains, hava as their telos intersubjecti ve
understanding, for he thinks— they inherently raise claims
to validity that are susceptible of discursive evaluation.
Habermas characterizes discourses as avenues for the
problematization of the validity of speech-acts, which
validity is usually taken for granted in contexts of every-
day communication. Discursive argumentation alone, in his
view, is productive of truth, which he understands
counter factual ly as consensus among all possible rational
participants in dialogue. Ideal speech communication,
according to Habermas, liberates theoretic and practical
questions from pa leo-symbol ic and purposive-rational
distortion. 34 Discursive action, for Habermas, would make it
possible for speakers to achieve sel f-transparency about
their knowledge of the external world, their practical goals
and their affective needs.
Communicative action, according to Habermas, takes root
in the rationalized lifeworld of modernity. Habermas
defines the lifeworld as the domain of everyday,
nontheoretical understanding, and he thinks that in the
course of modernization it has freed itself from the
constrictive monopoly of religious and metaphysical world-
views. Further, Habermas sees the modern lifeworld as
having resisted colonization by the imperatives of sub-
systems of purposive-rational action. The lifeworld, in
Habermas's view, harbors the possibility of communicative
rationality— traces of which can be found, he maintains.
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within th6 housGhold 3nd in th© inGdia^S— against thG
progressive dissemination of non- 1 inguis t ic means for the
coordination of social action, against the dissemination,
namely, of money and bureaucratic power. Thus, for
Habermas, the ideal speech situation is not a vacuous
utopistic construct: he points to extant structures,
cultural formations, theories and per sona 1 i ty-types that
anticipate communication aimed at consensus. Parliamentary
democracy, the decentering of world-views and of
subjectivity, the universalization of morality and law
[Recht]
,
the increased communicative reflexivity of social
formations, the substitution of subject-centered thought by
the paradigm of linguistic intersubjecti v
i
ty ; 36 Habermas
takes these to be conditions of possibility for
communicative rationality. But in addition to attempting to
historicize the concept of the ideal speech situation by
locating the presuppositions of its genesis in modernity,
Habermas invests this concept— to be sure, a counter factual
category— with practical significance: the idea of
communicative rationality is to serve as a critical measure
of the rationality of current societies and cultural
formations
.
Indeed Habermas seeks to anchor his critique of
Horkheimer and Adorno's Dialectic of Enl ightenment in the
notion of distortion-free communication. Dialectic of
Enlightenment is found to be wanting by Habermas precisely
for failing to thematize the normative content, the rational
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potential of communicative action. Dialectic of
Enlightenment
,
according to Habermas, does not exit the
framework of the philosophy of consciousness, for— he
claims— it conceives of knowledge as the activity of a self-
centered subject presumed to be the sole legislator of truth
and meaning; and it conceives of labor as the instrumental
action .of an autarchic subject against a natural environment
that this subject deems to be threatening. Furthermore,
Habermas understands Dialectic of Enlightenment as
globalizing instrumental rationality. In his view,
Horkheimer and Adorno condense the course of human
civilization in ph i losoph ico-h is tor ical fashion into a
process of the instrumental ization of thinking and action, a
process the telos of which is--on Habermas's account— the
total triumph of a rationality incapable of problemat i zing
the ends of human life. A subject-centered conception of
knowledge and labor and the reduction of reason to its
instrumental form, Habermas argues, make it impossible for
Dialectic of^ Enl ightenment to recognize the potential for
rationality immanent in the lifeworld.
In what follows, I advance the view that Habermas's
critique of Dia lectic of Enlightenment displays fissures,
which call into question the coherence he ascribes to his
theoretical system. 37 Rational critique and historicist
understanding cohabitate in his discussion of Dialectic of
Enlightenment, but their union is not even sanctioned by
common law. According to Habermas's universal pragmatics of
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language, the understanding of speech-acts necessarily
involves critically determining their validity. The failure
of Habermas's critique of Dialectic of En 1 igh tenment
consistently to abide by the regime imposed by his
pragmatics of language casts doubt on his assumption that
this critique, unlike its object, promotes movement in the
direction of communicative rationality.
In The Entwinement of Myth and Enlightenment
, Habermas
writes:
In the tradition of the Enlightenment,
enlightening thinking was understood both in
opposition and as the counterforce to myth. In
opposition [to myth], because it posits the
uncoercive force of the better argument against
the authoritarian corapul sor iness of a tradition
interlocked with the chain of the generations. 38
The first sentence in the passage makes a historical claim
about the Enlightenment's self-understanding, a self-
understanding which in Habermas's view, incidentally, is not
marred by ideological deception. (Horkheimer and Adorno, in
contrast, argue in Dialectic of Enl ightenment that myth and
enlightenment are not entirely different from each other.
In Homer's Odyssey
,
they contend, the mythical account of
Odysseus' encounter with the sirens incorporates
instrumental-rational elements. Odysseus, according to
Dialectic of Enlightenment , cunningly plots his self-
preservation by having himself tied to the ship's mast. He
knows that, otherwise, the seductive power of the sirens'
singing would prevent him from ever reaching his goal, which
is to return to his native Ithaca. And the productivist
48
rationality prevalent in modern industrial society, Adorno
and Horkheimer maintain, resembles in its blindness to its
course and desirability mythical compulsiveness and
enclosure
.
)
In the second sentence, however, Habermas eschews the
question of how the tradition of the Enlightenment
understood itself. Rather, he interprets that tradition
from the standpoint of his concept of the uncoercive force
of the better argument. This concept figures in his
universal pragmatics of language, according to which neither
deductive closure nor a putative correspondence between
language and the external world define validity and truth.
Logical and semantic analysis, Habermas argues, fails to
account for the inter subjective character of all language,
whereas correspondence theories of truth are said by him to
be engaged in the futile attempt to exit language: facts,
for Habermas, are linguistically constituted. Truth, which
he understands as the result of an uncoerced universal
consensus, can only be forged, he believes, in the practical
circumstances of discursive argumentation. The notion of
the uncoercive force of the better argument is inseparable
from the concept of undistorted intersubjecti ve
communication. Habermas assumes that in the course of
discursive deliberations the better argument will win out.
He does not offer substantive criteria for distinguishing
between good and bad arguments. He limits himself to
imagining that in the context of free linguistic exchange a
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consensus will crystallize around the most persuasive
reasons, be they as they may.
But regardless of its merits, a universal pragmatics of
language does not automatically lead to the conclusion that
a communicative, discursive view of knowledge is definitive
of enlightenment. In point of fact, Habermas's own
discussion of Kant in Labor and Interaction^^ renders the
definition of enlightenment in terms of the uncoercive force
of the better argument problematic. In that essay, Habermas
argues that Hegel's Jena writings articulate, in contrast to
Kant, a subjectivity that is mediated, and not an isolated,
monological transcendental unity of apperception. In these
writings, Hegel, according to Habermas, maintains that the
self is constituted both through an inter subjective struggle
for recognition within the laboring process and through
communicative interaction. Habermas claims that, in
contradistinction to Hegel, Kant's conception of the self
posits a singular subject of cognition who synthesizes the
sensorial manifold and who obeys the moral law in
abstraction from the intersub jec t i v i ty of the ethical realm
[Sittlichkeit]
,
from the objectivity of spirit [Geist] , that
is to say. Habermas imputes to Hegel's Jena writings the
view that both labor and interaction are linguistically
mediated .
But if the theoretical and practical activities of
self-consciousness for Kant are not linguistically
i n ter sub j ec t i V e and the distinguishing mark of the
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Enlightenment were a communicative conception of
rationality, Kant's position as an Enlightenment philosopher
could hardly be elucidated. Perhaps communicative
rationality cunningly, surreptitiously asserts itself in his
work or, maybe, Kant does not belong in the tradition of the
Enlightenment. Habermas's passage on the distinction
between, myth and enlightenment articulates an aporetic
history: to the extent that it characterizes the
Enlightenment in terms of a universal pragmatics of language
that claims to have rendered the monological subjectivity of
transcendental idealism obsolete, it threatens to jettison
Kant's philosophy from the tradition of the Enlightenment;
yet Habermas does place Kant's philosophy squarely within
that tradition.
But perhaps Habermas's claim that enlightenment
thinking posits [ en tgegens te 1 1 1 ] the uncoercive force of the
better argument against the authority of traditional
knowledge does not refer to the content of enlightenment
philosophies. Perhaps Habermas means to argue that
enlightenment thinking distinguishes itself from traditional
knowledge by making discursively redeemable validity-claims
and that a central feature of enlightenment rationality is
that disputes about the truth of propositions and the
validity of moral and aesthetic claims revolve solely around
the cogency of the arguments offered in support of the
different positions. On this interpretation, Kant's notion
of a subject of knowledge that is not communicatively
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constituted would not be pertinent to the distinction
between enlightenment and tradition. Instead, only the
answer to the question whether the persuasiveness of Kant's
arguments can be discursively established, whether their
"uncoercive force" can be measured in the context of
undistorted communication, could determine whether he is to
be placed within the Enlightenment.
Thus if Habermas's category of the uncoercive force of
the better argument is to be the criterion for marking
enlightenment argumentation off from myth and tradition, the
assessment of whether such argumentation is indeed of the
enlightenment could only take place within the framework of
distortion-free deliberation. Habermas seems to think the
reconstruction of the history of enlightenment rationality
from the perspective of the ideal speech situation possible.
It remains a desideratum of his theoretical project,
however, to show that there is such a thing as an
enlightenment progress driven by the triumph of superior
arguments. Since the measure of the superiority of such
arguments, for Habermas, could only be given by consensual
agreement among participants in discursive communication,
his characterization of enlightenment thinking in terms of
the notion of the uncoercive force of the better argument
rests on the strange assumption that retrospective judgment
about enlightenment arguments can already be passed on the
basis of a prospective ideal speech situation. The
assumption is strange because, as is well known, Habermas's
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counter fac tua 1 category of an ideal speech situation
establishes procedural criteria for undistorted
communication; such a category, therefore, could not supply
substantive criteria for deciding upon the cogency of
arguments that have been made in the course of the history
of enlightenment thinking. Nor can Habermas's at once
prospective and retrospective procedural ism settle the
question whether such arguments are genuinely enlightenment
arguments
.
Habermas characterizes the Enlightenment in historicist
fashion, that is, in terms of its self-understanding, but he
also interprets it from the standpoint of his theory of
communicative action as being directed toward communicative
rationality. Yet as my discussion of Kant above suggests,
Habermas fails to harmonize his own paradigm of linguistic
intersubjectivity with philosophies centered on a subject
that they understand in abstraction from communicative
processes. As a matter of fact, his theory of communicative
action claims to have overcome such philosophies. His
discussion of Dialectic of Enl igh tenment wavers too between
a historicist account of its object and a critique launched
from the perspective of the notion of communicative
rationality.
Habermas claims that Dialectic of Enlightenment does
not cease to intend to have an enlightening effect, its
radical ization of the critique of ideology [ Ideologiekr i tik]
notwithstanding. As practiced by the Frankfurt School in
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the 1930s, the critique of ideology, according to Habermas,
the potential for a rational social order inherent
in bourgeois culture and institutions: it was precisely the
normative content of the ideals of freedom, justice and
equality, he avers, that permitted a critique of the failure
of bourgeois social formations to live up to these (their)
ideals’. The promise for a just social order held out by the
admittedly distorted rational content of modernity, Habermas
maintains, gave the critique of ideology an emancipatory
intent. In his view. Dialectic of Enl ightenment overtaxes
the critique of ideology: Horkheimer and Adorno's work, says
Habermas, turns the suspicion of ideological distortion
against reason itself. Habermas reads Dialectic of
Enl ightenment as conceiving of modern enlightenment
rationality in r educ t ionist ic fashion, for--he claims--it
collapses the distinction between rational validity and
power. For Habermas, Adorno and Horkheimer think the
differentiation between reason and a calculating
understanding no longer operative, the latter having
assimilated the former, since instrumental rationality
replaces contemplation about human ends with a thoroughgoing
operational ism. Dialectic of Enlightenment , he proceeds,
thereby uncouples its diagnosis of the process of
enlightenment from any affirmation of the normative content
of modernity.
But in implicating reason in the domination of nature,
Habermas contends. Dialectic of Enl ightenment incurs a
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performative contradiction: he holds that it undercuts the
rational, normative validity-claims it itself makes about
instrumental reason. He asks: if reason is inextricable
from power, wherefrom does the critique that makes such a
claim derive its normative force? Habermas subjects
Di^ l sctic o f En 1 igh tenme n
t
to a kind of critique of
ideology: on his view, the book's own rational, critical
intervention belies the negative instrumental totality he
says it posits. Habermas highlights Dialectic of
En l ightenment's philosophical theses as a residue of
enlightenment, which residue, he thinks, escapes the all-
encompassing power that this text attributes to a thoroughly
functionalized and administered world. Habermas thus holds
that the enlightening effect Horkheimer and Adorno's book
intends, its rational edge, finds anchorage in the validity-
claims it makes, which according to a universal pragmatics
of language are susceptible of discursive redemption. If
Dialectic of Enl ightenment fails rationally to support its
critique of instrumental reason, Habermas suggests, this is
to be explained by its failure to thematize and to recognize
the potential inherent in modernity for communicative
rationality. In point of fact, he argues that Dialectic of
Enlightenment conceives of reason in terms of a monological
relation between subject and object. And if Dialectic of
Enlightenment thinks the history of subjectivity as the
progressive reification of the self, the communicative,
intersubjecti ve constitution of the modern subject.
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according to Habermas, cannot be explained. Dia lectic of
En 1 igh tenmen t , read along the lines of Habermas's critique,
treats of self-consciousness as exhaus t i ve 1 y mo Ided by
civilization's instrumental intervention upon nature; views
the process of civilization as consolidating the social
division of labor; and in contradistinction to the analyses
of Marx and Hegel advances the idea that civilization
irrevocably consists in the compulsive domination of nature
and in the mastery of the majority of humans by a minority.
For Habermas such a diagnosis fails to capture communicative
practices rooted in the lifeworld, which evade
instrumental i zation, point in the direction of a rational
consensus and are constitutive of an autonomous ego.
Yet if it is indeed the case, as Habermas holds, that
Dialectic of Enl igh tenment situates reason in a monological
subject, and hence that it cannot rationally ground by means
of a universal pragmatics of language the validity-claims it
raises against instrumental rationality, his assertion that
Dialectic of Enl igh tenment is implicated in a performative
contradiction is incoherent: Dia l ectic of Enl igh tenmen t's
putative erasure of the distinction between domination and
reason, which reason Habermas claims it understands in
monological terms, could not contradict performati vely its
presumed communicative-rational, that is, discursi vely-
redeemable mobilization of validity-claims. Habermas's
category 'performative contradiction' could only make sense
in the context of his discussion of Dialectic of
56
En 1 igh tenment if he had established that Horkheimer and
Adorno's work employs the very rationality that it
presumably undermines. But, on the one hand, Habermas
constructs his critique of Dia
l
ec t ic of Enlightenment by
claiming to have located the latter's rational reservoir in
its discursively testable claims to validity. Dia lectic of
Enl ightenment would thus be rational in the sense of
'rational' Habermas espouses in his pragmatics of language.
To be sure, he argues that Adorno and Horkheimer remain
oblivious of this sense of 'rational'. On the other hand,
Habermas reads Horkheimer and Adorno's concept of
instrumental reason as if it were caught up in the
philosophy of consciousness's understanding of reason. As I
argue in my fourth chapter, Habermas thereby means that
Dialectic of En 1 ightenment understands reason as the
instrumental activity of a cognizing subject that purports
to legislate truth and meaning in monological fashion. Even
if the critique of instrumental reason were totalizing, as
Habermas maintains, it would be entangled in a performative
contradiction only if the rationality that he takes in the
end to evade instrumental i zation were the monological
rationality posited by the philosophy of consciousness. He
maintains, though, that the rationality mobilized by
Dialectic of Enl ightenment that does escape the instrumental
logic of positivistic science and technology is to be
understood as lying outside the framework of the philosophy
of consciousness, that is to say, as comprehensible solely
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in terms of the paradigm of linguistic intersubjectivity.
Habermas's argument that Dia l ectic of Enl ightenment is mired
in a performative contradiction blindly oscillates between
what he sees as Adorno and Horkheimer's obsolete perspective
on reason and the discursive rationality that, in tune with
his own theoretical approach, which understands itself to be
at the cutting edge of enlightenment thinking, he ascribes
to their normative and cognitive claims. This oscillation
remains unmediated in his texts critical of Dia lectic of
Enl ightenment
,
and hence it subverts behind the scenes the
attempt by these texts to position themselves against their
object as heralds of a triumphant, reflexive, enlightening
theory of communicative action.
Habermas's discussion of Dialectic of Enlightenment
vacillates unawares between a historicist treatment of its
object and a critique from the standpoint of a communicative
rationality with universalist aspirations. He argues that
Horkheimer and Adorno, in thematizing the self-destruction
of enlightenment rationality, give up hope in the liberating
power [loesende Kraft] of reason, but that they nonetheless
abide in the "now paradoxical labor of the concept." 41 He
avers that "this mood, this attitude or view [Einste 1 lung
]
is one we no longer share. "42 jf Dialectic o f Enl ightenment
relinquishes the critique of ideology and, in agreement with
historicism, is skeptical of reason, Habermas maintains,
this is to be explained in the light of the collapse of
bourgeois culture and institutions under fascism. Fascism,
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in his view, appeared to eviscerate the rational content and
normative potential of modernity and hence to remove the
ground wherein ideology-critique could find anchorage.
Dialectic of Enl ightenment
,
according to Habermas, merely
reflects the crumbling of bourgeois culture under fascism,
without being able to extricate itself from the ruins. Had
Dialectic of Enl ightenment problematized its skepticism of
reason [ Vernunf tskepsis] and pondered the ground why such
skepticism is untenable, he adds, it would have secured the
normative foundations for critical social theory and thus
prevented its own participation in the decomposition of
bourgeois culture under fascism. In other words, Habermas
holds that if Dialectic of Enl ightenment would have grounded
its own rational intervention by appeal to what he terms
'the validity basis of speech', it would have avoided
helplessly mimicking the apparent self-destruction of
enlightenment rationality. For Habermas, fascism marks a
temporary deviation from social evolution in the direction
of universalist law and morality; decentered world-views
destructive of the monolithic authority of myth, religion or
metaphysics typical of traditional societies; subjective
autonomy nourished by communication aimed at consensual
agreement; the differentiation of modern cognition into
separate spheres of validity, each with its own logic the
spheres, namely, of science, law and morality, and art; and
lifeworld resistance to penetration by non-1 inguistic
systemic media— such as money and power— that coordinate
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social action. In his retrospective analysis of the
circumstances in which Dialectic of Enlightenment was
written, Habermas deems the latter's putative mood, attitude
and orientation, and its presumed failure to resist the
decomposition of bourgeois culture under fascism to be
governed by a historical constellation, which he sees as
passfe: Stalinism, the failure of a socialist revolution to
materialize in the west, the lack of an autonomous
proletarian consciousness and the experience of fascism
explain, according to Habermas, Adorno and Horkheimer's
negative appraisal of the emancipatory potential of
enlightenment theory and bourgeois institutions.
Yet in spite of relativizing Dialectic of Enlightenment
in historicist fashion, Habermas also locates in it a
reservoir of discursive rationality, which his universal
pragmatics of language roots without historical specificity
in the intersubjecti ve r edeemabi 1 i ty of the claims to
validity advanced in speech. Habermas criticizes Dialectic
of En 1 igh tenment as being oblivious to the reflexivity of
its own validity-claims, which claims, he thinks, are
thereby left ungrounded. This lack of reflexivity prevents
it, he maintains, from rescuing the rationality immanent in
critical social theory from dissolution in the face of
fascism. This criticism draws Dia l ectic of En 1 ightenment
into the magnetic field of Habermas's theory of
communicative rationality.
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In upbraiding Dia l ectic of En 1 igh tenmen
t
for its lack
of reflexivity, Habermas's critique communicates with it, so
to speak, within the horizon of discursive rationality; in
circumscribing elements of Dialectic of Enlightenment within
a determinate historical constellation, his analysis
extrudes them from the communicative space wherein their
validity could be problematized. But in cleaving the
textual elements that he uno^-rstands in historicist fashion
from the conceptual terrain where, according to his theory
of communication, their validity could be assessed, Habermas
violates one of the tenets of this theory, the tenet,
namely, that the understanding of speech-acts is inseparable
from affirming or denying their validity. Habermas's
historicist relativization of Dialectic of En 1 igh tenmen t'
s
supposed pessimism about the liberating power of
enlightenment rationality evades subsumption under the
systemic gaze of his ahistorical concept of the validity of
speech-acts
.
In its dismissal of most of Dialectic of
Enl igh tenmen t's presentation [Darstel lung] as rhetoric,
Habermas's discussion pendulates again between rational
critique and sympathetic understanding. Habermas abstracts
what he takes to be Dialectic of Enl ightenment's rhetorical
form from what he suggests is the substance of the
"thoroughly philosophically meant text [der Anspruch des
durchaus ph i losoph isch gemeinten Textes]." Habermas
conceives of rhetoric as self-referential speech, in the
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sense that he does not think it capable of rational
thema ti zation aimed at inter sub jective agreement.
Rhetorical language for Habermas is narcissistic: it merely
celebrates itself and thus disobeys the regime of discursive
rationality. His critique of Dia l ectic of Enlightenment
tosses out the latter's presumed rhetorical shell and
understands itself as a sober assessment of the merits of
the two properly philosophic theses it finds in Horkheimer
and Adorno's text. This critique draws Dialectic of
En 1 igh tenmen t'
s
presentation into the horizon of the theory
of communicative action, and it at once takes a
hermeneutical leap in the direction of authorial intention.
The discardable rhetorical form leaves intact, according to
Habermas, the philosophically meant theses.
No doubt, in the 1969 preface to Dialectic of
Enl ightenment Adorno and Horkheimer intimate that they
conceive of their work as a philosophical tract, though what
they actually say resists Habermas's simplification: "Our
conception of history does not imagine itself to stand
outside history, yet it does not positivistically chase
after facts [Information]. As a critique of philosophy, it
does not wish to relinquish philosophy." 44 a first approach
to the previous claim suggests that Horkheimer and Adorno
draw upon the earlier critical theory's insistence that
philosophy cannot be grasped in abstraction from history,
from the social division of labor, indeed, from the
conditions of production. Both the early critical theory
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and Dia l ectic of Enl ightenment reject conceptions of
philosophy that view it as a disembodied, ahistorical
activity detached from social processes. Habermas's rather
diffuse category of a "thoroughly philosophically meant
text" does not do justice to the terms in which Adorno and
Horkheimer conceive of the relation between their work and
philosophy. Further, Habermas does not lay out criteria for
resolving the hermeneutical tension between his sympathetic
treatment of Adorno and Horkheimer's supposed philosophical
intentions and his silence toward their view that Dial ectic
of Enl ightenment'
s
style cannot be sundered from its
substantive claims. In the 1944 preface, they state: "If
the public realm finds itself in a condition in which
thought turns into a commodity and language into its praise,
the attempt to trace this depravity must refuse allegiance
to the received linguistic and conceptual standards, lest
the world-historical consequences of this depravity overtake
any such attempt." 45 Habermas does not explain why he takes
authorial intention to be hermeneutically significant in
some instances and not in others. And his foray into the
terrain of a hermeneutics of authorially determined meaning
fails to adhere to the rational strictures that rule his
critique of Dia l ectic of En l ightenment's presentation.
Despite this critique, Habermas himself employs
rhetorical language in his discussion of what he takes to be
Dialectic of En l ightenment's position with respect to
modernity. As I will argue shortly, Habermas's rhetorical
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language is incongruent with the language of his critique of
Dialectic of Enl ightenment* s picture of modernity, a
critique which is carried out from the standpoint of his
notion of communicative rationality.
In spite of the occasional Rankean detours, Habermas
criticizes what he sees as Dia l ectic of Enlightenment's
diagnosis of modernity. Habermas argues that Dialectic of
Enl ightenment does not do justice to the cultural content of
modernity, for, in his view, it fails to register
modernity's differentiation into separate spheres of
validity. Following Max Weber, Habermas understands
modernity as compartmentalized into the realms of science,
law and morality, and art. According to Habermas, each
realm is governed by its own principles of validation.
Dialectic of Enl ightenment
,
Habermas argues, thus ignores
the potential for communicative understanding inherent in
the process of the rationalization of world-views away from
the closed cosmogonic-mythical conception of the world
typical of traditional societies. Such a conception, he
maintains, did not distinguish between nature and culture,
and it conflated sign, meaning and referent. Enlightenment,
for Habermas, explicitly maps out the bounds of the external
world, intersubjectivity and inner nature. Insofar as for
Habermas the progress of enlightenment in the course of
modernization issues in the three distinct spheres of
validity just mentioned, it paves the way toward an
admittedly counter factual ly construed ideal speech situation
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in which rational speakers would achieve clarity about
theoretical matters, practical aims, and aesthetically
nurtured and interpreted inner needs. According to
Habermas, the communicative structures immanent in the
lifeworld, which in his view holds out the promise of
distortion-free communication, facilitate access to the
reflexive problematization of modern culture, which access
is blocked under the mythological conflation of nature and
culture. Dialectic of Enl ightenment's thesis that myth and
enlightenment are entwined is at odds with Habermas's belief
in the enlightening effect of the cultural differentiation
of modernity. He conceives of Dialectic of Enlightenment as
immobilizing modern science and technology, morality and
law, and art, under the sign of the mythological force of
instrumental reason.
Yet rhetorical figures creep into Habermas's critique
of what he characterizes as Adorno and Horkheimer's account
of modernity. Habermas rhetorically and adventitiously
reads into Dial ectic of Enl igh tenment attitudes and moods.
Such attitudes and moods, that is to say, are not
articulated in Dialectic of Enl ightenment . I would have
thought that the linguistic turn in philosophy, which
Habermas does take, is incompatible with the translation of
propositions into unstated feelings. In his interpretation
of Dialectic of Enlightenment , Habermas practices
d i s tor t ion- f r ee communication in reverse. From Horkheimer
and Adorno's claim that Nietzsche and Sade correctly see a
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formal, subjective, instrumental rationality as not standing
closer to morality than to immorality, Habermas derives the
conclusion that their analysis sarcastically agrees with
ethical skepticism. 46 Furthermore, he attributes to
Dialectic of Enlightenment
,
in connection with its critique
of the culture industry, "powerless rage over the ironic
rightness [Gerechtigkei t] of the presumably non-re v isable
judgment that mass culture crystallizes around an art that
was always ideo log ica 1 4
7
But if the authors of Dia l ectic of Enlightenment had
indeed been rendered powerless by rage over the
commodification of bourgeois culture, the chapter on the
culture industry would not have come into existence. On the
other hand, if the chapter were expressive of powerless
rage— be that as it may--its effect upon Habermas, who was
obviously mobilized by it into publishing a rejoinder, would
remain a mystery. Habermas, the linguistic turn shepherd
who claims to lead critical social theory away from
mentalistic pastures in the direction of communicative
intersubjectivity, seems to hear diabolical laughter and mad
ravings, in tune with what appears to be a veritable private
language of his, upon coming into contact with some passages
in Dialectic of Enlightenment . Though he patr iar cha 1 1
y
dismisses its presentation as being rhetorical, and hence as
lying outside the bounds of discursive rationality, as if
Dialectic of En 1 igh tenment*
s
claim that its form and content
are interwoven were not worthy of dialogical interpretation.
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Habermas's own critique exits discursive space when it tries
to transubstantiate Horkheimer and Adorno's theses on
morality and culture into moods.
In a similar vein, Habermas characterizes Dialectic of
Enl ightenment's defense of the practice of determinate
negation as if it were a kind of conjuration. He maintains
that Dia l ectic of Enlightenment shares with Nietzsche's work
the radicalization of the critique of ideology. Yet, he
argues, whereas Nietzsche embraces the consequence of such a
radicalization--namely, the dissolution of reason--and
resorts to the aestheticist glorification of the will to
power, Horkheimer and Adorno, exercise determinate negation
in ^ hoc fashion. For Habermas, the critique of
instrumental reason mobilizes the critique of ideology
against reason i tse 1 f-- insofar as it collapses the
distinction between power and rational validity— and thereby
renounces theory. Although he does not elucidate at this
juncture his sense of 'theory', he undoubtedly means a
reflexive system that recognizes the possibility of
discursively grounding its validity claims. Habermas sees
in determinate negation a useless remnant of the debris
supposedly left by what he takes to be Dialectic of
Enl ightenment's self-destructive account of the
operationalization of reason.
Yet the very passage, which Habermas quotes, where
Horkheimer and Adorno thematize determinate negation
expressly points to a dialectical language that they think
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is the vehicle, so to speak, of determinate negation. The
conception of such a language inherent in Adorno and
Horkheimer’s discussion bears no obvious resemblance to
magical incantations. They write:
Dialectics. ..reveals every image as script. It
reads in the image's features the confession of
falsity. In extracting this confession,
dialectics disempowers the image and commits
itself to truth. Language is therefore more than
a mere system of signs. With the concept of
determinate negation, Hegel stressed an element of
enlightenment that distinguishes it from the
positivist disintegration he imputed to it.^8
I would suggest the following interpretation of the
previous passage. Dia l ectic of En 1 ightenment reads the
proscription by Jewish religion against false
representations of God--that is, against ido la tr y--and
against naming God in vain as a progressive enlightenment
step, for, on Horkheimer and Adorno's theory, this
proscription is destructive of specious harmonies between
facticity and any notions of what would transcend it. They
secularize the prohibition on graven images and on the
misuse of God's name by refusing to depict a just society.
In their view, premature, artificial anticipations of a
social order free from domination enfeeble the critique of
present conditions, and they are hence corrosive of truth.
Dialectic of Enlightenment conceives of positivist science
as an image, a photographic reproduction, as it were, of
advanced capitalist society. Adorno and Horkheimer
characterize the process of enlightenment, which they
believe issues in the establishment of a hegemonizing
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positivist rationality, as the progressive abstraction of
the cognizing subject from the material world. This
process, in their view, renders the external world devoid of
meaning and, therefore, susceptible to unbridled
instrumental manipulation. They maintain that the
mathemat i za t ion of knowledge under the aegis of positivism
mirrors the abstractness of a nature subjected to industrial
domination and of capitalist social relations governed by
exchange value. According to Dia l ectic of Enlightenment
,
positivist thought merely pictures facticity, as it were;
such thought verifies without spanning any critical distance
what is already extant. A dialectical language that "is
more than a mere system of signs," Horkheimer and Adorno
suggest, problemat i zes the harmonious relation, the
congruency assumed by positivism between a formalistic
scientific knowledge and external nature. To the extent
that they view such a problemati zat ion in terms of
determinate negation, they reject abstract, global
dismissals of science and industr ial ism.49
Positivist science's inability to grasp by means of its own
categorial apparatus its location and role within the social
division of labor is for Adorno and Horkheimer an index of
the falsity of its image of reality. Dialectic of
Enlightenment understands itself as transcending
positivism's petrified, formalist, abstract categorial
framework by examining the development of enlightenment
knowledge within the context of the process of civilization.
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Ths positivist CGgistration of facts, according to
Horkheimer and Adorno, is oblivious of the price exacted by
enlightenment progress, that is, of the objectification of
the self, the senselessness of production for the sake of
production, the fracturing of society under the aegis of
domination, capitalist exploitation, the commodification of
culture, and the release of genocidal violence. It would be
platitudinous to point out that Horkheimer and Adorno's
dialectical critique of positivism relies upon conceptual
and linguistic means, were it not for Habermas's peculiar
attempt at converting the language of determinate negation
into some sort of chant typical, perhaps, of magical rites.
Habermas catapults determinate negation from the space of
discursive rationality by characterizing it as if it were
like a conjuration. Paradoxically, he also domesticates the
alien spirits with which he associates Adorno and
Horkheimer's dialectics precisely by articulating
determinate negation's supposed abandonment of theory. His
critique of Dialectic of En 1 igh tenment fails to clarify the
basis upon which it can decode textual material that it
itself has declared to lie outside the realm of discourse.
Habermas's discussion of Dialectic of Enlightenment
fails to acknowledge its own deviation from the systematic
tenets that inform the notion of communicative rationality.
To be sure, Habermas does not exempt his own discourse from
his distinction between genesis and validity^O. His theory
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of communicative action understands itself as a contribution
toward ideal speech, not as the instantiation of such
speech. The empirical circumstances in which his discourse
lays out the ideal speech situation, that is, this
discourse's institutional conditions of possibility, the
polemics that inform it, the professional jealousies that
attach to it, its inconsistencies, obscurities and
contradictions, do not vitiate— Habermas suggests— the
validity of the concept and practice it advocates, the
validity, namely, of communicative rationality. This is so
because validity for Habermas can ultimately be established
only under ideal discursive conditions. From the standpoint
of Habermas's consensus theory of truth, the truth of his
critique of Dia l ectic of Enl igh tenment could only be
ascertained in the course of universal rational
deliberation. But it remains a desideratum of Habermas's
theory of communicative action to establish, rather than
merely assuming, a connection between the modern lifeworld
and pro-enlightenment discourses, on the one hand, and the
concept of the ideal speech situation, on the other. In
other words, that such modern bourgeois institutions as the
family, the mass media, parliamentary democracy, Habermas's
philosophy, a decentered subjectivity, a desacralized social
sphere, and so forth, might point in the direction of
communication aimed at consensus--and Habermas thinks that
they do—does not by any means settle the question whether
the practices that append to these institutions are indeed
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conducive to the instantiation of communicative rationality.
That question might very well not be answerable a priori.
But in any event, Habermas's analysis leaves open the
possibility that the practices and institutions he thinks
anticipatory of ideal speech could postpone, perhaps
indefinitely, the attainment of his cherished goal.
(Claus Offe's work on the separation between form and
content in liberal democracy suggests that raising such a
possibility is not idle speculation. 51 According to Offe,
welfare-state liberalism conceives of society and the state
as connected by a bidirectional informational bridge. That
this conception is today ideological, Offe argues, becomes
clear as soon as one reflects upon the state's glorification
of and dependence on so-called experts, its practice of
behind-the-scenes decision making, and the thoroughly
undemocratic character of a politics governed by influence-
peddling. Further, Offe points to the extraparliamentary
forms of opposition during the late 1960s in the Federal
Republic of Germany as another indication of the cleft
between society and the state.)
Further, Habermas's defense of the so-called rational
potential of modernity does not preclude the possibility
that revolutionary change might be better than the
melioristic practices he seems to detect in parliamentary
government as a means to bring about the consensual polities
he glorifies. The point of invoking these possibilities is
not abstractly to attempt to lay out the best praxis toward
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a communicative utopia. The point, rather, is to highlight
the lack of fit between Habermas's critique of Dialectic of
Enl ightenment
,
which critique understands itself as sharply
contrasting with its object in its support of communicative
enlightenment, and the counter factual concept of the ideal
speech situation. Obviously, the defense of modernity
inherent in that critique does not suffice to bring about
the establishment of communicative rationality, and the
critique does not systematically respect the ideal speech
regime to which it pledges allegiance. Habermas,
nonetheless, reads Dia l ectic of En 1 ightenment as if he were
apprised of the outcome of a procedural is tical ly and
counter factual ly construed universal discourse about the
rationality of Adorno and Horkheimer's work. The polemical
force with which Habermas seeks to relegate Dia l ectic of
Enl ightenment to the fringes of rationality cannot conceal
the fact that the connection between his critique of
Horkheimer and Adorno and the realization of the ideal of
consensual discourse is not necessary. Insofar as
Habermas's ideal speech situation remains at best a distant
aim to be fulfilled in the course of enlightenment progress,
which course cannot soberly be mapped out in advance, his
supposedly pro-enlightenment critique of Dialectic of
Enlightenment cannot but be adventitiously linked to such an
aim. Nor is Habermas's critique of Dialectic of
Enlightenment fully congruent with the presuppositions of
distortion-free communication.
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The unmediated opposition between the fragments in
Habermas's critique of Dia l ectic of Enlightenment that
conflict with the notion of rational critique (a notion that
originates in his universal pragmatics of language), on the
one hand, and the systematizing scope he ascribes to his
theory of discursive consensus, on the other hand, is
analogous to the contradiction thematized in Dialectic of
Enl ightenment between an abstract, subject-centered,
systematic instrumental reason, and the residues it fails to
assimilate. Dialectic of Enl ightenment argues that the
species' struggle for self-preservation governs the
c i V i 1 i zat iona 1 attempt at controlling external nature, and
that the dominant contemporary form of en 1 ightenment--
namely, instrumental rational i ty--seeks to render in
systematic fashion its environment, society and inner nature
f ul ly manipulable , calculable, determinable. Dialectic of
Enlightenment
,
pace Habermas, does not maintain that
instrumental rationality colonizes the whole industrial
world. Horkheimer and Adorno understand their own
intervention as a reflection upon the course of
enlightenment rationality and thus as eluding
i ns t r umon ta 1 i za t ion . Further, DialGCtic of Enl ightenment
already locates in what Adorno's Aesthetic Theory terms
'autonomous works of art' formal principles of construction
that subvert the instrumental logic Dialectic of
Enlightenment imputes to discursive rationality. Such art
works, according to both texts, give expression to the
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fissures, the dissonances of a society under the aegis of
abstract economic, political and cultural forces.
Autonomous art works, on this theory, are not ruled by the
systemic imperatives of a reason bent on self-preservation,
nor do they view society as if it were a harmonious
functional whole.
Yet whereas Dialectic of Enl ightenment conceives of the
fracturing of society as a necessary consequence of the
operation of the dominant ratio
,
an analogous linguistic
mechanism that would account for the failure of Habermas's
critique of Dialectic of En 1 ightenment to crystallize around
the systematic tenets of his universal pragmatics is not all
that visible. Perhaps such a mechanism is to be found in
Adorno's Negative Dialectics
,
which offers a philosophical
explanation for the lack of fit between conceptual systems
and what they in spite of themselves fail to absorb, an
explanation it gives in terms of an incongruency inherent in
the history of enlightenment thought between subject and
object, language and world, idea and reality. To the extent
that Habermas's critique of Dialectic of Enlightenment
leaves as abstractly related opposites the systemic
imperative toward rational critique and the textual
splinters rebelling against the system, it lags behind the
conceptual level achieved by its object's problems ti zat ion
of the aporias of systematizing thought. In the fourth
chapter, I sharpen the previous point by arguing that
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Habermas falsely assumes the notion of reflexive grounding
to be already intelligible within his theoretical system.
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CHAPTER 3
ADORNO'S ELABORATION OF DIALECTIC OF ENLIGHTENMENT:
TOWARD AN UNREGIMENTED SUBJECTIVE Ej^ERIENCE OF NATURE
In the first chapter, I argue that Juergen Habermas
misreads Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno's Dialectic of
Enl ightenment as if it conceived of reason reductively.
Whereas Habermas maintains that Dia l ectic of Enlightenment
universalizes instrumental reason and that it is thus guilty
of a performative contradiction, I contend that Adorno and
Horkheimer grasp enlightenment rationality as a historically
differentiated process. To be sure, they claim that since
its inception in Homeric myth the process of enlightenment
has had an abiding attribute, that it has been governed
throughout by the separation between the cognizing subject
and the material world. Adorno and Horkheimer distinguish
enlightenment reason, which they locate in an abstractive
subjectivity, from mimetic interaction with nature. In
Dialectic of Enl ightenment
,
mimetic interaction between
humans and nature is situated, albeit vaguely, in an archaic
time marked successively by preanimis tic , animistic and
magical practices, and it is taken to be suggestive of a
utopian condition in which human beings would relate to
nature and among themselves without coercion. Horkheimer
and Adorno trace the roots of the domineering subjectivity
they think becomes prevalent with the forward march of
enl ightenment back to a historical time (which
is documented in Homer 's Odyssey) in which the
to consol idate itsel
f
as distinct from nature.
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that the emerging self experiences the external world as a
threat, and that it aggressively renounces sensorial
satisfaction to preserve itself.
Yet Adorno and Horkheimer do not treat of enlightenment
reason reductively as if it were merely an instrument of
self-preservation. They suggest that instrumental
rationality becomes dominant in the course of the formation
of the subject, but that it does not thereby eliminate the
possibility of an alternative form of reason or of a social
formation free of domination. According to Dialectic of
Enl ightenment
,
if it is true of instrumental reason that it
is blind to its own direction and to human ends, there
nonetheless remains a form of enlightenment rationality
capable of critical reflection upon the effects of
instrumental thought and action. Horkheimer and Adorno hold
that the abstractive process through which the subject comes
to constitute itself as a monadic force destructive of
instinctual fulfillment and external nature and productive
of societal fractures also makes possible the emergence of a
critical rationality not functionalized in the service of
self-preservation. Dialectic of Enlightenment instantiates
and defends a critical enlightenment that claims to
historicize instrumental reason. That is. Dialectic of
Enlightenment seeks to shatter the positivist myth that
mathematized science is the paragon of knowledge, and that
it is indispensable for social progress. Dialectic of
Enlightenment contains the kernel of an idea developed by
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Adorno in Aesthetic Theory
,
the idea namely that the
autonomous art of the bourgeois era is the locus of an
aesthetic subjectivity that experiences and cognizes the
material world in noninstrumental fashion. Later in the
present chapter, I will elaborate the previous claim in the
context of my discussion of Adorno's development in Negative
Dialectics and Aesthetic Theory of Dialectic of
Enl ightenment's theory of the formation of the self.
In the second chapter, I subject Habermas's discussion
of Dialectic of Enl ightenment to an immanent critique. That
is, I ask whether Habermas is correct in assuming that his
critique of Dialectic of Enlightenment is unlike its object
in that it is capable of being reflexively justified.
According to Habermas, his version of critical social theory
is reflexive, for it recognizes that the ideal speech
situation is the communicative condition in which its truth
could be decided upon. Habermas maintains that, in contrast
to his theory of communicative action. Dialectic of
Enlightenment remains oblivious to its own discursiveness,
to the fact that it raises discursively testable claims to
validity. He holds that Horkheimer and Adorno criticize
reason in totalizing fashion as being inextricably entwined
with domination, and that they thereby undermine their own
noninstrumental theory. According to Habermas's formal
pragmatics of language, the claims to rational validity
Dialectic of Enl iqhte nme n t raises are susceptible of
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discursive problematization. Yet, Habermas avers, because
Dialectic of Enlightenment remains imprisoned within an
epistemology predicated on the interaction between a
monological subject (which subject, he thinks, is sundered
from the communicative contexts in which it is formed) and
the objective world, it is incapable of establishing the
conditions of its own truth. For Habermas, such conditions
can only be given in inter subjective communication devoid of
coercion. That is, he thinks that they can only be given in
communication that would not be encumbered by any of the
following: strategic manipulation; psychological
disturbances; systemic media for the coordination of social
action (namely, power and money); unproblema t i zed
traditional values; or pre-modern, cosmogonic-mythical forms
of knowledge and action.
My discussion of Habermas's critique of Dialectic of
Enlightenment advances the view that his concept of
communicative rationality fails to support the said
critique. Habermas counter factual ly construes communicative
rationality as a discursive procedure that would make
consensus about theoretical, practical and aesthetic matters
possible. I think, though, that a prospective allusion to
distortion-free communication, which allusion is not the
outcome of consensual discourse, does not sustain the
apodictic force with which Habermas concludes that Dialect i
c
of Enlightenment is irreflexive, that it dispenses with the
means rationally to justify itself. Embedded in Habermas's
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defense of a procedural rationality he thinks would produce
intersubjecti ve consensus is a difficulty that calls into
question the cogency of his notion of reflexive grounding.
The difficulty I have in mind is that within the framework
of his theory the truth of the said defense could only be
understood as the result of discursive deliberation. Quite
clearly, such discursive deliberation awaits practical
realization. Habermas retrospectively criticizes Dialectic
of Enlightenment as a self-destructive critique of
instrumental reason and as being oblivious to the traces of
communicative rationality immanent within it; yet his
discussion of Horkheimer and Adorno's theory of
enlightenment rationality cannot clarify, for Habermasian
reasons, its prospects for being understood and endorsed by
participants in the so-called ideal-speech situation. The
charge of lack of reflexivity that Habermas levels at
Dialectic of Enl igh tenment is a projection of the failure of
his polemic against Adorno and Horkheimer to establish a
necessary connection between the theory of distortion-free
communication (on which the said polemic rests) and the
counterf actual ly conceived ideal-speech practice.
Habermas all too prematurely dismisses Dialectic of
En lightenment as being incapable of contributing to
noncoercive communication. In claiming that Adorno and
Horkheimer globalize instrumental reason, he mistakenly
congeals their discussion of the process of enlightenment.
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(L3t6r in th© chaptGc, I will argu© that Adorno's Nsgative
Dialectics and Aesthetic Theory develop Dialectic of
Enl ightenment's historically differentiated account of
language and reason, which account Habermas's critique of
Dialectic of Enlightenment fails to thematize.) Habermas
understands his universal pragmatics of language as the
rationalization of communicative competence, and it is in
this light that he imposes hermeneutic closure on Dial ectic
of Enl ightenment. Although Adorno's Negative Dialectics and
Aesthetic Theory most certainly do not espouse the
procedura 1 is t regimentation of communication advocated by
Habermas, they do elaborate Dialectic of Enl ightenment's
critique of rigidified thought and language. In the course
of the present chapter, I will develop the idea that the
said critique opens up the space for Adorno's concept of an
unregimented subjectivity, which subjectivity he takes to be
a necessary condition for a society (indeed, for a a form of
communication) devoid of domination.
According to Habermas, all speech-acts are
understandable, and their unders tandabi 1 i ty is one of
properties that attests to their anticipation of
communicative rationality. Purporting to locate the
transcendental ground for an uncoerced intersubjecti ve
understanding, he abstracts from the diversity of linguistic
formations. Habermas poses the question, how is such
understanding possible? His answer is that every competent
speaker, in engaging upon speech acts, raises discursively
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redeemable claims to validity. To be sure, Habermas does
not conceive in totally ahistorical fashion of the potential
for communicative rationality he thinks is implicit in
speech-acts. Unlike John Rawls's A Theory of Justice,
Habermas's concept of ideal speech does not presuppose the
so-called original position, that is, it does not presuppose
deliberation behind a veil of ignorance about human history,
the social division of labor, power, and so forth. For
Habermas, as I argue in the previous chapter, the ideal
speech situation is thinkable only within the framework of
modernity. Habermas historicizes both his idea of
communicative rationality and his critique of Adorno and
Horkheimer by arguing that they are constitutive of a
program to further enlightenment (to advance "the project of
modernity") in the direction of consensual knowledge and
action. Yet he deh is tor ic i zes his notion of the
rationalization of communicative competence by claiming that
all speech-acts are capable of being understood and
critically evaluated from the standpoint of an admittedly
stylized ideal speech situation that awaits historical
crystallization. Habermas interprets modernity as the
historical condition of possibility of intersubjective
consensus. But, he avers, the genetic dependency of
distortion-free communication upon modernity does not at all
relativize the universal validity of the idea of
communicative rationality.
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Habermas purchases the rationalization of communicative
competence at a hefty price: his theory of communicative
action robs language of its historicity. He scrutinizes all
language according to whether its claims to validity are
discursively redeemable. As if he were the spokesman for
all rational participants in ideal speech deliberations,
Habermas proclaims that poetry and rhetoric are self-
referential, that is, that they are incapable of being
discursively examined regarding their cognitive, moral and
aesthetic validity. Speech-acts, on the other hand, are for
him inherently rational. But just as Kant's transcendental
inquiry into the conditions of possibility of synthetic
judgments a priori takes Newtonian physics as a given, 52
Habermas's investigation into the conditions of possibility
of intersub jecti ve consensus hypostatizes a linguistic
competence rationally reconstructed as the capacity to
engage in discursively testable speech-acts. Habermas's
formal pragmatics of language is positivistic with respect
to the rational potential he ascribes to speech-acts.
Habermas forcibly packages Dialectic of En 1 igh tenment
as being incompatible with communicative enlightenment. In
his view, most of Dialectic of Enlightenment is rhetorical,
and hence it stands outside the matrix of what he takes to
be rational discussion. He does maintain, to be sure, that
Adorno and Horkheimer advance two philosophical theses:
myth already contains elements of enlightenment; and
enlightenment reverts to mythology. According to Habermas,
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though, not only do thoso thosGS threatGn to convict
Gnl igh tcnniGnt of bGing inGxtricably bound to practicGS of
domination and of failing to bring to light its entanglement
with such practices, but furthermore the said theses border
on self-destruction. if it were indeed the case that
enlightenment thought is ineluctably tied to power, Habermas
reasons, Horkheimer and Adorno's critique of instrumental
reason would lack the normative distance it claims to span
with respect to its object.
As I point out in the first chapter, I take Habermas's
argument to miss the differentiated character of the concept
of enlightenment unfolded in Dialectic of Enlightenment .
The latter text thematizes the historicity of language and
reason, and it does not reduce enlightenment to instrumental
thought. No doubt, it does view such thought as having
become progressively more dominant in the course of
civilization. Yet Adorno and Horkheimer do not explain how
the abstractive cognizing subject that they think is at the
root of enlightenment reason is still capable of subverting
instr umenta 1 i zat ion. In Dialectic of Enlightenment , they
merely allude to a self that would harmoniously orient
itself toward nature and society. If there is an element of
truth in Habermas's critique of Dialectic of Enlightenment ,
it is that Horkheimer and Adorno do not offer a constructive
theory of a non-r ig id i f ied consciousness.
Dial ectic of Enlightenment develops a theory of the
reification of consciousness. For Horkheimer and Adorno,
85
the reification of consciousness is a condition of
possibility of fascism, Stalinism, the culture industry and
bourgeois morality, and it is reproduced by them. According
to Dialectic of Enl ightenment
,
theoretical edifices— from
Greek metaphysics to positivist f orma 1 i sm-- that
systematically exclude as non-sc lent i f ic the particular, the
incommensurable, the qualitatively distinct, are the
conceptual expression of the human drive toward self-
preservation. That is, they are taken by Adorno and
Horkheimer to express at the conceptual level the subjective
domination of nature.
But Dia l ectic of En 1 gh tenment proceeds according to
the early Frankfurt School's notion of theory as immanent
critique, which means that its theory of the formation of an
autocratic subjective reason does not completely jettison
the conceptual resources of an enlightenment it
characterizes as abstractive. Dialectic of Enlightenment
does not place itself fully outside the framework of its
object. Horkheimer and Adorno suggest that Dialectic of
Enl ightenment too is an effect of the division between
mental and manual labor, theory and praxis, mind and body, a
division that they argue is the result of the enlightenment
repression of use-values, instinctual fulfillment and the
diversity inherent ih nature. For Dialectic of
Enlightenment
,
modern enlightenment rationality remains
imprisoned within a field of forces that encompasses
systematizing theory, the prevalence of exchange-value
,
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routinized and menial labor, and an unbridled economy and
technology divorced from the human need for a society devoid
of coercion. Dialectic of Enl ightenment retains a
philosophical language that abides by both the social and
the academic divisions of labor. It treats of its object,
the process of enlightenment, conceptually, that is, in
abstractive fashion. if it succeeds in relativizing what by
its own lights is the autarchy of the cognizing subject, who
unavoidably experiences the material world abstractively, it
is in its fragmentary and paratactic structure. Adorno and
Horkheimer give up the pretense to systematic coherence that
they attribute to the monadic, instrumental-rational
subject. Dialectic of Enlightenment
,
though, does not
explicitly offer a justification for its stylistic
dissolution of systematic thought.
Dial ectic of Enl ightenment*
s
textual layout subverts
what for Horkheimer and Adorno is the predominant form of
enlightenment. It subverts, namely, the mode of cognition of
a systematizing, logically circumscribed, and yet
colonial is tic subjectivity. Dialectic of Enlightenment is
not unified under the signature of systematic coherence.
Although Habermas erroneously claims that Dialectic of
Enlightenment is self-refuting, he correctly suggests that
Adorno and Horkheimer leave their argumentative strategy
largely unproblematized.
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Adorno's Neg a t i v e Dialectics aims to overcome the
deficit: it offers a theory of the abstractive force of
enlightenment rationality. According to Negative
Dia l ectics
,
there is a non-erasable difference between
subjective conceptualization and its object. 53 por Adorno,
the ideal that thought must exhaustively grasp being is
expressive (as Dialectic of Enl ightenment already claims) of
an imperious subjectivity bent on mastering its environment.
Adorno maintains that the imperious cognizing subject seeks
to cancel its difference from, its lack of identity with its
object. In Negat ive Dialectics
,
he holds that the tendency
toward the mathema t i za t ion of nature and formalization of
reason--a tendency that Dialectic of Enl ightenment
,
in
agreement with Edmund Husserl's Crisis of the European
Sciences and Tr anscendenta 1 Phenomenology
,
ascribes to the
Western process of r a t iona 1 i za t ion54--has the effect of
robbing objects of their differential qualities, that is,
of those properties of theirs that are not susceptible of
scientific standardization. Adorno argues that the
quantification of nature is the projection of a reified
subjectivity coercively unified to preserve itself against
external threats and dissolution in sensorial bliss. For
Adorno, the necessary lack of fit between concept and object
is made manifest by the contrast between the fixity of
conceptual forms, which aim to unify a manifold of
particulars, and the historicity and complexity of their
objects . 55
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Adorno illustrates the previous point in his discussion
of Max Weber's account of the concept of capi ta 1 i sra , 56 an
account which can be found in Economy and Society
. Adorno
argues that Weber correctly criticizes subjectivist
interpretations of capitalism that center on acquisitiveness
and the profit motive as merely registering surface
phenomena. Adorno then points out that for Weber the profit
motive cannot be understood in abstraction from the need to
estimate rentability, that is, in abstraction from a
calculating economic rationality. Further, Adorno maintains
that Weber sees the departmentalization of work, household
and managerial office, as a necessary ingredient of
capitalism, and that, in addition, Weber interprets
capitalism as requiring a rationalized system of law.
Indeed, in his discussion of the the bureaucratization of
modernity, Weber views the capitalist firm as closely
exemplifying the bureaucratic principle. According to
Weber, the capitalist firm approximates in its commitment to
the maximization of efficiency the bureaucratic ideal type.
Weber asserts that the capitalist firm requires speed, the
functionalization of roles, hierarchical discipline,
meritocratic remuneration, and so forth.
Yet Adorno criticizes Weber for failing to note that
the instrumental rationality of commodity exchange
reproduces itself in and through capitalist relations of
production, that is, in and through the capitalist division
of labor. According to Adorno, capitalist bureaucratic
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rationality is, in thG substantivs sens© of raason,
irrational, for it blindly preserves and reproduces societal
fractures, immiseration in the midst of material plenty, and
a heteronomous
,
passive, fragmented, and manipulable Humean
self. In short, for Adorno, the rationality Weber imputes
to capitalist bureaucratization is the mark of an irrational
society that lies under the spell of domination.
Nonetheless Weber's characterization of capitalism has
the merit of evading hypostati zing definitions, which cannot
but fail to do justice to the historicity and complexity of
capitalism, Adorno contends. For Adorno, as for the early
Frankfurt School, the critique of the reification of
consciousness has as its object the progressive
bureaucratization of society. (Frederick Pollock's account
of state capitalism distinguishes between liberal and
politicized, administered capi ta 1 i sm.) 57 Neither monadic,
congealed categories nor logically circumscribed definitions
suffice, according to Adorno, to grasp the historicity and
multifaceted nature of objects.
According to Adorno, concepts distort the identity of
their objects by subsuming them under a monistic form that
excises their differential qualities. 58 Further, the
enlightenment cognitive ideal of systematic completeness
—
which ideal is inherent in Kant's notion of reason, Hegel's
idea of the absolute spirit, Leibniz' concept of mathesis
universalis, Spinoza's axiomatized ethics and the
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positivistic subsumption of protocol statements under
universalizing principles— is inadequate to the
contemporary, fissured social world, Adorno suggests. 59 on
this theory, linguistic constellations of paratactical ly
assembled sentences offer an antidote to the mode of
cognition of the monadic enlightenment subject, v/hich
projectively freezes its object as if it were a non-
contradictory and immutable whole. 60 Adorno claims that his
idea of linguistic constellations is not obtained
epistemologically. He argues that it is instead a response
to the integrative force of an irrational social order held
together by the rule of exchange-value
,
and that its aim is
to understand the said force and the fractures it produces.
For Adorno, that conceptualization fails to achieve a
perfect fit with its object is not a justification for
arbitrary thought. Linguistic constellations, he suggests,
are conditioned by the density and increasing consolidation
of modern society. They seek to grasp social phenomena in
their historicity and contradictoriness, Adorno asserts.
The first essay in Dia l ectic of Enlightenment
instantiates Adorno's notion of linguistic constellations.
Enlightenment there is not given a peremptory, monolithic
definition. In that essay, Horkheimer and Adorno unfold a
concept of enlightenment that calls into question the
categorial autonomy with which many a modern philosopher
have invested subjective reason. Indeed Cartesian
introspection, the Kantian transcendental unity of
91
appGrcGption and thG FichtGan absolutG Ggo purport to
isolatG roason from social, Gconomic and somatic effects.
And, according to Dialectic of Enl ightenment
,
even Hegel's
notion of spirit (though it is sustained by a philosophy
that claims to rescue concretion from the rubble left by
Kant's agnosticism with respect to the possibility of
knowledge of things in themse 1 ves) 61 functions within a
clearly demarcated logical space. For Adorno and
Horkheimer, reason cannot be analytically sundered from the
sensorial repression it brings about; nor can it be
disentangled from a social domination maintained in and
through the functionalization of work and the unequal
exchange of equivalents. Yet, as I point out above, they do
not take enlightenment to be reducible to domination and
power. They argue that in the course of the c i v i 1 i za t iona
1
domination of nature the capacity for critical reflection is
not wholly extinguished.
In short, the first essay in Dialectic of En 1 ightenment
treats of enlightenment reason as a contradictory and
historically differentiated process. I think the said essay
is best read as an Adornian linguistic constellation. On
the view advanced in Negative Dialectics , if theory proceeds
on the assumption that it must be harmonious, systematic and
expressive of eternal essences, the dynamic and
intrinsically contradictory character of enlightenment
rationality can no longer be grasped.
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Adorno's constel latory writing seems to me to be a
response to what Dialectic of En 1 igh tenmen
t
characterizes as
enlightenment's nominalistic tendency. 62 as I point out in
the first chapter, the process of enlightenment for
Horkheimer and Adorno is marked by reason's progressive
distancing from the material world. They think that in the
course of the development of enlightenment thought human
beings progressively lose all affinity with nature. On this
theory, enlightenment reason jettisons the mimetic relation
to nature that informed preanimist ic
,
animistic and magical
practices. Adorno and Horkheimer do not paper over the
violence inherent in such practices, but they do see in pre-
enlightenment mimesis a key to a possible noninstrumental
knowledge and experience of nature. (Later in the present
chapter and in the fourth chapter, I will dwell on the view
advanced in Adorno's Aesthetic Theory that aesthetic
experience is noninstrumental and mimetic.) Adorno and
Horkheimer think that the process of enlightenment leads to
the desubstantial ization of concepts and theories, and that
this process issues ultimately in formalist thought. On
their reading of Homer's Odyssey , Odysseus is the
prototypical nominalist, for he empties the name 'Udeis'
(which means 'nobody') of its content in order to get
Polyphemos to fool his friends into thinking that nobody
attacked him. For Dialectic of Enlightenment , the modern
tendency toward the disintegration of religion and
metaphysics, a tendency that Max Weber interprets in his
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theory of rnoderni zation as the progressive loss of meaning,
attests to the prevalence of a form of thinking structured
around nominalistic signs. In Neg a t
i
v e Dialectics, Adorno
says of linguistic constellations that they aim to overcome
the arbitrariness of the relation between concept and
object, which arbitrariness he thinks is inherent in a
nominalistic enlightenment.
Negative Dialectics thematizes what it calls
'unreflected nominal ism'. 63 Adorno maintains that
unreflected nominalism celebrates the dematerialization of
thinking, and that it takes such dematerialization to be
irrevocable. Kantian idealism; the Saussurean decoupling of
signifier and signified; Rorty's neo-pragmatist stylization
of ideas as contingent tools that might or might not work
for the purpose at hand (in Rorty's case, the purpose is to
defend liberalism's understanding of freedom); and the
consensus theory of truth in its Habermasian version: these
positions recoil from the attempt at adjudicating the truth
or, in the case of neo-pragmatism, the plausibility of
theory in terms of the question whether thought or language
adequately represent external reality. I interpret these
positions as illustrative of Adorno's notion of unreflected
nominalism. For Adorno, the somatic, historical, economic,
psychological, social, cultural and political tributaries of
language and reason cannot be conjured away. Adorno claims
that theories that short-circuit their connections with
social reality unref lectively ratify enlightenment's
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dominant tendency toward subjectivist involution. in his
discussion of relativism in Neg a t
i
v e Dialectics, Adorno
argues that sociological relativism, in uncritically
registering a multiplicity of ideologies and perspectives,
remains oblivious to the fact that such perspectives and
ideologies are the effects of an irrational society, that
they are expressive of a bourgeois system of production
governed by the private appropriation of profit. 64 Adorno's
insight is that the diverse perspectives, opinions and
ideologies, of which the bourgeoisie prides itself reflects
social atomization, that is, economically, politically and
cultural ly mandated selfishness. For Adorno, sociological
relativism leaves the social conditions of possibility of
competing ideologies unproblemat i zed.
Yet Negative Dialectics does not claim to construct a
language that captures the material world as it is in
itself. In Adorno's view, the subjective mediation of
experience cannot be erased. In Negativ e Dialectics
,
he
carries out an immanent critique of a nominalistic
enlightenment. That is to say. Negativ e Dialectics reflects
upon enlightenment's abstractive, subjectivist distortion of
objects, without thereby pretending completely to jettison
the conceptual resources of a nominalistic language.
Adorno, unlike Heidegger, does not concoct a neologistic
German in search of a lost immediacy. Adorno extracts from
the nominalistic separation between subject and object he
elements of his notion of a critical subjectivity. He
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argues that the division between intellectual and manual
labor, which he suggests is constitutive of economic,
political, racial, gender, national and cultural domination
in contemporary society, nonetheless makes possible a
modicum of autonomy with respect to the expansion of
commodification. Such autonomy, for Adorno, provides the
space for critical thinking, for a non-reified
consciousness
.
Adorno maintains that both idealism and materialism are
false insofar as they purport to cancel the distinction
between subject and object. 65 in his view, idealism confers
primacy to an all-encompassing subjectivity, whereas
materialism treats of consciousness as being conditioned by
the objective world. Nonetheless, according to Adorno, both
materialism and idealism agree in positing one logically
prior principle that has the effect of erasing the
distinction between subjective cognition and the material
world. To be sure, as I will argue below, Adorno does not
absolutize the said distinction. Adorno extracts from
Hegelian idealism the concept of a subject that confronts
congealed thought and reified social institutions
negatively, that is, critically. No doubt, Adorno rejects
as premature Hegel's affirmation of an absolute spirit that
heralds the reconciliation between universal and particular,
monarchy and subject, community and individual. With Hegel,
Adorno views subjective cognition as inflicting a wound, so
to speak, on the objective realm, as detracting from what
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materiality is in itself. For Hegel, the understanding
leaves the said wound to fester, and he argues that it is
the task of speculative reason to heal the wound. Adorno
thinks that Hegel imposes unity between subject and object
by fiat; in a fragmented society, Adorno avers, harmonizing
theory is false. Also false is, in his view, the related
glorification of a disembodied, presumably wholly autonomous
rationality. Adorno maintains that only linguistic
constellations, in their sensitivity to the fractures,
manifold qualities and historicity of objects, avoid the bad
alternative between a consolidated, monadic subjectivity
that projects its coercively forged identity onto the object
and the passive, naive-realist acceptance of facticity.
Adorno assumes that, in contradistinction to the
predominant enlightenment tendency toward the
standardization of the material world, non-hierarchical and
non-systematizing assemblages of sentences approximate the
unique, contradictory and historical identity of objects.
He also assumes that the antinomy immanent in advanced
capitalist society between the integrative power of
exchange-value and socially produced atomization can only be
grasped in conste 1 1 ator y fashion. Leaving aside the
question whether these assumptions are correct, he makes, in
my view, an important contribution toward demythologizing
philosophical discourse. By this I mean to say that for
Adorno language and any received canons of reasoning are not
immutable or atemporally valid. Adorno's philosophy is
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incompatible with the view, widespread in analytic circles,
that meaning can be def ini tiona 1 ly fixed as if to grasp
eternal essences. Adorno opens up the terrain of textual
presentation to critical reflection. For him, the grammar
of philosophical thought is not carved in stone. He
suggests that the assumption that only arguments adhering to
logical form are capable of clarity and rationality rests on
the reduction of language to a kind of scientific technique.
According to Adorno, such a reduction is false, for it robs
language of the capacity to express individual suffering.
In opposition to the utilitarian calculus, Adorno thinks
that happiness and suffering are not standardizable
,
quantifiable. He interprets the process of socialization--
perhaps 'collectivization' would be more apt—under
administrative industrialism as being governed by the
societal buffeting and consequent atomization of human
beings.
Adorno seeks to give a voice to the fractured self's
suffering. On his theory, philosophical edifices founded on
putatively universal truths and logically committed to
sy s tema t i c i t y unref lectively emulate the monopolistic
corporatism of modern political, economic and cultural
institutions, which stultify the individual. Adorno appends
to his reflection upon the social conditions of the
linguistic architecture of systematizing thought an
exploration into the possible language of a subjectivity
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that would not be subjugated by bureaucratic
functionalization.
In Die Rev id ier te Psychoanalyse , 67 Adorno criticizes
Karen Horney's revisionist psychoanalytic theory for
undervaluing what in his view is one of Freud's chief
contributions, namely the theory of the instincts. Adorno
maintains that the revisionist current in psychoanalysis,
within which he takes Horney's work to be paradigmatic,
posits in harmonizing fashion the concept of a unified
character shaped by its social milieu, and that it
disregards the consequences of Freud's account of the
dynamic of drives for an understanding of modern society.
The revisionist current, Adorno says, accuses Freud's theory
of conceiving of the ego in abstraction from its social
influences. Furthermore, Adorno claims, psychoanalytic
revisionism breaks the genetic link between id and ego that
Freud posits. (Adorno speaks in several places of the
libidinal matrix of the ego.)68 The revisionist current's
understanding of the self, for Adorno, is liberal: the self,
he avers, is viewed there as an organic whole capable of
spontaneous and autonomous action in contemporary society.
Adorno contends that psychoanalytic revisionism thereby
relinquishes Freud's insights that the self is fragmented,
and that it is not transparent to itself. According to
Adorno, in the name of a sociological turn in
psychoanalysis, the revisionist approach becomes oblivious
to the fate of the individual who, under the aegis of
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civilization's reality principle, is forced sharply to
curtail instinctual satisfaction. in Adorno's view, such
revisionist categories as 'social influence', 'milieu' and
'family background' are society-affirming in that they
retain the liberal departmentalization of individual and
society. He adds that the said categories lose the critical
force of Freud's insight into che aggressiveness with which
libido is displaced and the super-ego constituted. For
Adorno, although Freud uncritically distinguishes between
psychology and sociology and thereby passively accepts the
intellectual division of labor, his admittedly atomizing
theory of the dynamics of the instincts provides cognitive
and critical access to the social force by means of which
individuals are made to conform to reality. In contrast,
revisionism's salonf aehig desexua 1 i zat ion of Freudian
theory, Adorno suggests, passively adopts liberalism's
concept of a unified self.
Habermas hypostatizes modern speech-acts as if they
were implicitly rational. He claims that Dialectic of
Enlightenment congeals its object under the rubric of
scientistic thought and language. Dialectic of
Enlightenment, he argues, thus fails to grasp the potential
for communicative rationality inherent in modern speech.
But Habermas loses sight of the historicity Dialectic o£
Enlightenment ascribes to reason and language. Adorno's
Negative Dialectics makes possible an explanation of
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Dialectic of Enl ightenment's experimental textual
arrangement, that is, of its paratactic, fragmentary and
cons te 1 1 a tor y architecture. As I point out above. Dialectic
Enl igh tenment does not explicitly justify its textual
layout. According to Negat i ve Dia lec t ics
,
the identity of
objects is unavoidably deformed by the abstractive,
nominalistic subject that comes to predominate in the course
of rationalization, the reason being that the said subject
projects onto the objects its forcibly consolidated unity.
The enlightenment process of subjecti v ization, for Adorno,
leads to the repression of the self’s psychosomatic needs.
Adorno argues that only a textual structure that refuses
artificially and in harmonizing fashion to reach systematic
closure can begin to do justice to the complexity,
historicity and conflictual nature of objects of knowledge.
Negative Dialectics carves out the space for interpreting
Dialectic of Enl igh tenment*
s
textual layout as the
fragmentation of the grammar of a rigidified subjectivity.
Adorno conceives of cons te 1 1 ator y thought as anticipating an
unregimented subjective cognition and experience of nature.
In Dialectic of Enl ightenment , instrumental rationality
is interpreted as blocking subjective reflection. For
Horkheimer and Adorno, the culture industry commodifies
cultural products, and the reception of art is reduced to
mindless applause for ol igopol is tical ly controlled
mechanisms of economic exchange. According to Dialectic of
Enlightenment
,
entertainment and relaxation in a
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productivist world are defined in terms of the mechanical
execution at work of functionalized tasks. On this view,
entertainment and relaxation are essentially the means for
mustering enough energy for yet another laboring week.
Scientism and a patriarchal super-ego, Adorno and Horkheimer
maintain, also militate against the spontaneous,
unprogrammed experience of the material world. The
widespread torturing of children with the question 'What do
you want to be when you grow up?' gives evidence of the
imprisonment of experience within functionalistically
conceived social roles. Adult life is prepackaged under the
signature of aes the t ic i zed roles--the above question could
easily read, What kind of performer do you want to be in the
theater of life?--which roles, both inside and outside
Hollywood, are inseparable from the laws of administered
exchange- V a 1 ue . Dialectic of En 1 ightenment retains the
romanticist theme that industrialism and the city limit the
scope of sensorial experience. (Its clear, though, that
Adorno and Horkheimer do not endorse the romanticist
embellishment of the bucolic past. On their theory, all
romanticizations of the past are escapist and stylize it as
if it had eluded history's entwinement with suffering.)
Adorno's Negative Dialectics and Aesthetic Theory reject any
attempt at reliving a sentimentally stylized past, and they
unfold a theory that sketches out an unregimented knowledge
and experience of nature. The foil for such a theory, which
is no doubt a constructive effort by a thinker frequently
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accused of defeatism, is provided by Dia l ectic of
Enl ightenment*
s
account of the instrumental-rational
constriction of experience.
In Nega fi ve Dialectics
,
Adorno distinguishes between
theory, which he understands as immanent critique, and
spontaneous, unregimented exper ience.69 to be sure, as I
will detail later, he does not absolutize that distinction.
Adorno maintains that the force bureaucratized society
exerts upon consciousness cannot be grasped and criticized
if thought is structured around categories external to the
system of domination. Already in Dialectic of
En 1 igh tenmen
t
,
Horkheimer and Adorno view such philosophies
as Zen as feeble attempts at escaping the industrial,
technocratic and scientistic discipline enforced by modern
social institutions. In Negati ve Dialectics , Adorno points
out that the integrative power of a society coordinated by
such institutions requires of the critique of that society
that it not be disjointed. (It is a measure of the
cognitive reach of Karl Marx's immanent critique of
political economy and capitalism, in contrast, say, to
aristocratic or romanticist critiques, that his thought
continues to be violently persecuted by the overseers of
capital.) For Adorno, romanticized idealizations of a
bucolic past, Heidegger's metaphysical yearning for a
putatively non—metaphysical being^O and Bergson s
i n tu i t ion i sm , 7 1 catapult thought away from its socio-
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historical context, thus leaving the latter uncriticized in
its systemic consolidation. (On Adorno's understanding of
theory, the pretense of the mainstream media in the United
States to being an autonomous institution guarding against
tyranny and oppression is left unscathed by arguing that
techno log i zed communications are yet another instantiation
of the se 1 f -conce a Imen t of being. in contrast, an immanent
critique of the mainstream media would elucidate in detail
the gap between their claim to enlighten the citizenry and
their consistent refusal to give a voice to those whose
experience contradicts the affirmative self-understanding of
contemporary capitalism in the United States.)
The frequent criticism directed against Adorno that he
absolutizes negativism fails to take into account his notion
of an unregimented knowledge and experience of the material
world. 72 This notion bears the influence of the Kantian
concept of spontaneity. Adorno sees empiricism and
positivism as consigning the cognizing subject to passive
acquiescence before the realm of facts. Echoing Friederich
Nietzsche and Walter Benjamin, 73 however. Dialectic of
En 1 igh tenmen
t
characterizes Kant's critique of reason as
being insufficiently critical, as leaving the Newtonian
understanding of experience unproblemati zed. For Adorno, a
spontaneous experience of objects would cease to involve a
cognitive subject that projects onto them its rigidified
identity. Such an experience, he avers, would respect the
difference, the non-identity between subject and object. As
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I will explain toward the end of the chapter, Adorno does
not understand the said difference as a neat dichotomy;
rather, he understands it in terms of a dynamic interaction
between subject and object. The manifold qualities of
objects, Adorno claims, are not subsumable in merely
subjectivist fashion under logically autonomous concepts.
If the error of Hegelian idealism consists in the
panlogicist identification of the world as if the world were
the reflexive movement of spirit, empiricism and positivism
falsely deny the subjective mediation of experience, Adorno
suggests. In both cases, the tension between subject and
object is artificially released, according to Adorno. He
argues that a mode of cognition that would retain this
tension would be one in v/hich the subject would relativize
itself, that is to say, one in v/hich it would recognize its
own objective, material elements. An unregimented
subjective knowledge and experience of objects, 74 for
Adorno, would not obscure subjective nature's affinity with
outer nature. An unregimented self, Adorno surmises, would
not be destructive of sensorial pleasure, use-value or the
possibility of harmony between the mental and the material.
In Negative Dialectics , Adorno discusses what he terms
'unregimented experience' in the subjunctive mood.
Dialectic of Enl igh tenment's thesis that modern society
verges on reducing the self to being a mechanism of
conditioned reflexes— to being obedient at the site of
production, supportive of the drivel dished out by the
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culture industry and he teronomous 1 y consumerist— is retained
in Negative Dialectics
. If Adorno does not theorize there
in the indicative mood about spontaneous experience, it is
so in accordance with his view that contemporary society
reproduces the reification of consciousness. A changed
consciousness, for him, cannot be abstractly foisted upon an
instrumental ized praxis. To be sure, as I will argue below,
Adorno interprets some modern art works as an index of a
spontaneous, noninstrumental, aesthetic experience of
nature. 75 por him, this aesthetic experience gives us a
glimpse of a society in which human beings would relate to
the material world in noninstrumental fashion. Yet he does
not deify contemporary aesthetic experience, for in his view
the autonomous art of the bourgeois era has the social
division of labor as its material condition of possibility.
As I will argue in more detail later in the chapter,
Adorno does not absolutize his distinction between theory
(that is, immanent critique) and unregimented experience.
Adorno sees in the knowledge and experience of what he
characterizes as the most advanced modern works of art the
anticipation of a non-domineering subjective experience of
nature. For Adorno, the material world is not exhaustively
identifiable by the cognizing subject. In prefiguring an
unregimented interaction between the subject, on the one
hand, and the external world and inner nature, on the other
hand, aesthetic knowledge and experience contribute to the
immanent critique of a contemporary society conditioned by
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and reproductive of reified consciousness, Adorno holds.
Aesthetic knowledge and experience, according to Adorno,
illuminate the concept of a non-mechanical subjectivity. In
his view, aesthetic knowledge and experience thereby
contribute to the critique of contemporary society, which,
although it is materially capable of fostering the
development of a community of free individuals, compulsively
continues to recycle instrumental thought and action.
Anke Thyen's excellent discussion of Adorno's Negative
Dialectics called to my attention the importance Adorno
attaches to the notion of an unregimented subjective
experience. But my reading of Adorno's philosophy differs
significantly from Thyen's. Thyen decouples Negative
Dialectics from Dialectic of En 1 igh tenment
,
which she
characterizes as articulating a pessimistic, negativist
phi losophico-histor ical account of Western enlightenment.
So far, I have not encountered much by way of a
clarification of what is meant by 'phi losoph ico- historical'
in the context of an interpretation of Dialectic of
Enlightenment . Helga Gripp, in her book Juergen Habermas ,
goes some way toward such a clarification. She argues that
philosophico-histor ical reconstructions of the course of
civilization identify a subject as the motor of history and
ascribe direction and meaning to history. Gripp maintains
that the early Frankfurt School, with Hegel and Marx,
located such meaning in nature-transforming human labor.
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Gripp notes quite correctly that already in the late 1930s
the Frankfurt School ceased to view the proletariat as the
privileged subject of history.
Dialectic of Enlightenment agrees with Weber's claim
that modernization brings about the progressive loss of
meaning, the increasing desubstant ia 1 i zat ion of reason.
Further, as I argue in my second chapter, Adorno and
Horkheimer no longer think that human labor is necessarily
liberatory. In contradistinction to Kant's and Hegel's
philosophies of history. Dia l ectic of En 1 ightenment does not
conceive of reason or spirit as legislating history's telos.
Arguably, Horkheimer and Adorno attribute to what they
characterize as the progressive subjective domination of the
material world an immanent teleology. That is to say, a
reading of Dialectic of En 1 ightenment that takes Adorno and
Horkheimer to be arguing that the archaic endeavor to pacify
nature contains the seeds of the process by which the
subject is progressively demater ia 1 i zed seems to me not to
be implausible. Yet for them, such a process is not under
conscious control, human or otherwise. Clearly, Dialectic
of Enlightenment does not interpret civilization as if it
were governed by an Aristotelian final cause. The course of
human history, for Adorno and Horkheimer, is not
deterministically fixed; nor do they herald the end of
history.
In any event, Thyen's point is to argue that Horkheimer
and Adorno offer a grand abstraction to characterize the
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whole history of enlightenment, and that the said
abstraction cannot survive detailed historiographic
scrutiny. Thyen proceeds to claim that Adorno's negative-
dialectical concept of the lack of identity between subject
and object ought to be seen, not as a phi losophico-
historical category, but as a Weberian ideal type suggestive
of a discursive and non— reified subjective experience.
According to Thyen, who in this regard agrees with Habermas,
Dialectic of Enl ightenment globalizes instrumental reason.
She adds that Horkheimer and Adorno thereby miss Weber's
insight that means-ends rationality cannot be fully
decoupled from value-rationality. Thyen's critique of
Dia lectio of Enl ightenment
,
which she correctly reads as
being influenced by V7eber's theory of the rationalization of
modernity, is that in reducing enlightenment reason to its
instrumental form it releases the Weberian tension between
means-ends rationality and value-rationality. For Thyen,
although Weber distinguishes between means-ends rationality
and value-rationality, he does not absolutize the
distinction. She interprets Weber's theory as advancing the
view that inherent in all strategic action is an
ineradicable element of valuation. Thyen concludes that
whereas Dialectic of Enl ightenment misses the value-
rationality immanent in strategic thinking, Adorno's notion
(developed in Negative Dialectics ) of an unregimented
subjective experience is sensitive to the connection between
instrumental and goal-oriented action.
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Thyen does not explain why she thinks the concept of
enlightenment developed in Dialectic of Enlightenment must
be interpreted as a ph i losoph ico-h is tor ica 1 category rather
than as a Weberian ideal type. Nor does she explain why she
takes Adorno's notion of a subjective experience sensitive
to its non-identity with nature to be unrelated to Dialectic
Q f En 1 ig h tenmen t '
s
putative phi losophico-histor ical
framework. I do not mean to take a position with respect to
any of these interpretations, but it does seem to me that
Thyen's basic hermeneutical approach to Dialectic of
Enlightenment and Negative Dialectics is external to the
texts. Thus she does not broach at all Adorno's critique of
Weber's concept of ideal types. According to Adorno, the
said concept is rather arbitrary, for it is obtained in
merely subjectivist, epistemological fashion. In relying
upon Weber's notion of ideal types to explain what she terms
'Adorno's theory of subjective experience', Thyen passes
over in silence the materialist motifs inherent in Adorno's
notion of a subjectivity that would engage with and yet
respect the alterity of the objective world.
Furthermore, I do not think that Adorno's idea of an
unregimented subjective knowledge and experience can be at
all understood in abstraction from the theory of the
formation of subjectivity unfolded in Dialectic of
Enlightenment . For all the talk about the putatively
speculative, phi losophico-histor ical character of Dialectic
of Enlightenment, it is indisputable that Horkheimer and
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Adorno offor a localizad thoory of th© fat© of consc iousn©ss
und©r Stalinism, fascism, bourg©ois morality, th© cultur©
industry and th© positivist d©ification of facts. Moreover,
Thyen’s attempt at divorcing Adorno's concept of experience,
which she stylizes as an ideal type, from Dialectic of
En 1 igh tenment fails to take into account Adorno's repeated
claim to be found, for instance, in his lecture Erziehung
nach Auschwi tz— that Auschwitz's material and subjective
conditions of possibility have remained in place. (Indeed,
one need only visit New York City to experience bourgeois
indifference in all its poignancy.) It is against the
backdrop of Dia lec t ic of Enl ightenment's theory of
sub j ec t i V i za t ion that Adorno conceives of a possible-
unregimented experience.
In addition, Thyen characterizes Negative Dialectics as
a theory of subjective experience without at all discussing
the distinction Adorno draws there between theory and
unregimented experience. Although both Negative Dialectics
and Aesthetic Theory concern themselves with the concept of
a non- i ns t r umenta 1 cognition, this does not mean that Adorno
understands a knowledge sensitive to its non-identity with
its object as if it were exclusively discursive. To be
sure, in claiming that Adorno's notion of a non-autocr at ic
subjective cognition is discursive, Thyen seeks to rescue
Adorno's category of the non-identical from the charge of
irrationality. In point of fact, Habermas takes Adorno in
this context to be merely gesticulating. But is rationality
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exhaustively discursive? Doesn't Adorno in Aesthetic Theory
develop a theory of an aesthetic rationality that recovers
the mimetic element of cognition he thinks was lost in the
course of the instrumentalization of nature? In her
discussion of Nega t i v e Dialectics
,
Thyen does not even
mention the word 'aesthetics', let alone Adorno's Aesthetic
Theory
,
and her account of Adorno's critique of instrumental
and identity thought remains imprisoned within a
constrictive understanding of rationality as if it were
exclusively discursive. Thyen elides without an explanation
Adorno's constructive attempt at sketching out an aesthetic
rationality that would not cancel the difference between
cognition and experience. A discussion of that attempt
follows
.
In Dialectic of Enl ightenment
,
Horkheimer and Adorno
interpret the history of the language of enlightenment as
the progressive separation between abstract, formal,
nominalistic cognitive signs and mimetic tones and images.
To be sure, they characterize scientistical ly construed
knowledge as the mimetic, tautological ratification of
instrumentalized nature. That is to say, such knowledge
blocks critical reflection upon social reality, and it
represses the recollection of the suffering wrought in the
course of the subjective domination of nature, according
Dialectic of Enl ightenment . The images and sounds
manufactured by the entertainment and information industry.
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for their part, drop art's capacity for giving expression to
social antagonisms, domination and suffering, Adorno and
Horkheimer maintain. Under the aegis of the culture
industry, according to Dialectic of Enl ightenment
,
tones and
images become abstract signs in the service of the
maximization of exchange-value.
In Dialectic of En 1 ightenment
,
Horkheimer and Adorno
laconically characterize the autonomous art of the bourgeois
era as the site of social critique. (Adorno's concept of
autonomous works of art will be dealt with below.) Adorno's
Aesthetic Theory develops the view that the knowledge and
experience of autonomous art works evades the instrumental
interaction between subject and object that for Dialectic of
En 1 ightenment is characteristic of scientism and the culture
industry. 76 Adorno's categories of aesthetic cognition and
experience must be understood as normative. He does not
take the reception of works of art in contemporary society
to be an index of their truth content.
Both Hans Robert Jauss77 and Peter Buerger78 have
criticized Adorno for disregarding aesthetic reception.
They correctly point out that Adorno's Aesthetic Theory
privileges aesthetic form as the locus of artistic meaning
and truth. 79 Thus, for Adorno, the significance of specific
works by such artists as Samuel Beckett, Franz Kafka and
Arnold Schoenberg, which works he takes to be at the cutting
edge of modernism, lies not in their serviceability to this
or that political cause or in whether this or that crowd
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identifies with particular motifs or characters. Rather,
Adorno contends, such works are important for the way they
revolutionize artistic form. Schoenberg's atonal music,
according to Adorno, liberates musical idiom from the regime
of such canons of composition as a governing home key. The
composer Adrian Leverkuehn in Thomas Mann's Doctor Faustus,
a novel constructed with the help of Adorno's musicological
advice and no doubt indebted to Schoenberg's Harmonie lehre
,
speaks of a musical idiom in which no tone is subservient to
a ruling motif. But Adorno does not take aesthetic form to
be unrelated to society. He interprets the autonomy of
tones in atonal compositions as allegorically prefiguring a
community of free individuals. Jauss asserts that Adorno
misses the communicative role of art as a source of social
values. Buerger says that his own experience with groups of
young people gathered to discuss works of literature
suggests that their reception of content can have the
socially emancipatory function of stimulating critical self-
reflection. Leaving aside the question whether there is any
merit to the critiques by Jauss and Buerger of Adorno's
privileging of aesthetic form, they seem to me to miss one
implication of Adorno's concepts of aesthetic cognition and
experience for his notion of an unregimented subjectivity.
I have in mind the implication that, on Adorno's theory, an
unregimented self would be unlike the autarchic instrumental
subject in that it would be receptive toward art and nature.
But Jauss and Buerger correctly stress that Adorno's
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sociology of art dismisses aesthetic reception in
contemporary society as the proper focal point of a
cognitivist philosophical aesthetics. Aesthetic Theory
subscribes to Dia lectio of En 1 igh tenment*
s
thesis that the
predominant modern consciousness is buffeted and blunted by
such phenomena as technocratic management, anxiety in the
face of weapons of mass destruction, oligopolistic control
of the economy, and the official lies cheerfully spread by
the organs of mass communications. In Aesthetic Theory,
Adorno holds that the said consciousness does not give the
measure of the truth about contemporary society immanent in
particular works of art.
Perhaps the following discussion will illustrate the
relation Adorno establishes between artistic form and modern
society. Alfred Doeblin's Berlinalexanderplatz
,
with its
stream of consciousness style, seems to me to give
expression to what Adorno characterizes as the fragmentation
of the self. In Doeblin's novel, both Franz Biberkopf's
unsublimated drives and his entrepreneurial, instrumental ly
rational calculations for making a living as a street vendor
find articulation. The novel's splintered narrative is the
stylistic analogue of Biberkopf's shattered, discontinuous
self amidst the underworld of the late Weimar Republic.
Further, inscribed in the dissonant moments in Mahler's Song
of a Wayfarer are, I think, the wounds of the modern
isolated individual. And cubist allusions to human forms
seem to me to mobilize mathematical figures to depict the
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dehumanization wrought by the progressive mathemat ization of
nature. Cubist geometric renderings of human forms give
expression, in my view, to the pummelling human beings take
in technocratic society, governed as it is by the
scientistic glorification of mathematized natural science.
Thought monistically committed to mathematical and
scientific certainty deforms human life.
Adorno's philosophical aesthetics concerns itself with
the relation between the knowledge of art and its
exper ience.80 por Adorno, aesthetic cognition in the
absence of experience is empty, whereas aesthetic experience
devoid of theory is blind. But he does not idealistically
subsume experience under knowledge or, in empiricist,
fashion, cognition under experience. Aesthetic experience
unfetters an otherwise subjective, self-absorbed
conceptualization, while theory extricates experience from
naive, passive reception, he argues.
Yet Adorno does not harmonize aesthetic cognition and
experience: concepts, on the one hand, and tones, images and
poetic language, on the other hand, are in his view not
intertranslatable. Adorno argues that musical idiom is
distorted if it is taken to evoke sceneries or stories. To
interpret music in such a fashion, he maintains, is to
shatter the autonomy of the formal principles of composition
to which musical idiom adheres. He thinks that to
incorporate musical motifs in film for the sake of providing
"atmosphere" is violently to sunder the said motifs from the
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carefully crafted musical totalities to which they belong;
it is falsely to amalgamate cinematography, script and
musical fragments, as if they constituted a unified
language. Further: in agreement with Hegel's Phenomenology
^ Spi^£^, Adorno criticizes pic ture- thinking. His remarks
to this effect are laconic, but I suspect that he takes
pic tur e- th ink i ng as dehistor icizing both language and its
object. Perhaps the following example will illustrate the
previous point. Habermas claims that subsystems of purposive
rational action such as money and power colonize the
lifeworld. Notwithstanding his polemic against what he sees
as Dia l ectic of Enl ightenment's phi losophico-histor ical
breadth, the most he does to historicize his concept of the
life-world is to situate its referent in modernity. His
spatial account of the invasion by non- 1 inguistic media for
the coordination of social action of a sphere of implicitly
rational, non-coercive communication, robs linguistic
interaction of its diversity and historical dynamism.
Habermas's constrictive territorial understanding of the
lifeworld colludes with his rationalization of linguistic
competence to congeal language.
Works of art, Adorno claims, do not speak for
themselves. He thinks that the knowledge about society
implicit in autonomous art works needs to be interpretively
disclosed. Already in his lecture Die Aktual itaet der
Phi losophie , Adorno assigns to philosophy the task of
interpretation. The social world, for Adorno, cannot be
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taken at its word. Autonomous art works, Adorno avers, are
cognitively significant precisely because they abstract from
social functionalization. Thus, it would be mistaken to
read Adorno's notion of autonomy as an endorsement of the
19th Century ideology of art for art's sake. Like
conceptualization, the construction of art works is a
subjective activity, Adorno maintains. (I do not thereby
mean to imply that Adorno conceives of them as being
exclusively subjective.) Yet the most advanced autonomous
works of art, for Adorno, do not subsume their material
under universal, abstractive principles. According to
Adorno, such works, in contradistinction to the instrumental
subject, do not standardize or quantify their material in
order to render it utilizable for technical and scientific
purposes. The funereal and folk motifs in Mahler's music
might illustrate Adorno's point in that they are not
instances or samples, in the scientific sense, of funeral
marches and folk songs. Nor are they abstractions.
Instead, these motifs are incorporated into and elaborated
within compositions that adhere to musical form, rather than
to the logic of instrumental reason. In Adorno's view, the
constructive, aesthetic-subjective engagement with artistic
material differs from the instrumental-subjective domination
of nature. In its relative freedom from enlightenment
i ns t r umen t a 1 i za t ion , aesthetic construction hints at a non-
rigidifying subject that would cease to convert nature to
abstract exchange-value , Adorno argues. (I say 'relative
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freedom' because Adorno thematizes the role of technique in
the construction of works of art.) If the aesthetic-
subjective construction of art works has the effect of
imposing order on the material elements integrated in such
works, Adorno asserts, it does not thereby eliminate the
qualities, the differential features of its object.
According to Adorno, autonomous works of art are not
exhaustively defined by their aesthetic-subjective,
constructive intervention. Such works, he states, give
expression to societal fractures. ^2 That is to say,
autonomous works of art, for Adorno, do not engage with the
material world after the fashion of the autarchic
instrumental subject. He claims that such works do not
sever all links with social reality. Adorno does not locate
the expression of societal antagonisms in the content of
autonomous art works, but in their form. Thus, for Adorno,
Beckett's language codifies the collapse of religious and
metaphysical meaning, and it gives expression to the
demeaning administration of life and death in our age.
(Incidentally, Dialectic of Enlightenment does not exempt
religion and metaphysics from its thesis of an entwinement
between power and thought. But it does interpret the
positivist dissolution of metaphysics and religion as an
index of the progressive evisceration of critical
reflection.) If Beckett's language is productive of
meaning, Adorno suggests, it is in the negative sense of
registering the progressive loss of meaning, the increasing
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desubstantial ization of reason, in the course of
modernization. 83 i would add that if there is a remnant in
Beckett's Endgame and Waiting for Godot of the immutability
with which metaphysics and monotheism invested truth and
meaning, it is the motionlessness of the characters.
Aesthetic construction, on Adorno's Aesthetic Theory,
is suggestive of a non-abstracti ve
,
non-commodifying
subjective engagement with the material world. It is thus
an intimation of an alternative to instrumental reason,
which converts nature into stuff expendable for the sake of
profit and for the sake of scientific and technological
development, Adorno maintains. He models his notion of
knowledge of works of art after what he characterizes as
their subjective construction. Knowledge of the cognitive
significance of autonomous art works, for Adorno, does not
proceed by standardizing them or reducing them to
commodities. Adorno insists on their being individually
interpreted, on their uniqueness. He criticizes Walter
Benjamin's positive valuation of technologically
reproducible art as being oblivious to what Dialectic of
Enl igh tenment terms the instrumental ization of enlightenment
in the service of mass deception. 84 on this view, the only
value of most commercial films is exchange-value.
I think it important to emphasize Adorno's view that it
is indispensable to engage in concrete and detailed
interpretations of particular artistic objects. According
to a widespread criticism, Adorno's philosophy is reductive.
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His work is said to center on some core themes— for
instance, on the commodification of consciousness, the
inter twinement between nature and history, and the relation
between enlightenment and myth— and the said themes are said
to inform a uniformly pessimistic, negativist view of
civilization. Adorno's thought is thus seen as the night in
which all cows are gray. it seems to me, though, that the
charge of reductionism frequently leveled at Adorno's
philosophy misses the diversity of his work. To be sure, his
writings await an interpretation sensitive to detail of the
relation between his philosophical tracts and the more
localized studies of art works, social contradictions,
psychology, the teaching profession, and so forth. In any
event, I suspect that the relation between Adorno's theory
of art and his own experience of individual art works
illustrates the tension his philosophical aesthetics claims
to register between aesthetic cognition and experience.
Even a cursory reading of Adorno's detailed studies of
individual works of art suggests that his aesthetic
experience is not exhaustively conditioned by antecedent
theoretical commitments. Already the title of his essay on
Beckett's Endgame
,
An Attempt at Understanding Endgame ,
seems to me to respect the difference between
conceptualization and art, which difference both Dialectic
of Enlightenment and Aesthetic Theory thematize, at the same
time that it gives expression to his attempt at fusing the
horizons of aesthetic knowledge and artistic experience.
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Theory, for Adorno, saves the experience of art works
from naivete. Aesthetic experience, he asserts, frees the
subject from its constrictive, isolating, petrifying labor
of self-preservation. Aesthetic experience, on Adorno's
theory, subverts the culture industry's mobilization of the
unconscious in the interest of profit. (Indeed, such
unrelenting trash as the films Dick Tracy
,
Batman and Rambo,
fills the coffers of the oligopolistic film, industry by
targeting and igniting unsublimated unconscious forces. The
said films express nostalgia for the opportunity to lash out
in unbridled fashion against clearly identifiable enemies.
Both Dick Tr acy and Batman mark the villainous other
physiognomical ly, thus resurrecting the fascist fixation
with biologistic criteria.) Hans Robert Jauss accuses
Adorno of failing to consider the cathartic effect of mass
entertainment. For Adorno, by desensitizing its audience,
the culture industry has the effect of normalizing
contemporary society, defined as it is by violence. He
argues further that the aestheticization of violence
produces conformity in the viewers who are thereby taught to
make their peace with societally sanctioned violence. For
Dialectic of Enlightenment , in consonance with Herbert
Marcuse's thesis of repressive desublimation, the culture
industry is psychoanalysis in reverse.
Yet, although for Adorno aesthetic experience eludes
commodification and manipulation, he does not think the
experience of autonomous art works exempt from the social
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division of labor. Even the sublimated experience of an art
work, in Adorno's view, cannot inter the roots of such a
work in a conflictual society. Aesthetic experience, Adorno
suggests, remains at present a privilege. But he contends
that its being a privilege does not vitiate it. Rather,
Adorno takes such experience, together with non-instrumental
aesthetic knowledge, to be an allegory of harmonious
relations between humans and nature, and among human beings
themselves .
Adorno's Negativ e Dialectics and Aesthetic Theory
develop Dialectic of Enl ightenment's insight into the
dynamic character of language and reason. Adorno's
linguistic constellations aestheticize logic, if the latter
is understood in terms of the double sense of logos as
narrative account and as the offering of justification for
what is said. Ruediger Bubner claims that Adorno's
materialist motifs and his rejection of foundational ism
reveal a refusal on Adorno's part to thematize and defend
the presuppositions of his theory. 85 But Bubner's critique
does not address Adorno's notion of a logic of
disintegration. 86 Negative Dialectics claims conceptually
to unearth the limitations of concepts, their insufficiency
in the face of the complexity and historicity of their
objects. Negative Dialectics thus undertakes to implode, so
to speak, the self-sufficient, narcissistic, conceptualizing
rationality that, according to Dialectic of Enl ightenment ,
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becomes dominant in the course of subject iv ization. Adorno
conceives of linguistic constellations as approximations to
objects, which approximations he thinks are sensitive to the
differential qualities of the material world. Indeed,
Negative Dialectics facilitates an explanation of Dialectic
of Enl ightenment's textual architecture. Horkheimer and
Adorno's Dialectic of Enlightenment unfolds a theory of the
formation of a domineering subjectivity, and its textual
layout subverts what they characterize as the systematizing
imperiousness of instrumental reason. As I will explain in
the next chapter, Adorno understands his concept of
linguistic constellations as the outcome of subjective
reflection upon the nominalistic character of instrumental-
subjective thought. In Dialectic of Enl ightenment
,
Horkheimer and Adorno do not thematize such self-reflection.
Adorno's Aesthetic Theory develops the concept of an
aesthetic subjectivity. For Adorno, the aesthetic-
subjective engagement with the material world does not stand
outside the social division of labor; it does not escape the
violent splitting of the mental from the material. Yet, for
Adorno, the aesthetic subject experiences its materials,
both in the construction and the reception of autonomous art
works, in non-manipulati ve, non-abs tr ac t i ve , unregimented
fashion
.
Under the signature of his notion of the
rationalization of linguistic competence, Habermas
s tr a igh t j acke ts his interpretation of Dialectic of
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Enlightenment . He views Dialectic of Enlightenment as
globalizing instrumental reason and hence as failing
philosophically to anchor its own discourse, but that view
is the projection of his regimentation of language, in
Aesthetic Theory
,
Adorno offers an idea of aesthetic
rationality that points to the utopia of a non-reifying
knowledge and an unfettered experience of the world.
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CHAPTER 4
HABERMAS AND ADORNO ON REFLEXIVE GROUNDING
AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF CONSCIOUSNESS
This dissertation set out to defend the thesis that
Adorno's elaboration in Negati ve Dialectics and Aesthetic
Theory of the theory of the formation of subjectivity
articulated in Dialectic of En 1 igh tenment avoids Habermas's
misreading of the latter text. In the previous chapters, I
argue that Habermas stra ight j acke ts Dialectic of
En 1 igh tenment as if it treated of its object, the process of
enlightenment, in monistic fashion. Habermas claims that
Horkheimer and Adorno conceive of enlightenment as having
degenerated into an omnipresent instrumental rationality,
and that they thereby lose the capacity to justify their own
non-instrumental, yet undoubtedly rational discussion of
enlightenment thought. For Habermas, as I will emphasize
below, critical social theory is enfeebled if it fails
rationally to ground the categories by virtue of which it
condemns bourgeois society of failing to live up to its
ideals of justice, democracy, liberty and equality.
Rational justification, according to Habermas, consists in
the determination of the validity of speech-acts under
conditions of free dialogue. Rationality, for Habermas, is
secured by way of communicative interaction. Indeed, he
argues that rationality is inconceivable outside the
framework of linguistic exchange.
Habermas argues that Dialectic of En 1 igh tenment fails
to register the potential for a rational society embedded in
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modern everyday communication, which communication he thinks
is susceptible of recursive justif ication.87 Thus Dialectic
—
Enl ightenment
,
in his view, cannot point to the way out
of a society that it characterizes as being governed by
instrumental knowledge and action. Had Horkheimer and
Adorno recognized that their ov^n theory raises claims to
validity capable of discursive problematization, Habermas
maintains, they would have been able to plot a line of
escape from the technocratic, scientistic, totally
administered world he claims they posit. According to
Habermas, even though Adorno's Negativ e Dialectics
,
unlike
Dialectic of En 1 ightenment
,
does seek to elucidate its own
presuppositions, it gets caught up in a paradox it cannot
resolve: Negative Dialectics
,
Habermas notes, employs
concepts to advance the claim that concepts do not
congruently capture their object. Negati ve Dialectics , on
Habermas's reading, cannot avoid destabilizing its own
conceptual scaffolding. And I take it that he interprets
Adorno's Aesthetic Theory as exacerbating the theoretical
instability of Negative Dialectics . 88 Habermas seems to
hold that the idea developed in Aesthetic Theory that
certain modern works of art mimetically capture fundamental
truths about advanced industrial society cannot be
philosophically grounded. Indeed, he states that Adorno's
notion of mimesis amounts to gesticulation. I will discuss
in some detail Adorno's concept of mimesis and Habermas's
treatment of it later in the chapter. Suffice it to say for
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the moment that from the standpoint of Habermas's theory of
communicative action, according to which truth is
consensually established by intersubjecti vely and
recursively testing the validity of speech acts, Adorno's
idea that some works of art contain true knowledge about
modern society could not be theoretically grounded.
Habermas's reasoning seems to be that in locating truth
outside the matrix of communicative action Adorno places his
own linguistic claims about the incongruency between concept
and object and about the mimetic capacity of art works
beyond the space of recursive justification.
In the third chapter, I maintain that Negative
Dialectics and Aesthetic Theory sketch out a theory of a
non-r ig id i f y i ng subjective knowledge and experience, which
theory is in my view dependent on the account of the
formation of subjectivity developed in Dialectic of
En 1 igh tenment . Habermas's reading of Dialectic of
Enlightenment misses Horkheimer and Adorno's differentiated
treatment of the concept of enlightenment, and it thereby
disregards their idea that the possibility for critical
reflection upon the blind progress of i ns tr umen ta 1 i za t ion
has not been extinguished. Adorno's Negative Dialectics and
Aesthetic Theory take such critical reflection to be a
conditio sine qua non of an unregimented self that would
harmoniously interact with nature. The present chapter
examines what I take to be Habermas's chief objection
against Adorno's philosophy, namely that it cannot be
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rationally grounded. Habermas seems to hold that critical
social theory is capable of recursive justification and,
ultimately, of being grounded only if it acknowledges that
its own truth can only be established consensus 1 ly.
Dialectic of Enl ightenment
,
Negative Dial ectics and
Aesthetic Theory ascribe in Hegelian fashion truth and
falsity to societal conditions and to the relation between
subjectivity and nature. Habermas reads Dialectic of
Enl ightenment as lacking reflexivity, as failing to
recognize that the validity of its own claims can only be
decided upon on the basis of the intersubjecti ve character
and recursive elasticity of language. His rather casual
discussion of Negative Dialectics and Aesthetic Theory
suggests that he takes the previous point about Dialectic of
Enlightenment to apply to those texts too. Habermas appears
to interpret Adorno's language as inflicting a wound on
itself, so to speak, as blocking the path of reflexive
justification by situating the conditions of its truth in
material processes.
In what follows, I advance the view that Habermas's
critique of Adorno's philosophy is not cogent. (I do not
take a position with respect to one of the questions
Habermas's communicative turn raises, the question namely
whether his theory of communicative action is preferable to
Adorno's problemat i zat ion of the truth-content of what he
terms 'autonomous works of art'.) I argue that Habermas
falsely assumes that his concept of rational grounding, on
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the basis of which he criticizes Adorno's thought and first-
generation critical theory as being irreflexive, is already
intelligible. Habermas's notion of rational grounding is
parasitic upon his counter fac tua 1 category of a deliberative
procedure open to all possible rational speakers. I
maintain that the (perhaps insurmountable) difficulties
surrounding the implementation of anything like universal
distortion-free communication, which difficulties Habermas
acknowledges, underscore the obscurity of the idea of the
ideal speech situation and of the attendant concept of
rational grounding.
I do not mean to argue that what is erroneous about
the interpretation of Adorno's thought I attribute to
Habermas (according to which Adorno's thought is impervious
to recursive grounding) is its unclarity about the
implementation of ideal speech. The contemporary world is
governed by a compulsive, destructive and blind productivism
geared toward the eternal return of privately appropriated
profit. A theory such as Habermas's that calls for a
communicative structure in which functional rationality
would be critically examined is bound to be obscure. Just
as the possibility of an unregimented experience is not
immediately accessible to a person neurotically committed to
repetitive behavior, a possible noncoercive communicative
praxis is not clearly visible to a society ruled by
insidious, crisis-stabilizing technocratic powers. My
objection to Habermas's reception of Adorno's thought.
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rather, is that Habermas criticizes Adorno as if a universal
communicative procedure that would recursively ground
speech-acts were already clearly understandable.
Habermas also holds that Adorno's thought remains
caught up within what he calls the paradigm of the
philosophy of consciousness, and that his own focus on
communicative action overcomes the paradoxes that he thinks
terminally beset the philosophy of consciousness. I will
expound upon Habermas's rather complex notion of the
philosophy of consciousness shortly. Suffice it to say for
the moment that for Habermas what defines the paradigm of
the philosophy of consciousness is that it posits both a
cognizing subject supposedly capable in monadic fashion of
adjudicating the truth of knowledge-claims and a monistic
practical subject. Habermas offers few historical details,
which might clarify the referents of his notion of the
philosophy of consciousness. It seems, though, that he has
in mind the epistemologies of Descartes, Kant and Fichte,
and Marx's historical materialism. (Habermas's discussion in
Labor and Interaction of Hegel's Jena writings advances the
view that in those writings Hegel conceives of subjectivity,
labor and human interaction as communicatively constituted.
This suggests that Hegel's thought does not fit neatly into
what Habermas terms the philosophy of consciousness.)
According to Habermas, the philosophy of consciousness
misses the inter subjective , communicative dimension of
knowledge
.
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Habermas does not develop his claim that Adorno's
thought does not exit the space of the philosophy of
consciousness. In the present chapter, I unpack Habermas's
claim and examine it critically. Habermas's main point
seems to be that Adorno's conception of the relation between
subject and object abstracts from what he sees as the
communicative matrix of knowledge. Further, Habermas
explicitly agrees with Axel Honneth's view that Dialectic of
Enl igh tenment treats of subjective consciousness as if it
were not socially const! tuted. 89 por Honneth and Habermas,
Dialectic of Enl ightenment treats of the formation of
subjectivity solely in terms of the subject's instrumental
commerce with nature. Habermas argues, in contrast, that
the subject can only be understood as a product of processes
of acculturation and socialization, which for him are
eminently communicative. In the present chapter, I maintain
that Adorno’s notion of an unregimented subjective knowledge
and experience of nature is indebted to the concept of an
agential, spontaneous subjective consciousness, a concept
that I think Habermas would situate in the context of the
philosophy of consciousness. Yet it seems to me that
Habermas's discussion of the philosophy of consciousness is
not elastic enough to accommodate the differences between
Adorno's thought and subject-centered epistemologies.
Adorno does not conceive of subjective consciousness as if
it were the ground of clear and distinct ideas, objective
knowledge or absolute truth. My account later in the
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chapter of Adorno's notions of mimesis^O and of the
preponderance of the object^l is aimed at establishing the
previous point.
In claiming that Adorno's thought remains imprisoned
within the paradigm of the philosophy of consciousness,
Habermas means of course to convict Adorno's philosophy of
an error. For Habermas, I suppose, Adorno's thought shares
with the paradigm of the philosophy of consciousness the
inability to locate in everyday communicative action the
seeds of distortion-free communication, of communicative
rationality. In the present chapter, I argue that because
of the way Habermas constructs the ideal speech situation he
ends up subverting his view that it is a desideratum for
philosophy to overcome subject-centered thought. Put
schematically, my claim is that Habermas does not stabilize
his conception of subjectivity. On the one hand, he argues
that the subject is an effect of modern processes of
socialization and acculturation, and he confers upon
communicative action both logical and anthropological
primacy. 92 on the other hand, he thinks it a necessary
condition of distortion-free communication that the
deliberating agents be autonomous subjects. To the best of
my knowledge, he has not explained how he thinks that his
thesis of the primacy of communicative action is congruent
with his notion that distortion-free communication requires
autonomous subjective agents . I very much doubt that they
are congruent with each other. If, as Habermas holds.
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modern subjects become subjects as a result of processes of
socialization and acculturation, the subjective autonomy to
which he alludes would be an effect of communicative action,
which is to say that it would not be sjjbjective autonomy at
all. It is true that Habermas imagines the ideal speech
situation as a means for the participants to achieve self-
transparency about theoretical, moral and aesthetic
questions, whatever that might mean. Perhaps he believes
that subjects become autonomous when they recognize
themselves as the agents of a social consensus that has
left behind all obscurities, be they the result of ideology,
unconscious repression or strategic manipulation. The
instrument for attaining subjective autonomy would thus be
linguistic exchange devoid of coercion, and subjective
autonomy would mean that each speaker freely agrees with the
discursively produced consensus. The trouble with this line
of reasoning is that Habermas himself characterizes the
ideal speech situation minimal is tical ly in terms of its
procedural requirements and refuses substantively to
speculate about the outcome of distortion-free
communication. He does explicitly hold that such modern
phenomena as parliamentary government, the dissolution of
religious and metaphysical worldviews, the decentered
subject conceptualized by Piaget and the morally developed
individual thematized by Kohlberg are necessary conditions
for distortion-free communication, as is a yet to be
explained subjective autonomy. So far as I can tell, the
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idea of subjective autonomy finds expression in what
Habermas terms the philosophy of consciousness, notably in
Kant's moral philosophy. Habermas claims that this
philosophy has run its course, and that his theory of
communicative action leaves subject-centered thought behind.
Yet, as I point out above, the notion of subjective autonomy
is central to his account of the ideal speech situation.
Habermas prizes subjective autonomy, but in positing the
primacy of communicative action he calls into question the
possibility of such autonomy. if, as I claim, Habermas's
position with respect to the subject is paradoxical, it is
not at all clear why he takes his assertion that Adorno does
not exit the framework of the philosophy of consciousness to
be a cogent criticism.
At issue is not merely a logical inconsistency in
Habermas's thought. Habermas claims to leave the space of
subject-centered thought, and he wishes to retain a version
of a non-transcendental Kantianism. Thus, he states; "As a
resource that nourishes the capacity of participants in
[communicative] interaction to make statements capable of
consensus, the lifeworld functions the [communicative]
analogue of what subject-centered philosophy ascribed to
consciousness as its synthetic achievement. ..."^3 The
criticism of Habermas I develop in this chapter regarding
the conflict between his notions of subjective autonomy and
of the primacy of the lifeworld calls into question the
tenability of his non-transcendental Kantianism.
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Habermas gives few details from the history of
philosophy that might help clarify his notion of the
philosophy of consciousness. His discussion, rather, is
mainly typological. The essential characteristic of the
philosophy of consciousness, in his view, is that it posits
a monological cognizing subject. By 'mono log ica 1 ’ is meant
in this context that the knowing subject postulated by the
philosophy of consciousness putatively secures true
knowledge in abstraction from communicative practices.
Habermas claims, for instance, that Kant conceives of the
synthetic activity of the transcendental consciousness as if
it were independent from inter sub jective communication. And
I take it that Habermas would direct the same criticism at
Cartesian introspection, Fichte's concept of an absolute ego
and Hegel's notion of an absolute spirit. That the
linguistic media within which such categories as
'transcendental unity of apperception', 'absolute ego' and
'absolute spirit' figure are themselves the products of
communicative and hence social interaction eludes Kant,
Fichte^^ and Hegel, Habermas suggests. For its part, the
Marxian idea that the human species progressively ceases to
be the object of history by transforming nature through
labor is, for Habermas, anchored in the philosophy of
consciousness. Habermas's point is that Marx conceives of
human labor as the vehicle for the formation of the human
species as the agential subject of its own history.
According to Habermas, Marx thereby privileges the
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liberatory potential of human commerce with nature at the
expense of an insight into the emancipatory possibilities
inherent in communicative action. As I point out in the
second chapter, Habermas understands communicative action as
social action oriented toward the attainment of
inter sub jective agreement. Later in the present chapter, I
will discuss in some detail Habermas's idea that
communicative action harbors emancipatory possibilities.
Habermas asserts that the philosophy of consciousness
has reached a dead end. He defends this assertion by
claiming that "the paradigm of the philosophy of
consciousness" is beset by problems, by "aporias," that it
cannot resolve, and that such problems vanish as soon as one
takes his theoretical approach, centered as it is on the
notion of communicative action. Thus Habermas avers that
the philosophy of consciousness separates the
transcendental from the empirical, establishes an opposition
between human beings as agents of their history and as its
objects, and is mired in the paradox of locating a
putatively self-conscious subjectivity in a social milieu
not fully within its grasp. Habermas's discussion is quite
abstract. The following remarks are an attempt at
clar i f icat ion
.
In Kant's philosophy, the empirical ego is understood
as distinct from the logically unified transcendental
subject. Kant, Habermas suggests, thereby misses the
empirically ascertainable communicative basis of knowledge.
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Habermas's claim seems to be that if forms of knowledge are
indeed effects of lifeworld processes, Kant's idea that the
r u 1 e— go V e r ned activity of the unified transcendental
consciousness is the ground of objective knowledge must be
rejected. Instead of anchoring cognitive certitude in a
logically stabilized, disembodied self-consciousness,
Habermas conceives of knowledge as the result of
inter sub jective consensus.
According to Marx and Engels' Communist Manifesto
,
neither the proletariat nor the bourgeoisie is the agent of
human history. The proletariat, they argue, has no say over
the distribution of the social surplus, to which its labor
gives rise, whereas the bourgeoisie, they claim, cannot
avert such crises (of overproduction, for example) as are
the inevitable result of the dynamic of capitalism.
Although Marx and Engels hold that the course of capitalist
society is not under the conscious control of human beings,
they nonetheless envision a transformation toward a
socialist society catalyzed by the proletariat's becoming
aware of its position as an exploited class. For Habermas,
I suspect, it is not at all clear how proletarian class
consciousness is attainable if labor, to the exclusion of
communicative action, is seen as the motor-force for
overcoming class divided society.
As I suggest above, Habermas claims that the philosophy
of consciousness leaves a third contradiction unresolved.
On the one hand, the subject's movement from being-in-itself
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toward be ing-for- i tse 1 f is posited; on the other hand, the
subject is placed within a social world it does not fully
master. Perhaps a problem I see with Hegel's philosophy
illustrates Habermas's claim. Hegel advances the view that
modernity's distinctive mark is the emergence of
subjectivity, of self-consciousness. His Philosophy of
Right purports to trace the world spirit's march in the
direction of an ethical order in which particular and
universal, individual and monarch, subject and object are
reconciled. Hegel sees Prussia's constitutional monarchy as
the realization of what he takes to be the telos of human
history; an ethical system in which subjectivity is neither
neglected by nor in opposition to the universal, which he
thinks is embodied by the state. The Ph i losophy of Right
,
however, registers an obstacle in what otherwise seems to be
the smooth logical flow of a world spirit bent on attaining
self-consciousness by actualizing itself in the world.
Hegel argues that with the onset and in the aftermath of the
industrial revolution civil society, which he defines as the
system of needs, cannot avoid giving rise to an
impoverished class. Already in the Philosophy of Right
overproduction as a source of economic crises is thematized.
Hegel, uncharacteristically, offers no solution to poverty,
except to suggest melioristic welfare measures. His
puzzlement about the means to overcome the poverty inherent
in industrial society seems to me to deflate the panlogicism
of his claim that the world spirit attains self-awareness
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through its actualization in a Pr uss ian- 1 i ke monarchy. The
world spirit's failure to stabilize the system of needs
calls into question Hegel's world-historical triumphalism.
And the impoverished individuals at the margin of civil
society, he himself admits, are by virtue of their destitute
condition robbed of the possibility to participate in
ethical life as agential subjects. Social, economic,
cultural and political processes unfold behind their backs.
As I will elucidate shortly, Habermas sees his turn
toward the paradigm of communicative action as overcoming
the paradoxes that he thinks terminally beset the philosophy
of consciousness. He maintains that the essential trait of
the human species is its capacity to engage in communicative
action. Borrowing Noam Chomsky's term 'competence',
Habermas uni ve r sa 1 i st ica 1 1 y attributes to human beings the
competence to use language, which he takes to be necessarily
inter sub j ecti ve. Habermas characterizes his theory as the
rational reconstruction of communicative competence. I will
elaborate on the previous sentence below. For the moment,
suffice it to say that Habermas thinks it empirically
observable that in lifeworld contexts (that is, in pre-
theoretical, unproblematized circumstances of linguistic
exchange) human beings manifest their communicative
competence by engaging in speech-acts. Habermas claims that
the exchange of speech-acts harbors the latent expectation
of inter sub j ec t i ve understanding. Implicit in all
communication, Habermas argues, is the possibility of
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settling disputes, removing obscurities, and reaching
consensus about theoretical, moral and aesthetic questions.
Habermas claims to reconstruct the capacity for undistorted
communication immanent in lifeworld contexts by suggesting a
communicative procedure in which speech-acts would be
examined with regard to their validity. in his view,
communicative rationality consists in a deliberative
procedure that rules out coercion. Habermas links the
lifeworld with communicative rationality: rationality, for
him, is anchored neither in the synthesizing activity of a
transcendental consciousness nor in the contemplation of a
transcendent cosmic order; it is implicit, rather, in actual
communication
.
I think that Habermas sees his theory as avoiding the
pitfalls of the philosophy of consciousness in the following
fashion. He hopes to eschew the distinction between the
transcendental and the empirical by taking as his point of
departure for the theory of communicative rationality the
fact of everyday communication. He acknowledges that his
argument seems to proceed in transcendental fashion (in
Kant's sense), for he inquires into the conditions of
possibility of distortion-free communication. As I point
out in the third chapter, his answer is that everyday
speech-acts are capable of noncoerci ve--that is,
discursive
—
probl emat i zat ion regarding their validity. For
Habermas, though, discursive validation is not a
transcendents 1- log ica 1 activity but an admittedly
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counter factual ly conceived i nter sub j ec t i ve practice. (i
think it rather doubtful that Habermas thereby overcomes the
split between the transcendental and the empirical. He does
not tailor the ideal speech situation to concrete historical
conditions but views it as a universally valid deliberative
procedure. Further, the imagined universal discursive
community is supposed to be unified in its commitment to a
single communicative procedure and hence seems as monolithic
and logocentric as the logically unified transcendental
consciousness posited by Kant.)
I argue above that perhaps the Communist Manifesto
displays what Habermas sees as another vice typical of the
philosophy of consciousness insofar as it does not
satisfactorily explain how human beings can cease to be the
objects of history to become its agents. I gather that
Habermas seeks to avoid antinomially conceiving of humans as
agents and as objects of history by proposing that modernity
be understood as the progressive rationalization (in the
sense of the advance of communicative rationality) of the
lifeworld. That is, Habermas thinks that by their very
communicative action human beings have succeeded in the
course of modernization in moving toward a form of society
informed by undistorted speech and away from mythical,
religious and metaphysical world-views.
Instead of paradoxically situating putatively self-
conscious subjects in social milieus they do not fully
grasp, Habermas advances the view that all everyday
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communication is an anticipation, a foretaste, so to speak,
of a rational (that is, discursive) procedure, which he
thinks must be conceptualized as possible in our world and
which he believes would secure clarity about the social,
natural and affective realms. (Habermas seems
to assume that the rational communicative procedure he
espouses is already intelligible. I will challenge this
assumption toward the end of the present chapter.)
Before turning to Habermas's claim that Dial ectic of
Enl ightenment and Adorno's later philosophy remain caught up
within the framework of the philosophy of consciousness, I
should like in some detail to trace the line Habermas draws
between the lifeworld and the ideal speech situation.
Habermas asserts that his investigation of the potential
for undistorted communication immanent in the lifeworld
aims to erase what he sees as the main deficit of Dial ectic
of Enl ightenment and the rest of Adorno's philosophy: their
refusal, namely, to provide a philosophical justification of
their own concepts of rationality and a rational society.
Habermas argues that implicit in Dialectic of
Enl ightenment*
s
critique of instrumental reason and in
Adorno's category of the nonidentical (that is, of a
material realm not standardized by an abstractive
subjectivity) is the notion of a noninstrumental form of
thought. This notion, according to Habermas, is left
without theoretical grounding, and it is not clearly
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articulated; at best, he thinks, the notion is hinted at in
the hopes for a better life to which Dialectic of
Enl ightenment and Adorno's later philosophy give expression.
Habermas thinks it indispensable that a critical theory
of society be capable of explaining and defending the
position from which it launches its critique. He undertakes
to ground his own critical project by tapping into a
property of language, namely its reflexivity. Wilhelm von
Humboldt, Habermas notes, claims that language can refer to
the external world, can point outside itself, but that it
can also refer to itself. As I remark above, Habermas
thinks of language as an inter subjective medium. He
reformulates Humboldt's idea by ascribing reflexivity to
communicative action. For Habermas, speech-acts, which he
thinks are necessarily inter sub jective
,
are capable of
recursive problemat i zat ion. To speak, he suggests, is to
enter the terrain of communicative rationality. This is
not to say that he takes all speech-acts to be valid. The
point, rather, is to emphasize that Habermas locates the
potential for a rational social formation in linguistic
interaction. Habermas rejects the ancient concept of
theor ia
,
that is, of knowledge as the contemplation of a
putatively harmoniously ordered and functioning cosmos. 95
He also rejects the notion of a reason anchored in the self-
conscious activity of a monadic subject. Such conceptions,
Habermas suggests, purport to locate truth outside the space
of linguistic interaction. That they are deficient, he
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further suggests, becomes obvious as soon as it is
recognized that they themselves are the products of
communicative action. Paradoxically, such conceptions claim
to ground knowledge even though they fail to broach its
communicative conditions of possibility. Habermas holds
that critical social theory can be grounded in a notion of
rationality, which he claims to secure by pointing to an
argumentative procedure that would distinguish between valid
and invalid speech-acts. Validity, which for Habermas
comprises propositional truth, normative rightness, and
subjective and aesthetic truthfulness (be that as it may),
is supposed to be established once a consensus is freely and
uncoercively arrived at by all participants in discursive
deliberation. Such deliberation, the so-called ideal speech
situation, Habermas asserts, is immanent in all
communicative action as an expectation. Thus communicative
action, according to Habermas, is reflexive insofar as in
every conversation the possibility of a rational procedure
for arriving at a universal consensus about theoretical,
practical and aesthetic questions is counter factual ly
assumed. Habermas believes that it is a virtue of
liberalism and of putatively liberal institutions such as
parliamentary democracy, the mass media and constitutional
government, that they have not foreclosed the possibility of
the discursive elaboration of lifeworld communication, that
they continue to tolerate the recursive elasticity of
language
.
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Having discussed Habermas’s notion of the philosophy of
consciousness and the theoretical perspective from which he
criticizes that notion, I should like to turn to his claim
that Dialectic of Enl ightenment and Adorno's later works
remain imprisoned within the paradigm of the philosophy of
consciousness. Habermas does not elaborate the latter
claim, yet its implications are easily educed. As I remark
in the previous chapters, Habermas reads Dialectic of
Enl ightenment as if it argued that the contemporary world is
governed by an all-encompassing instrumental rationality.
Horkheimer and Adorno do articulate a theory of the
formation of subjectivity according to which
instrumentalization is the outcome of the progressive
solidification of an autarchic and imperious subjectivity
antinomially positioned against the material world. Pace
Habermas, however, Adorno and Horkheimer do not reduce
reason to its instrumental form. They argue that
instrumental thought comes to be dominant in the course of
modernization
.
For Habermas, though, the essential point is that
Dialectic of Enlightenment misses the rational potential of
communicative action. Dialectic of Enl ightenment , on
Habermas's reading, is constrained by the Marxian belief in
the emancipatory potential of labor, of instrumental action.
To be sure, it positions itself negatively with respect to
the said belief: whereas Marx thinks that the proletariat
could constitute itself as the agential subject of a
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socialist history, Horkheimer and Ador no--Habermas correctly
notes had already in the 1930s given up the idea of the
proletariat as the privileged subject of history. Indeed,
Habermas points out that Dial ectic of Enlightenment
articulates a negative philosophy of history. This means
that Habermas takes Dialectic o
f
Enlightenment to be
informed by the question whether the telos of history is the
formation of humanity as the agential subject of its history
and to answer in the negative. At the price of detailed
historical knowledge. Dialectic of Enlightenment
,
according
to Habermas, straight jackets its account of the process of
the formation of subjectivity within the horizon of a human
history reduced to the history of the advance of
instrumental reason.
Habermas contends that a theory sensitive to historical
detail would not erase the differentiated character of
modernity, which he thinks accommodates both instrumental
and communicative action. For Habermas, the key to an
understanding of human history is not the cognitive and
instrumental agency of a monadic subject, but
intersubjecti ve communication, which he takes to point in
the direction of a rational communicative procedure.
Whereas Horkheimer and Adorno subsume the process of
enlightenment under the category of a systematizing
instrumental reason, Habermas maintains, modernity is
properly understood in terms of the tension between system
and lifeworld. He argues that although nonl inguistic
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systemic media for the coordination of social action— to
wit: money and administrative power— threaten to destroy the
communicative resources inherent in lifeworld contexts su-h
as the family, the mass media and deliberative political
structures, it would be erroneous to reduce the last five
hundred years of human history to the progress of
functionalization. The possibility of rational deliberation
among free and autonomous subjects, for Habermas, has not
been extinguished by modern forms of cognition and action.
According to Habermas, even though Negative Dialectics
and Aesthetic Theory develop a critique of what for Adorno
is a domineering enlightenment subjectivity, they too fail
to exit the terrain of subject-centered thought, of the
philosophy of consciousness. xn order to understand
Habermas's point, I think it worthwhile to recapitulate my
third chapter's account linking Dialectic of Enl ightenment
with Adorno's later works.
Adorno too, one could say, criticizes subject-centered
reason, although for reasons different than those Habermas
advances. Adorno's Negative Dialectics and Aesthetic Theory
retain the idea articulated in Dialectic of Enlightenment
that reason, rather than being the principle of cosmic order
or the logical activity of a disembodied subject that
imposes order on the material world, cannot be abstracted
from the human labor of self-preservation. Indeed,
according to Dialectic of Enlightenment, it is in the course
of the progressive mastery of nature, from Homeric times to
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industrial society, that reason is formed as an instrument
humans wield to preserve themselves in a threatening
environment. For Adorno and Horkheimer, though, reason is
not singularly a tool for human self-preservation. They
suggest that the reflection they undertake in Dialectic of
Enl ightenment upon instrumental rationality's involvement in
industrialism, technocratic management, scientism and the
commodification of culture, is itself expressive of
noninstrumental thought. Habermas, though, is correct in
claiming that Dialectic of Enl ightenment barely explains its
concept of a reflective enlightenment that would sever the
nexus Adorno and Horkheimer find between instrumental
reason, on the one hand, and the domination of nature and
social antagonisms, on the other hand.
In the previous chapter, I maintain that Negative
Dialectics and Aesthetic Theory sketch out a theory of an
unregimented subjective experience, that is, of an
experience that would not be governed by the conflictual
interaction between a coercively constituted logocentric
subjectivity and the material world. Adorno interprets the
nonconceptua 1 , but still subjective organization of material
elements in what he characterizes as the most advanced works
of art as an allegory of a subjective experience in harmony
with nature. Negative Dialectics articulates the idea of a
mode of writing that aims to dismantle the conceptual
machinery of nominalistic thinking. Adorno conceives of
linguistic constellations as a means of shortening the
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distance between nominalistic concepts and their objects.
Linguistic constellations are assemblages of sentences that
seek to capture the historicity and fractured character of
the social world. They respond, according to Adorno, to
the lack of elasticity and nominalistic estrangement of
concepts by striving for greater congruency with the
processive nature of society. Adorno thinks it a
desideratum of critical social theory that it adequately
capture social reality. Yet he harbors no illusions about
language's capacity to achieve a perfect fit with the
external world. In the course of the development of
enlightenment rationality, according to Adorno, thought has
lost the capability present in myth mimetically to interact
with nature.
Habermas suggests, as do other commentators (Bubner,
for instance), that Adorno's key category of mimesis places
his philosophy on the verge of the mystical and the
irrational. I take Habermas to mean that the idea developed
in Aesthetic Theory that autonomous works of art are
repositories of truth (in that they organize their material
elements in noninstrumental fashion and mimetically recover
essential qualities of modern society lost to instrumental
reason) is incapable of recursive grounding. Habermas's
reasoning might be that by ascribing truth to autonomous
works of art Adorno leaves the truth-conditions of his own
language unexplained. I suppose that Habermas sees Adorno's
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theory as ungroundable
,
as blocking the path to its
reflexive justification by situating truth outside the
terrain of discourse. In the following paragraph, l attempt
to clarify Adorno's concept of mimesis. Later in the
chapter, I argue that for Adorno this concept and the
related notion of the preponderance of the object are
accessible only by means of subjective re f lection. 97
(Adorno's philosophy does not carry out a reactionary attack
against Kant's Copernican revolution. It is true that
Adorno implicates the idealist subject in the domination of
nature. But he maintains that knowledge of nature can only
be subjectively mediated. His philosophy does not propose to
cancel the subject, only to release it from its logocentric
confinement.) Such critics as Habermas and Bubner seem to
me to miss the philosophical justification Adorno offers
in the form of a logic of disintegration for his concept of
mimesis. (I introduce the notion of a logic of
disintegration in the third chapter, and I develop this
notion toward the end of the present chapter.) I argue
below that Habermas's concept of reflexive grounding is too
diffuse for him to establish that the ung roundabi 1 i ty of
which he seems to accuse Adorno's concept of mimesis is
objectionable .
In Dial ectic of Enlightenment , Horkheimer and Adorno
maintain that practitioners of archaic magic sought to
pacify the demonic forces they perceived as threatening by
behaving like demons. It isn't that Adorno and Horkheimer
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advocate a return to the mythical past, as if such a past
knew of a harmonious relation between humans and nature.
They stress that myth too was governed by violence.
Horkheimer and Adorno develop an enlightenment critique of
myth that highlights the absence of critical reflection in,
for instance, the sacrificial practices recorded in Homer's
Odyssey . Because mythical symbols, unlike metaphysical
abstraction, do not separate thought from being, they do not
yet allow for the possibility of conceptually criticizing
social arrangements, Adorno and Horkheimer maintain. But the
Enlightenment's understanding of itself as if it were
radically different from myth is in their view erroneous.
According to Dialectic of Enlightenment
,
the dominant form
of enlightenment thought in the contemporary world (an
abstractive, formalistic scientism that blindly reinforces
the domination of nature) is, like myth, under the aegis of
fate. Insofar as instrumental rationality cannot
problematize its own desirability and direction, Horkheimer
and Adorno argue, it operates outside the bounds of
conscious control. On the theory advanced in Dialectic of
Enlightenment
,
myth is false from an enlightenment
perspective because it does not accommodate the self-
critical agential enlightenment subject, whereas
enlightenment is untrue from the standpoint of myth because
it represses the human affinity with nature.
Adorno and Horkheimer claim that the history of
language gives evidence of the loss in the course of the
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process of enlightenment of the capacity mimetically to
interact with the material world. According to Dialectic of
En 1 igh tenment / words no longer conflate image and sign, as
did hieroglyphs. In positivism, perhaps the twentieth
century's chief philosophical outlaw for Horkheimer and
Adorno, language— they maintain--is straight jacketed within
a formalistic framework that merely ratifies surface facts.
Positivism, Adorno and Horkheimer contend, pictures science
as if it were not implicated in the reproduction of society,
and it is incapable of grasping the connection between a
positivistically glorified science and the domination of
nature
.
As I argue in the previous chapter, Adorno's later
works sketch out a theory of a nonr ig id i f ying knowledge and
experience of the material world. I should like to propose
that his concept of mimesis lies at the boundary, so to
speak, between conceptual language, which for Adorno is the
means of expression of an autarchic subjectivity, and
autonomous works of art, which he thinks organize their
material elements in nonconceptua 1 fashion. Such art works,
he holds, point to a nondomineering subjective intercourse
with the material world. (As an aside, I think it a mistake
to interpret Adorno's notion of mimesis as aiming to provide
direct conceptual access to nature. Adorno explicitly
rejects the possibility of an unmediated knowledge of
nature. In Negative Dialectics , he states that not even the
most assiduous commitment to concretization can succeed in
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affixing empirical reality to the page of a book.) it seems
to me that Adorno's concept of mimesis links Negative
Dialectics
,
which claims to disclose the lack of fit between
conceptual fixity, on the one hand, and a historical and
conflictual social world, on the other hand, with Aesthetic
Theory
,
which reads autonomous art works as hinting at a way
out of the enlightenment subject's logocentric confinement.
Thus Adorno's category of mimesis underscores his view that
conceptualization standardizes the natural world, thereby
excising its differential qualities, and that the formally
most advanced modern works of art--on ref lection--br ing
repressed nature back into focus. It is precisely because
his concept of mimesis aims to shift theoretical attention
away from the effort at stabilizing conceptual assemblages
that Adorno does not develop that concept. Adorno's notion
of mimesis paves the way toward an aesthetic theory that
interprets autonomous works of art as convicting abstract,
uni ver sal is tic concepts of their insufficiency with respect
to the material world.
The previous point is emphatically made in Adorno's
essay on Beckett's Endgame . Adorno argues there that
Beckett's drama bears some resemblance with French
existentialism. Yet, he contends, whereas the latter raises
the notions of absurdity, choice and situation to the level
of abstract, universal concepts. Endgame per format ive ly
captures the absurdity, irrationality and meaninglessness of
language and culture in the aftermath of rationally executed
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genocide and in the light of possible atomic annihilation.
Adorno suggests that existentialism fails to grasp its own
paradoxical nature: in seeking philosophically to grasp
absurdity and meaninglessness, it invests them with meaning.
Beckett's language, according to Adorno, codifies the
dissolution of metaphysical and religious meaning. Hence,
he maintains, the task of interpreting Endgame consists in
grasping its resistance to conceptual subsumption.
Beckett's drama mimes the terror prevalent in contemporary
society the administrative discipline of which militates
against individual autonomy, Adorno argues. The characters
in Beckett's play make manifest the paucity of subjective
spontaneity under a corporatist social order that
continuously exacts obedience. Existentialist language,
according to Adorno, fails to evade the Western predilection
for abstraction, conceptual fixity, immutable essences.
Beckett's drama, in contrast, does not compress socially
produced pusillanimity into a philosophical thesis, Adorno
maintains. Beckett's linguistic form, on Adorno's reading,
exposes existentialism's thoroughly abstract character, and
it unmasks as illusory any philosophical pretense to educing
meaning from an instrumental i zed social order.
Habermas, to the best of my knowledge, does not offer
an elaborate critique of Adorno's concept of mimesis. In
the fourth chapter of the first volume of the Theory of
Communicative Action, he summarily dismisses Adorno's notion
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of mimesis as bearing the imprint of a philosophy that
degenerates into gesticulation. Yet a more sober
Habermasian objection to Adorno's concept of mimesis than
the one Habermas himself raises is not all that difficult to
construct. From the standpoint of Habermas's formal
pragmatics of language, Adorno's aes the t ic i zed theory is but
an aporetic linguistic attempt at exiting the realm of
language. The attempt is said to be aporetic since Adorno
eschews reflexively grounding his theory after the fashion
of Habermas's pragmatics of language and seeks, rather, to
overcome theoretical autarchy by orienting his philosophy
toward the unregimented experience of nature he thinks
autonomous art works presage. Habermas argues that Adorno
intentionally engages in the paradoxical endeavor
conceptually to convict concepts of their inadequacy with
respect to their objects. Adorno, on Habermas's reading,
thus destabilizes his own theoretical project.
The plausibility of Habermas's critique of Adorno's
philosophy rests on the notion of the reflexivity of
communicative action. As I claim above, Habermas
reformulates Humboldt's idea that language not only points
to the external world but is also self-referential: for
Habermas, the possibility of a rational procedure for
inter sub jective communication rests on the still extant
human capacity recursively to examine the validity of
speech-acts, of lifeworld communication. Habermas
recognizes the practical difficulties of actualizing the
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ideal speech situation. As I point out in my second
chapter, communicative rationality is in his view a
counter factual construct that serves to assess the
liberality of present communicative structures and to
provide a model for such structures to emulate. Thus
Habermas sees his theory of communicative action as
suggesting a nexus between theory and praxis: truth in
theoretical, moral and aesthetic matters would no longer be
locatable in a transcendent cosmic order beyond the planning
and control of human beings or in the spontaneous cognitive
activity of a monological subject; it would instead be
consensually generated by free participants in actual
discursive practices.
It seems to me, though, that Habermas fails to consider
a consequence of the practical difficulties surrounding the
ideal speech situation. If we do not yet know how billions
of human beings divided by language, class, gender, power,
nationalism, religion, and so forth, can engage in
distortion-free communication, Habermas's idea of the
discursive examination of the validity of speech-acts
remains obscure. The notion that theory and communicative
action are reflexive is wedded in Habermas's philosophy to a
counter factual idea that he thinks must be viewed as
realizable if we are to live in humane fashion. Yet insofar
as this idea awaits enlightenment about its practical
implementation, it fails to protect Habermas's philosophy
from the theoreticism it claims to circumvent. Habermas's
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central category, that of a link between communicative
action and communicative rationality, is most fragile.
Theoretical stability of the kind Habermas claims is wanting
in Adorno’s philosophy could only be secured if Habermas
were to succeed in demytho log i z i ng the question of the
practical implementation of undistorted communication in a
differentiated modernity. So far, however, his philosophy
has merely gestured toward the ideal speech situation.
Habermas fails to establish that the practical conditions
for the realization of discursive interaction are any more
accessible to current language than he claims is the case
with Adorno's concept of mimesis. This should not be
irrelevant to Habermas's theory, which after all purports to
disclose the pragmatic grounds for continued progress in the
direction of communicative enlightenment.
As I suggest in the previous chapter, Habermas is not
alone in charging that Adorno's idea, sub juncti ve ly
articulated in Negative Dialectics and Aesthetic Theory
,
of
an experience and knowledge of the material world whereby
the cognizing subject would liberate itself from the
strictures of identi ty- thought borders on theoretical chaos.
Indeed, Ruediger Bubner contends that Adorno's insistence on
the lack of congruency between concept and object prevents
his philosophy from recursively clarifying its
presuppositions. These criticisms seem to me best discussed
in the context of Adorno's notion of the preponderance of
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the object (Vorrang des Objekts)
,
a notion that I will
attempt to elucidate shortly. For the moment, though, l
think it important to stress that such criticisms do not
broach Adorno's suggestion that his philosophy is a logic of
disintegration. In Phi losophische Termino log ie
,
he comes
close to advocating Aristotle's definition of philosophy as
a knowledge about knowledge. Adorno, however, and this is
the sense of the expression 'logic of disintegration',
argues that a reflexive knowledge must yield the conclusion
that conceptualization misses the qualitative richness of
its objects. If Descartes, Kant and the German idealists
seek to stabilize the concept of subjectivity by assuming
that the consciousness of objects presupposes self-
consciousness, Adorno maintains that they err by extruding
from the domain of subjectivity all somatic, objective, that
is, natural elements. This means that subjectivity mustn't
be conceived more ph i losoph ico as if it were independent
from the dynamic of drives, and that the idealist subject
projects the unity it imposes on itself onto the material
world, Adorno holds.
The sentence 'Only those thoughts are true that fail to
understand themselves', a sentence that figures in several
of Adorno's writings, 98 underscores his view that the
cognizing subject cannot be robbed of its cultural,
historical, economic, political, social and instinctual
attributes. Against the subjectivist turn initiated by
Descartes, Adorno ceases to locate the foundation of
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cognitive certainty in self-consciousness. The cognizing
subject, for Adorno, cannot succeed in understanding nature
and social reality by attempting in theoreticist fashion to
secure the perimeter within which its activity is to take
place. Adorno's reasoning is that the philosophical subject
thus stabilized represses its own nature, which then remains
concealed--al 1 pretenses to enlightenment notwithstanding--
and that it antinomially sets itself against a variegated
material world that it distorts by means of conceptual
standardization. Further, he thinks that the nominalistic
distance between language and reality exposes discrete
definitions and logical closure as artificial conceptual
maneuvers
.
Perhaps Adorno's idea that thought cannot incestuously
ground knowledge explains Habermas's failure to elucidate
the concrete circumstances in which communicative action
would be recursively evaluated. Habermas correctly
maintains that the concept of communicative rationality must
be linked to communicative praxis if it is to escape
idealism 's grip; yet the failure of his theory to articulate
how the communicative procedure it favors might be
implemented in this sordid planet of ours means that the
truth-conditions of the theory remain at present beyond its
hermeneutical reach. Is it too irreverent to suggest that
by situating the grounds for the verification of speech-
acts, theories, and hence his own formal pragmatics of
language, in a murky discursive beyond Habermas ends up
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adding his voice to Adorno's claim that 'only those thoughts
are true that fail to understand themselves'?
The difficulty, which may very well be insurmountable,
in putting into practice the ideal speech situation suggests
that the notion of distortion-free communication is at best
vaguely accessible to contemporary consciousness. If
Habermas's theory fails to move beyond paying lip service to
the idea that communicative action is capable of reflexive
grounding, his suggestion that Adorno's concept of mimesis
defies recursive validation loses its critical edge.
Adorno's concept of mimesis, on my reading, does indeed call
into question the self-sufficiency of conceptual
assemblages. Yet Habermas would have to elucidate the
practical circumstances of discursive communication for his
idea to hold that mimesis, in contrast to communicative
action, stands outside the domain of the rational. Without
a discussion of how on earth communicative rationality might
be realized, the link between theory and praxis that
Habermas claims to forge is missing.
If the previous criticism of Habermas's theory is
tenable, if it is indeed the case that his dehistor icized
concept of reflexive grounding presupposes a rather obscure
discursive practice, his charge that Adorno's concept of
mimesis amounts to gesticulation is not cogently supported.
Habermas correctly implies that Adorno does not situate his
concept of mimesis in a theory that seeks to ground its
claims, to stabilize them within a clearly demarcated
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comiTiun i c a t i V © spac©. (For Adorno, any such th©ory is an
artificial construct ©xpr©ssiv© of a subjectivity that
projects its own forced unity onto the objective world.)
Yet Habermas's ideal speech situation is so ethereal that it
is questionable whether the related concept of discursive
grounding has critical force. There may very well be other
worlds, and a universal consensus is not logically
impossible. But if the measure of the groundabi 1 i ty of
theories and concepts is given by a counter factual ly
construed communicative practice, then it is not at all
clear how historically localized theories and concepts can
be simply dismissed as gesticulation. Further, the
reflexive argumentation Habermas imagines would be a
universal intersubjec tive practice
,
and thus it is not
obvious what warrants his assumption that his theory
,
unlike
Adorno's philosophy, is not reflexive. I suspect that for
Habermas the reflexivity of his theory rests on its
themati zat ion of the ideal speech situation, that is, on its
recognition that it could be subjected to a discursive
examination regarding its validity. The problem with this
line of reasoning, though, is that it cannot be taken for
granted that participants in an ideal speech procedure would
find Habermas's theory intelligible. Habermas seems to
assume he can smoothly project that a (counter factua 1 ly
conceived) universal communicative praxis would
r e t r o j ec t i V e 1 y recognize itself as the actualization of his
theory of communicative action. If I am not mistaken.
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Habermas thinks that his theory is reflexive in virtue of a
link, which I think is still missing, between the theory and
a yet to be realized ideal speech praxis.
Habermas also argues that Adorno's theory, in spite of
its critique of identity thought as expressive of a
subjectivity that represses nature and conceals the social
matrix of knowledge, remains caught up within the framework
of the philosophy of consciousness. This means that, for
Habermas, Adorno's philosophy fails to dismantle the
Cartesian and idealist scaffolding that supports a
mono log ica 1 1 y understood subject. Notwithstanding Adorno's
notion of the preponderance of the object, according to
which the materiality of the subject (that is, its
affectivity and emplacement within society) is accessible to
subjective reflection, Habermas contends that the philosophy
of consciousness haunts Adorno's work. Habermas suggests
that Adorno's espousal of a community of free individuals
hints at distortion-free communication, and he points out
that in isolated places (in the discussion of Eichendorff,
for example) Adorno makes room for inter subject iv i ty. Yet,
for Habermas, Adorno misses the fact that the subject is an
effect of communicative structures, of the lifeworld.
As I argue in the third chapter, Adorno does not
completely jettison the concept of the subject nourished by
the philosophies of Descartes, Kant and the German
idealists. In Negative Dialectics and in ^ Subject und
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Ob j ec
t
,
Adorno retains the Kantian insight into the
subjective mediation involved in the knowledge of objects.
He argues that although objects exist in the absence of
subjective mediation, we do not have cognitive access to
what they are in themselves—what he terms 'naive realism'
notwithstanding. But philosophies that rest on the notion
of a transcendental subject, Adorno avers, mistakenly
purport to erase the subject's constitutive objectivity.
The abstract, idealist subject, Adorno maintains, is the
conceptual reflection of abstract economic relations, of the
prevalence of exchange- value. 99 Further, he holds that
there is an element of ideology in the notion of a
transcendental subject: the logical unification of
consciousness, he suggests, masks the fragmentation of the
empirical self prevalent within the social division of
labor. And already in the chapter on Homer's Odyssey in
Dialectic of En 1 igh tenment
,
Adorno and Horkheimer claim that
the Western subject constitutes itself as the agent of human
self-preservation by repressing instinctual satisfaction.
Yet both Dialectic of Enlightenment and Adorno's later
philosophy sketch out the idea of a reflective subject that
would communicate with nature in a noninstrumental fashion.
The subject's reflection upon the domination of nature,
according to Adorno, initiates movement away from the
conceptual homogenization of the material world. The
remembrance of the sacrificing of happiness exacted by the
progress in the instrumental control of nature and society.
164
he suggests, aims to dislodge the subject from the
anthropocentric pedestal in which modern thought has put it.
(Kant's Copernican revolution enthrones a subjectivity
afflicted with a Ptolemaic complex.) Negative Dialectics
follows a centrifugal course away from the hubris of self-
centered humanism in the direction of an aesthetic theory
that seeks to recover the subject's buried mimetic
capac i t ies
.
Adorno interprets art as a subjective intervention upon
the material world. This is not to say that Adorno locates
the significance of art in authorial intention or that he
thinks of works of art as private opinions about social
reality. The point, rather, is that for Adorno art works do
not straightforwardly mirror reality— be that as it may.
Works of art, he contends, organize their material elements.
Aesthetic subjectivity, according to Adorno, gives form to
the colors, tones and words that figure in artistic
creations. He thinks that the most advanced art works in
modernity organize their material elements in
nonstandardizing fashion. It is thus that he believes
aesthetic subjectivity differs from the conceptualizing
subject that he takes to be at the root of instrumental
reason. For Adorno, it is precisely the nonconceptua 1
,
nonsignifying nature of modern works of art that explains
their puzzling character, their resistance to theoretical
understanding. 100 That at the level of form musical
compositions and the visual arts eschew concepts goes
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without saying. As for the works of literature that in
Adorno's view display the most advanced formal features (the
works, that is, of Joyce, Beckett and Kafka), Adorno's
position is not that concepts do not figure in them at all.
Rather, Adorno thinks that such works differ from conceptual
systems in that they do not homogenize nature. Beckett's
Endgame
,
for instance, does not proclaim more philosophico
that modernity is marked by the dissolution of metaphysical
and religious meaning, Adorno argues. He suggests that the
very language of the drama and the trash bins that house
Nagg and Nell (Hamm's parents) rescue meaninglessness from
the grip of philosophical abstraction.
Adorno's idea that works of art are hermetic to
conceptual understanding would be misinterpreted if taken as
denying the possibility of aesthetic interpretation.
Adorno's Aesthetic Theory is not guilty of sophomoric self-
refutation. For Adorno, art works must be understood in
their resistance to subsumption under theoretical formulas.
His aesthetic theory respects the alterity of works of art,
without thereby petrifying the distinction between theory
and mimesis. According to Adorno, the nonconceptua 1 nature
of art reminds theory, as it were, of its insufficiency with
respect to the material world. (The aura of untainted
objectivity with which scientism invests modern natural
science, Adorno maintains, is but the manifestation of a
reified subjective consciousness. Critical theory holds
that the mathematized language of the natural sciences is
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incapable of thematizing the position of these sciences
within the framework of the intellectual division of labor.
This blindness suffices to give the lie to the scientistic
glorification of the sciences of nature as models of true
knowledge.) Aesthetic interpretation for its part, taps
into the cognitive resources latent in art works, Adorno
claims. Adorno thinks that by organizing their material
elements in noninstrumental fashion, autonomous works of art
subvert the logic of the subjective, instrumental domination
of nature.
If Habermas's claim that Adorno's theory fails to exit
the space of the philosophy of consciousness means to
emphasize that Adorno does not take the turn toward the
paradigm of communicative action, it is not in the least
controversial. Adorno does not find mapped in what for
Habermas are lifeworld communicative contexts the royal road
to a more humane society. Of course, Habermas himself, at
the end of the second volume of the Theory of Communicative
Action
,
can only very generally (and implausibly, it seems
to me) point to the modern family and mass media as the loci
of communication undisturbed by systemic imperatives. But
Adorno's notion of an unregimented subjective experience and
cognition of the material world, which experience and
cognition would be sensitive to the self's affinity with
nature, does not presuppose a monological subject after the
fashion of the philosophy of consciousness. To be sure,
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Adorno retains the idea of an agential subject that would
not experience the world passively. Still, his concept of
mimesis subverts any claim to the logical autonomy of
subjective consciousness. On Adorno's theory, if art works
are resistant to subsumption under concepts, it is in part
because aesthetic subjectivity does not logically unify the
material elements to which it gives form. Further,
according to Adorno, if autonomous works of art hint at an
unregimented subjectivity, it is because they, unlike
conceptual assemblages, do not erase the diversity inherent
in nature. In Negati ve Dialectics
,
moreover, Adorno argues
that the subject's conceptual activity is inescapably
linguistic. He suggests, however, that in the course of the
development of enlightenment thought language has become
increasingly nominalistic, and that reflection upon the
mimetic force of art can extricate the subject from
conceptual systems fixed in their distance from nature.
Adorno's discussion of the somatic, and social elements of
the self differs significantly from the Cartesian and
idealist construction of an autarchic subject.
Yet Adorno's account of the relation between subject
and object does abstract from the Habermasian question
whether extant communicative processes provide a glimpse of
a rational, noncoercive society. His discussion of an
unregimented subjective knowledge and experience of nature
only vaguely thematizes the kind of intersubjective (for
Habermas, communicative) context in which such knowledge and
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experience might flourish. Dial ectic of Enlightenment
advances the view that the repressive, instrumental subject
formed in the course of the human struggle for self-
preservation and involved in the attempt at mastering nature
is a condition of possibility for domination in society.
For Adorno, a nonr ig id i f y ing , unregimented subjectivity is a
necessary condition for a community of free individuals.
Further, Adorno extracts from the philosophies of Kant and
Hegel the notions of spontaneity and determinate negation,
which notions figure in his allusion to a noninstrumental
subject. Aesthetic knowledge and experience, according to
Adorno, are subjectively mediated, though in his view the
truth immanent in autonomous works of art is not produced as
if in Fichtean fashion by subjective consciousness. Hence
Habermas is right in pointing out that Adorno's thought does
not leave the terrain of the philosophy of consciousness. I
do think it important to stress, though, that in
characterizing the philosophy of consciousness as positing
both a monological subject of cognition that supposedly
legislates truth and meaning and a monadic subject of action
Habermas does not leave enough space to accommodate the
differences between Adorno's philosophy, on the one hand,
and subject-centered epistemologies and theories of history,
on the other hand.
But Habermas's assertion that Adorno's thought does not
exit the space of the philosophy of consciousness is meant
not only to describe Adorno's philosophy but to criticize
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it. At issue, I think, is the relation between subjectivity
and communicative processes. Habermas argues that the
modern subject is the result of processes of socialization
and acculturation, that is, of communicative action, and
that communicative action must be viewed as having both
logical and anthropological primacy. The subject, according
to him-, is an effect of the lifeworld. Habermas thinks that
modernity harbors a potential for communicative rationality,
which communicative rationality he characterizes as a
deliberative procedure involving autonomous subjects.
Adorno, for his part, eschews the question of primacy. He
takes the search for first principles to be expressive of an
imperious subjectivity bent on foisting artificial logical
hierarchies on reality. Further, in contradistinction to
Habermas, he does not interpret modern communicative
structures as telegraphing the ideal speech situation. The
few remarks he makes about communicative interaction in
contemporary society indicate that he views it as an
expression of the prevalence of instrumental ization,
exchange-value and the culture industry. He does not
interpret modern communicative structures as sources of a
possible noninstrumental subject. Habermas contends that
Adorno's idea that the aesthetic subjectivity engaged in the
construction of autonomous art works provides a glimpse of
an unregimented subject is esoteric, and he suggests that
the idea abstracts from the communicative conditions of
possibility of true knowledge.
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The plausibility of Habermas's critique rests in part
on whether he successfully links the lifeworld with
communicative rationality. In the second chapter and
earlier in the present chapter I argue that he fails
convincingly to forge such a link. I think Habermas's
critique of Adorno further weakened by its unstable approach
to the concept of subjectivity. If the subject is indeed an
effect of communicative action, the sense in which she or he
can be said to be capable of auto nomous agency within the
framework of ideal speech is obscure. Habermas's strict
adherence to a procedural is t characterization of distortion-
free communication rules out speculation within the
framework of his theory about whether subjective autonomy
might somehow be produced in the course of discursive
interaction. As I point out at the beginning of this
chapter, I do not see how Habermas can reconcile his
attribution of logical primacy to communicative action with
his notion that subjective autonomy is a necessary condition
of distortion-free communication. If, as I suspect,
Habermas smuggles the concept of subjective autonomy, which
is rooted in the philosophy of consciousness, into the
terrain of the theory of communicative action, his claim to
having unmistakably overcome the "exhausted" paradigm of
subject-centered reason does not hold. Hence Habermas's
theory ends up failing to support his view that it is
objectionable for Adorno not to have exited the space of the
philosophy of consciousness.
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To conclude: in falsely straight jacketing Dial ectic of
En 1 igh tenment as if it reduced the process of enlightenment
to instrumental reason, Habermas isolates it from Negative
Dialectics and Aesthetic Theory . Dialectic of
Enl igh tenment'
s
theory of the formation of sub jec t i v i ty^Ol
contains the kernel of the critique of anthropocentrism, of
subject-centered humanism, unfolded in Negative Dialectics
and Aesthetic Theory . Dialectic of En 1 igh tenment
,
that is
to say, already advances the notion that subjective
reflection upon the objective elements of the subject and
upon the subject's (so far repressed) affinity with nature
points to a knowledge and experience of the material world,
which knowledge and experience would no longer be governed
by a forcibly unified, logocentric, instrumental self.
Habermas departmentalizes Adorno's philosophy: for him.
Dialectic of Enlightenment incurs a performative
contradiction, dedifferentiates human history more
ph i 1 osoph i CO as if it were under the signature of a
totalitarian instrumental reason and loses sight of the
potential for rationality immanent in bourgeois culture and
institutions; Negative Dialectics' conceptual reflection
upon the lack of fit between concept and object incurs a
self-referential paradox; and Aesthetic Theory's attribution
of truth to autonomous works of art is esoteric, while the
concept of mimesis amounts to gesticulation. It is not
possible to glean from Habermas's atomizing reading of
Dialectic of Enl ightenment , Negative Dialectics and
172
Aesthetic Theory that Dialectic of Enl ightenment's theory of
the formation of an instrumental-rational subject launches
the concept of an unregimented subjective experience of
nature. It seems that for Habermas the only thing uniting
the three texts mentioned above is their incapability of
being grounded and of recognizing that true knowledge is
consensual knowledge.
In contradistinction to Habermas's interpretation of
Adorno's thought, my dissertation locates one bridge linking
Dialectic of Enl ightenment with Negative Dialectics and
Aesthetic Theory . For Dialectic of En 1 ightenment
,
although
the process of the formation of subjectivity is
tenden t ious 1 y a process of progressive instrumental ization,
the subject has not wholly lost the conceptual resources for
ref lectively overcoming logocentric r igidif ication, for
recovering its mimetic capacities. Negati ve Dialectics
interprets such subjective reflection as the conceptual
disclosure of the materiality of the subject, which
materiality— according to Ador no--cannot be fully captured
by concepts. Aesthetic Theory thematizes a dynamic tension
between conceptualization and mimesis, and reads the
subjective construction of autonomous art works as an
allegory of an unregimented subjective knowledge and
experience of nature. If the critique of Habermas advanced
in the present chapter is correct, neither his concept of
reflexive grounding nor his opposition to sub ject— centered
thought succeed in supporting what I see as his core
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criticism of Adorno's thought, namely that Adorno's notions
of mimesis and of the preponderance of the object are
objectionable because of their ungroundabi 1 i ty and their
indebtedness to the so-called philosophy of consciousness.
174
ENDNOTES
iMax Horkheimer, "Tradi tione 1 le und kritische Theorie,"
Gesammelte Schr if ten
,
vol, 4, ed. Alfred Schmidt (Frankfurt
am Main: S. Fischer, 1988) pp. 162-216.
2Juergen Habermas, Die Neue Unuebersichtl ichkei t (Frankfurt
am Main: Suhrkamp: 1985) pp. 167-208.
3Juergen Habermas, "Die Versch 1 ingung von Mythos und
Aufklaerung: Horkheimer und Adorno," Der Ph i losoph i sche
Diskur s der Moderne (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1986) 130-
157 and "Bemerkungen zur Entwicklungsgeschichte des
Hor khe ime r schen Werkes," Max Horkheimer Heute: Werk und
Wi r kung ed. Alfred Schmidt and Norbert A1 twic ke"r (Trank f ur t
am Main: Fischer, 1986) pp. 163-179.
^Juergen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, vol.
1, trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon, 1984") ppT 339--
399.
^Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, Dialektik der
Aufklaerung (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer”, 1971) pp. 20-2 2.
^See Herbert Schnaede 1 bach
,
"Transformation der Kritischen
Theorie," Kommunikati ves Hande
I
n
,
ed. Axel Honneth and Hans
Joas (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1986) pp. 33-34.
^Juergen Habermas, "What is Universal Pragmatics,"
Communication and the Evolution of Society
,
trans. Thomas
McCarthy (Boston: Beacon, 1979) pp. 1-68 and " Vor bere i tende
Bemerkungen zu einer Theorie der Kommuni kat i ven Kompetenz,"
in Juergen Habermas and Niklas Luhman, Theor ie der
Gese 1 1 schaf t Oder Sozial techno log ie (Frankfurt am Main:
Suhrkamp, 1971) pp. 101-41.
^Ruediger Bubner, Modern German Ph i losophy
,
trans. Eric
Matthews (Cambridge: 1981) 173-82 and "Adornos Negative
Dialektik," Adorno Konferenz: 1983 , ed. Ludwig von
Friedeburg and Juergen Habermas (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1983)
pp. 35-39.
^Michael Theunissen, "Negati v i taet bei Adorno," Adorno
Konferenz
, pp. 41-65.
^*^Herbert Schnaede 1 bach , "Dialektik als Vernunf tkr i tik. Zur
Rekonstruk tion des Rationalen bei Adorno," Adorno Konferenz ,
pp. 67-93.
^^Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialektik der Auf k laer ung , p. 30.
l^Dialektik der Aufklaerung , p. 39.
^^Dialektik der Aufklaerung, p. 10.
175
l^Dialektik der Aufklaerung
,
p. 25.
^^Dialektik der Aufklaerung p. 17.
l^Dialek tik der Aufklaerung p. 11.
^^Dialekt ik der Aufklaerung p. 11.
^^Dialektik der Aufklaerung p.29.
^^Dialektik der Auf k laerung p.lO.
^^Dialekt ik der Aufklaerung
,
p.l6.
^^Dialek t i
k
der Auf k laerung p. 16.
^^Dialektik der Aufklaerung p. 23.
^^Dialekt ik der Aufklaerung pp. 23-
24oialektik der Aufklaerung
,
p. 9.
^^Dialek t i der Aufklaerung p. 24.
^^Dialektik der Aufklaerung pp. 39-
^"^Dialektik der Aufklaerung p. 40.
28Dialektik der Aufklaerung
,
p. 148.
^^Dialektik der Aufklaerung p. 19.
30Gunzelin Schnid Noerr, "Die Stellung der 'Dialektik der
Aufklaerung' in der Entwicklung der Kritischen Theorie," in
Max Horkheimer, Gesamme 1 te Schr i f ten
,
vol. 5, ed. Gunzelin
Schmid Noerr (Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer, 1986) p. 433.
31juergen Habermas, Die Neue Unueber s ich
t
1 ichke i t , pp. 173-
178.
^^See the title essay in Juergen Habermas, Zur
Rekonstruk t ion des Historischen Mater ia l ismus (Frankfurt am
Main : Suhtkamp, 1976) pp. 144-199.
33Habermas, "Moralentwicklung und Ich-Identitaet ," Zur
Rekonstruk t ion des Historischen Mater ial ismus, pp. 63-91.
34Habermas, "Der Uni versal i taetsanspruch der Hermenutik,"
K.O. Apel et al., Hermeneutik und Ideolog iekr i tik (Frankfurt
am Main: Suhrkamp, 1971) pp. 120-159.
176
^^Habermas, "The Tasks of a Critical Theory of Society,"
trans. Thomas McCarthy, Critical Theory and Society, ed.
Stephen Eric Bronner and Douglas MacKay Ke 1 Iner (l^w York:
Routledge, 1989) pp. 292-312.
3 6 Habermas, "Ein Anderer Ausweg aus der Sub j ke tph i losoph ie
:
Kommunikat i ve vs. sub jek tzentr ier te Vernunft," Der
Phi losophische Diskur s der Moder ne
, pp. 344-379~i
3”^Habermas espouses theoretical coherence in
"Wahr he i ts theor ien , " Wirklichkeit und Reflexion. Festschrift
fuer ^ Schul z (Pfuel 1 ingen: 1973)~^p. ril-265.
3 R Habermas, Die Ver sch 1 ingung von Mythos und Aufklaerung, p.
131.
3 9 Habermas, "Arbeit und Interakt ion ," Technik und
Wissenschaft als >Ideologie<, (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp,
1968) pp. 9-47.
‘^'^Habermas
,
"Taking aim at the Heart of the Present,"
Foucau 1 t
:
A Cr i tica l Reader
,
ed. David Couzens Hoy (Oxford:
Basil Blackwell, 1986) pp. 103-108 and The Theory of
Communicative Action
,
vol. 1, pp. 143-156.
'^^Habermas, Die Verschl ingung von Mythos Und Aufklaerung, p.
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^^Adorno,
^^Adorno,
^
^Adorno
,
^^Ador no
Negative Dialektik, pp. 166-168
Negative Dialektik
,
pp. 45-48.
Negative Dialektik
,
pp. 48-50.
Negative Dialektik, pp. 39-42.
6 7Adorno, "Die Revidierte Psychoanalyse," in Max Horkheimer
and Theodor Adorno Sociologica (Frankfurt am Main:
Europaeische Ver lagsanstal t , 1984) pp. 94-112.
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